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Post by SKORIC on Sept 30, 2008 11:06:55 GMT -5
au.youtube.com/watch?v=ehtejh6aUOc&feature=channel_pageThis part of the Documentry "Secrets of War - The Balkan Tinderbox" on the History channel shows that Draza's Cetniks were more successful in fighting the Axis forces then the Partizans before the Allies switched support. And how the Communists distorted British intelligence to make the Partizans look better. It just goes to show that Mihajlovic was fighting the Nazi's contrary to Tito's propaganda after the war. The myth that Cetniks were just hanging around in the woods singing songs and drinking while the Germans and Ustase were killing innocent people is all a lie. And that Mihajlovic only fought the nazi's in 1941 and then joined them is an even bigger lie. Sure some groups that also called themselves Cetniks were allied with the Nazi's (Nedic's and Pecanac's Cetniks) but they were enemies of Mihajlovic. The fact is Tito won the war and as they say history is written by the victors, he downplayed Mihajlovic's role and made him out to be some collaborator. Oh but thats right.. Mihajlovic handed over american pilots to the nazi's or killed them
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Post by SKORIC on Oct 1, 2008 12:47:47 GMT -5
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Post by SKORIC on Oct 18, 2008 11:12:40 GMT -5
DOCTORED PHOTOPropaganda book portraying Cetniks as collaborators. Here on the front page on the right and left sides, German officers are supposedly standing besides Cetniks, in addition to Germans crouching in the front row. ORIGINAL PHOTONo German officers. That photo was taken with rescued American pilots. Hidden photos of Communists colluding with Germans.1941 March 1943 Germans launch reprisals, killing Serbian civilians due to Draza's attacks on the occupiers. Dated 1943.German propaganda paper declares Draza Mihajlovic an enemy of the Serbian people, announcing that all Chetnik prisoners and sympathizers of Draza are to be executed. Dated 1943.Retaliation for resistance. In 1943, the Nazis issued a standing offer for the capture of General Draza Mihailovich, dead or alive. The reward was 100,000 gold Reichsmarks.The Germans did not succeed.
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Post by SKORIC on Oct 18, 2008 11:27:15 GMT -5
Newspaper articles from the WW2 era.
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Post by SKORIC on Oct 18, 2008 11:35:21 GMT -5
Partizan collaborationA German memorandum states that the German-Partisan conversation took place in Gornji Vakuf (west of Sarajevo) on March 11, 1943, from 9:30 to 11 A.M. . . . During the March discussions, the Partisan delegation stressed that the Partisans saw no reason for fighting the German Army - they added that they fought against German troops only in self-defense - but wished solely to fight the Chetniks; that they were oriented toward the propaganda of the Soviet Union only because they rejected any connection with the British; that they would fight the British should the latter land in Yugoslavia; that they did not intend to capitulate, but inasmuch as they wanted to concentrate on fighting the Chetniks, they wished to suggest respective territories of interest. ^A Communist Partisan officer, right, with German officers of the 7th SS Mountain Division “Prinz Eugen”.The content of this German memorandum of conversation is confirmed by a document which the Partisan delegation left behind and which bears the signatures of the three Partisan emissaries. In it Djilas, Velebit and Popovic proposed not only further prisoner exchanges and German recognition of the right of the Partisans as combatants but, what was more important, the cessation of hostilities between German forces and the Partisans. The three delegates confirmed in writing that the Partisans ‘regard the Chetniks as their main enemy.’. . . . A few days later, on March 17, the German Minister in Zagreb, Kasche, sent a telegram to Berlin in which, clearly referring to the German-Partisan talks, he reported the possibility ‘that Tito and supporters will cease to fight against Germany, Italy and Croatia and retire to the Sandzak in order to settle matters with Mihailovic’s Chetniks.’Meanwhile in the wake of the discussions between the three high Partisan representatives and Lieutenant General Dippold, further talks were arranged at Zagreb. . . . Velebit and Djilas passed again through the German lines and were brought by a German military plane from Sarajevo to Zagreb on March 25, 1943. There they had talks with Glaise von Horstenau and his staff. Milovan Djilas and Vladimir Velebit met with German General Edmund Glaise von Horstenau, above, in Zagreb.Not having received a reply from Ribbentrop to his message of March 17, Kasche sent another telegram to his Foreign Minister on March 26, 1943, in which he reported that two duly authorized representatives of Tito had arrived in Zagreb for the purpose of discussions with German, Italian and Croatian military representatives. One of them, Kasche said, was Dr. Petrovic, a Croat, and the other a Montenegrin by the name of Markovic These people, he added, again offered to stop fighting if they could be left in peace in the Sandzak. . . . On March 29, Ribbentrop sent Kasche a telegram in which he prohibited all contact with the Partisans and asked on what Kasche based his optimism. . . . The discussions between the Partisan representatives and the Germans in Zagreb regarding a possible cessation of hostilities got nowhere, not only because the Partisan proposals were unacceptable to the Germans but, above all, because Berlin utterly opposed any accommodation with the Partisans. When apprised of the Zagreb contacts, Hitler reportedly said: ‘One does not negotiate with rebels - rebels must be shot.’”. . . . The fact remains, however, that the Partisans, who labeled Mihailovic and the Chetniks traitors for their accommodation with the enemy, sent two high-ranking officers to the German general in Zagreb with the purpose of arranging a cease-fire, after having declared in writing that their main enemies were the Chetniks and not the occupying Axis forces.No wonder that there is great sensitivity in Yugoslav Communist circles about that chapter in history. None of the official Yugoslav documents mentions the Velebit-Djilas trip to Zagreb, while every possible Chetnik Axis meeting is duly recorded.” Robert’s primary sources for these meetings and discussions between the Partisans and German forces concerning collaboration were based on the Nuremberg Armed Forces High Command document series which was assembled by prosecutors at the Nuremberg war crimes trials by the U.S. The document that disclosed the meeting was NOKW 1088, Record Group 238. The Communist dictatorship that Tito established after the war covered-up and suppressed this evidence of Communist Partisan collaboration with Nazi forces.Communist mole and spy James Klugman falsified reports and data in support of the Communist Partisan forces of Tito, backed and supported by Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union.Tito’s objective was thus to negotiate an end to hostilities and to combat between Communist Partisans and German occupation forces. The goal was to allow Tito to concentrate on destroying the Chetnik forces under Draza Mihailovich before a possible Allied landing that would allow a link up of Allied forces and Chetnik forces that would ensure Mihailovich’s victory in the civil war conflict in Yugoslavia. Mihailovich had not yet been completely abandoned and betrayed by the British and the U.S. Because the british and the U.S supported Mihailovich over the Communist Partisans, Tito and the Partisan leaders were willing to collaborate with the Nazis occupation forces and to engage in combat against British and U.S forces if doing so would allow them to prevent the Chetnik guerrilla movement from being recognized by the Allies. Finally, the Communist Partisans “collaborated” with the Nazis from the time of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact from August 23, 1939. When Hitler attacked Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, the Communist partizans did not resist the invasion. It was only when the Soviet Union was attacked on June 22, 1941, that the Partisans change this collaborationist policy. The decision to begin an armed struggle against the Nazi occupation forces was not made until a July 4, 1941 meeting held in Belgrade on 4 July 1941. The Communists celebrate the Day of Uprising on July 7, when a Communist murdered two Serbian officials. The Partizan resistance began with the murder of two Serbs, not with any resistance against Nazi troops. According to Djilas, in 1945 Communist partisan leaders decided that was it decided that July 7 should be the anniversary for the beginning of resistance, when shots were fired “at gendarmes and not at the Germans.” From April 6, 1941 to July 7, 1941, the Partizans collaborated with the Nazi occupation forces. Only when the Soviet Union was attacked were they reluctantly forced to began a resistance. Draza Mihailovich and the Chetnik forces, by contrast, had launched a resistance movement from the start of the German invasion of Yugoslavia.The documented proof that Tito’s Communist Partisans collaborated with the Nazis challenges the assumptions that the Partisans represented the popular will of the population of Yugoslavia and that they were an effective and viable resistance movement. The evidence of Partisan collaboration shows that the Communist Partisans were obsessed with achieving power and establishing a Soviet-style and Stalinist-style Communist dictatorship in Yugoslavia at all costs and by whatever means necessary, even collaboration with German occupation forces. This evidence provides historical background and context on the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. Military force, in the form of Soviet tanks and troops of the Red Army, put Tito into power in Belgrade. The bullet, not the ballot, established the Communist dictatorship in Yugoslavia under Tito. Moreover, the rejection and betrayal of Allied ally Draza Mihailovich and the support of the Communist faction by the U.S. and Britain gave the Partisans the decisive advantage in the civil war conflict. This evidence supports the argument that foreign intervention in the Yugoslav conflict from 1941-1945, by the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Britain, resulted in a Communist Partisan takeover of the Yugoslav government and the creation of a Communist dictatorship. Without this foreign intervention, the Communist Partisans were forced to collaborate with the Nazis because they faced defeat and loss in the conflict with Draza Mihailovich’s forces.
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Post by SKORIC on Oct 22, 2008 10:50:10 GMT -5
Open letter—April 9, 1999 To Our Troops In The Former Yugoslavia
"We Found Out The Truth About the Serbs...When We Were Shot Down" World War II Rescued American Airmen Defend Serbs By Richard L. FelmanOver 500 MlAs Saved By The Serbian People During WWIIDuring World War II, we were in the Army Air Corps list as "Missing in Action" in the very same area you are now serving. If we may, we would like to relay to you a frank, soldier-to-soldier message about our personal experience while there—something which politicians who sent you there have not told you and something which you have not read or seen in the anti-Serb media. In 1944, the members of our committee were flying bombing missions out of Italy over Southern Europe. During that time over 500 of us were shot down over enemy-occupied Yugoslavia and saved from certain death by the Serbian people. Ours was the greatest rescue of American lives from behind enemy lines in history but has been kept under wraps all these years because of pressure from foreign sources. While we were there, those of us who were wounded were given whatever medical supplies they had even at the deprivation of their own troops. If there was one piece of bread in the house, or one egg, it went to the American airmen while the Serb went hungry.If there was one bed or one blanket, it went to us while the Serb slept on the bare ground. No risk of sacrifice was too great to insure our safety and well being. One experience which is forever seared in my memory is the time a village with 200 women and children was burned to the ground by the Germans because the Serbs would not tell them where they were hiding us. To this day, I can smell the terrible stench of their burning flesh. One does not forget such things.The most incredible part of our rescue was that before each mission, our bomber crews were briefed by the highest levels of American intelligence that if shot down over Yugoslavia, we were to stay away from the Serbian people as they were collaborating with the Germans and "cutting off the ears of American airmen" before turning them over. Only after we were shot down did we find out the amazing thoroughness with which the truth about the Serbs was being distorted. Further compounding this deception is the fact that while the Serbs were our allies in WWII, Croatians and Muslims (who we are favoring today) were allies of the Nazis, shooting at us and responsible for killing many of our fellow American fliers. In view of the lies we were told about the Serbs during World War II, we could not help but wonder if our foreign policy there today is the same anti-Serb bias we encountered 52 years ago. Could our career diplomats sacrifice former friends and reward former enemies in the name of political expediency? Could it be because in the world community there are over one billion Muslims and only 9 million Serbian Orthodox Christians with the same proportionate power in the global economy? Could it be because the Serbs have no oil wells and no unlimited oil money? Could it be because the Croatians and Muslims outspend the Serbs 50 to one on lobbyists, media firms and campaign contributions? Could this be why, "atrocities" are manufactured to make the Serbs look bad while gaining sympathy for their opponents? Could this be why the Serbs are branded "aggressors" in land they have lived on for over 600 years? Could our policy have something to do with the fact there are 540 members of Congress, none of whom are Orthodox Christians? Could the State Department’s bitter bias, against General Draza Mihailovich, the anti-Communist guerrilla leader who saved us, be based on the fact he was a Serb? Could these be the reasons the State Department has covered up the truth of our rescue all these years and opposed our petition to express gratitude for saving over 500 American lives (a petition which is supported by the 8 million veterans of the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the Air Force Association and which has been approved by the United States Senate.)? Could it be these are the reasons the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee has also denied our petition by saying to us here are "ethnic groups in Yugoslavia" who oppose it? Are we mad? You can bet your next month’s paycheck that we are mad! We did not leave our families, risk our lives and watch our buddies get their arms, legs and heads blown off so that "ethnic groups in Yugoslavia" could tell us what we could or could not do in our own country. Now that the spring thaw has set in, temperatures and tempers will start to rise in the volatile area you now find yourselves. All we ask is that in your dealings with the local people you be made aware of the eyewitness experience of your fellow comrades-in-arms. By speaking out now we have nothing to gain except a burning moral passion to tell the truth, a sworn duty to protect our national honor, a patriotic desire to express heart felt gratitude to those on foreign soil who save American lives while they are fighting in defense of our glorious country. Now that you have been sent to foreign soil and asked to risk your lives we feel you should know the truth and not be "suckered in" by the rhetoric of highly paid public relations firms, foreign lobbyists and self-serving politicians who know absolutely nothing of the region’s history. We might also add that had it not been for the Serbian people, Air Force General Donald J. Smith, our chairman and one our rescued airmen, would not have survived the war and been able to dedicate 40 years of honorable service to his country.Had it not been for the Serbian people, technical Sgt. Curtis "Bud" Diles, another of our airmen, would not be alive today in Dayton, Ohio, enjoying retirement with his four children and 12 grandchildren.There are hundreds of us with stories just like those. Some of the greatest testimony to the many sacrifices made on our behalf us the many thousands of American children who are alive today solely because the Serbian people saved over 500 of their grandfathers during World War II. Some of them could very well be serving with you today in Bosnia. I was one of three rescued American airmen who returned last year to the former Yugoslavia to commemorate the 50th anniversary of victory in Europe with the people who saved us and to visit the cow pasture that served as a landing strip from which we were rescued. The most moving experience of our sentimental trip was being cheered by over 50,000 Serbs who gathered at a mountain top to welcome us and who kept chanting "USA, USA". As American military men, we have a proud tradition of "duty, honor and country" to uphold and a fierce sense of loyalty to those with whom we fought side by side in combat. We never forget their kindness nor do we return their battlefield sacrifices for us by bombing their women and children. The Serbian people helped us when we were desperate and in trouble. Now that the situation is reversed we can do no less. Please keep these untarnished truths in mind as you now serve our country and all it stands for, and may God bless you all as we pray for your safe return.
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Post by SKORIC on Oct 27, 2008 9:52:16 GMT -5
GERMANS SHATTER MYTH ABOUT MIHAILOVICH COLLABORATION
“Gerhard Emscotter was a German war correspondent (and intelligence agent) in Yugoslavia throughout the occupation. While communist torturers were preparing Mihailovich for trial in the spring of 1946, Emscotter gave the following statement to the American press:
‘I attended numerous confidential (German) meetings in connection with General Mihailovich throughout the war and the occupation while I was stationed in the Balkans. Based on what I learned about Mihailovich at those meetings and the information I obtained about him from our other sources, the accusation that Mihailovich collaborated with us is without any support or foundation. Our leaders regarded the Serbs and Mihailovich as sworn enemies. All our attempts to make contact with Mihailovich remained fruitless. There were several such efforts and they all remained fruitless. Therefore, there was never any communication between us, nor were we able to accomplish anything in this direction. We were hoping that, once he had been betrayed by all his allies, Mihailovich would finally realize that cooperation with us was his only remaining alternative. But he did not desire to cooperate with us, nor did he ever receive our emissaries, something that American and British officers attached to his staff could confirm.’
The head of the German intelligence service in Eastern Europe was General Gehlen, who acted in the capacity of a super-ambassador for all German intelligence agencies. In the days when Churchill was becoming suspicious of Mihailovich’s loyalty, based on Bailey’s intrigues and Deakin’s fantasies, Hitler’s general declared Mihailovich ‘Germany’s most dangerous enemy on the entire Southeastern sector.’ His reports (as well as others), all uniformly hostile to Mihailovich, were not unfamiliar to Himmler. As Churchill was abandoning Mihailovich , Himmler was dictating to his assistant, Miller, a new order ‘against the Mihailovich bands’ instructing that they be annihilated. Himmler’s order contained the following observation: ‘We cannot hope for success in Serbia or anywhere on the territory of pre-war Yugoslavia unless we destroy Mihailovich and his movement.’
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The Nazi police colonel and chief of the Gestapo for Serbia, Dr. Fuchs, when asked by the communist prosecutor about the relationship between General Mihailovich and the German police forces which he headed, responded unambiguously:
‘The Gestapo, which I headed throughout the war, maintained no contacts with General Mihailovich. Moreover, we always considered Mihailovich the number one enemy of the German people. That is why members of Mihailovich’s movement were persecuted without mercy by the Gestapo. The Germans were unanimous in the opinion that the nationalist movement in Serbia under Mihailovich’s command presented the greatest danger for the security of German troops in the Balkans. Finally, that is the movement which gave the most trouble to the Germans and which...’
Dr. Fuchs was not allowed to complete his sentence. The president of the court silenced him and adjourned the proceedings so that the world would never learn the truth about Mihailovich and the Germans from the mouth of a most competent witness, the man responsible for implementing Hitler’s laws in Serbia and over whose signature thousands of hostages were shot. The following day Dr. Fuchs trial was continued on camera.
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The head of the German economic apparatus in Serbia was engineer Franz Neuhausen. At his trial in Belgrade, after the war, prosecutor Minic boasted that ‘The German Reich was unable to export food from Serbia because of the operations of our Partisan forces.’ Neuhausen serenely exploded this communist fable:
‘We did not even feel the presence of the Partisans, or communists, in Serbia. If our warehouses were constantly under attack, pillaged, or destroyed, that was the responsibility of Mihailovich’s men, not of the Partisans. They [Mihailovich’s men] were the ones who curtailed our access to the villages and food stockpiles and thus frustrated German export from Serbia.’
Neuhausen’s testimony ends here because, he too, was silenced by the communist court.
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Post by SKORIC on Nov 5, 2008 6:18:12 GMT -5
On May 13, 1946, the Committee for a Fair Trial for General Mihailovich announced that a Commission of Inquiry had been established in New York for the purpose of taking testimonies of American officers and airmen whose request to be heard as witnesses at the trial of General Draza Mihailovich in Belgrade, Yugoslavia had been refused by the Tito government.Here are some quotes from the testimonies of: Nick Lalich Q. You had your own radio station?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Shortly before September 10th was your radio station attacked by anybody?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. By whom?
A. My radio station was attacked by the Partisans, a trio.
Q. You mean three Partisans?
A. Yes, three Partisans who ventured into General Mihailovich’s area. They had gotten information that a radio station was in that general vicinity, and Americans operating it evidently and they attacked it.
Q. Did they wreck it?
A. No, they did not wreck my radio or damage it, but I did see bullet marks and scars on the fence that went around my place.
Q. How do you know they were Partisans?
A. Because later that evening that same trio hit the town of Pranjani and attacked the town commandant. That was while I was sleeping in the town, by the way.
Q. Do you mean the commandant was a Chetnik?
A. Yes, I got up quickly and rushed into the street, wanting to find out what was going on, but they had left. This home was damaged, doors were knocked out, windows smashed, and the town commandant had escaped. His name was Markovich. There is no doubt in my mind that it was Partisans. The people also told me that it was Partisans. They were very much frightened.
Q. And none were captured?
A. That is right, none were captured, although they captured my guard, one of my guards.
Q. You mean the Partisans captured one of our guards?
A. Yes.
Q. Were there any Germans in that vicinity?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you send in an official report of the incident?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you based that on what you heard?
A. Yes, sir. I explained it. By the way, my guard was returned, and he told me that they were Partisans, that they were wearing the red star on their caps.
Q. Do you know why your guard was returned?
A. He told me that they were going to kill him, but he was returned. They wanted information from him, and he gave them some, but there was not anything relating to Americans. He was returned two days later.
Q. Returned or escaped?
A. He told me he escaped. He fled from the home where they had him tied up.--------BY MR. CHANDLER: Q. You left Pranjani about when?
CAPTAIN NICK A. LALICH: A: The night of September 10th, exactly at eight o’clock.
Q. Under what circumstances did you leave?
A. Well, at that time, I would say three or four days earlier, there was much shooting in the general vicinity, we could hear machine guns and mortars, and things were getting pretty hot. The Partisan army had penetrated in force across the Drina River and on into Maljen Mountains. And at the same time the Russians had reached the Danube River. So we started to move north, and our ultimate destination, according to General Mihailovich, was to penetrate north and over into eastern Bosnia, to the high mountain area, for a winter retreat.
Q. Am I right in saying that you left the Pranjani area because the Partisans attacked it?
A. Yes.
Q. And where did you go from there?
A. I moved north across the Valjevo-Belgrade railway. We crossed that railway at night three days later.
Q. Did you move because the Partisans were attacking the headquarters or because there was fear of an attack?
A. They were attacking the headquarters, I know that definitely.-------------- Q. Did you have any discussions at that time with General Mihailovich about the state of the war or his strategic plans?
A. Yes, sir, many discussions. We talked about the war and America, and the future of Yugoslavia, and in fact we even talked about Paris, France, New York, different places of interest.
Q. What did General Mihailovich have to say about his plans for the war?
A. Well, he realized that he had two enemies; he had the Germans and the Partisans to fight. In fact he told me he had no more aid but God, but he would get along somehow.
Q. He said he would go on fighting the Germans?
A. Yes, sir, he did. In fact I asked him, “Why don’t you come out with me when I am ready to go home?” He said, “No, I have fought for four years and I will stay with my people and fight to the end.”-------------------- BY MR. HAYS: Did he [General Mihailovich] say why the Partisans were his enemies?
CAPTAIN LALICH: Yes, sir.
Q. What did he say about that?
A. He said that they had different ideals, that their ideals were communistic and his were democratic, he had democratic processes, and he believed in the things we believed in; and in fact he compared America with his way of life.
Q. Did he talk of any attempts to collaborate with the Partisans, unitedly, so that they would both fight the Germans.
A. He said they tried to get together, and in fact all parties were invited to fight the enemy, that is the Germans, and they had these meetings and the plans were laid to attack different areas and towns; one in particular was Valjevo. And in attacking Valjevo they were supposed to hit together, but the Chetniks hit, and the Partisans hit them from the rear. This was all according to General Mihailovich. That was one reason.
And they had another outbreak of a similar nature in the Visegrad area. In fact at one time they rode the same tanks into the village of Cacak with red stars and the double eagle painted on these tanks. So it seemed they could not get together, and the break came and they separated.
Q. Did you get any idea of how much of his time was spent fighting the Germans and how much of his time was spent fighting the Partisans?
A. Yes, sir, they fought the Germans when I was in the Sarajevo area. It seemed to me that they would hit the Germans especially when they knew ammunition and guns were being carried, and vital supplies. I happened to be there when they attacked near Visegrad, a road running between Visegrad and Sarajevo, a German column moving in there, and they attacked and came out with two truckloads of ammunition and guns. This ammunition was brought up into my area.-------------------- Q. Were you there when any action took place against the Partisans?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When was that?
A. In fact, I witnessed a battle. I did not see the fight man-to-man, but I witnessed a battle in the area of Tuzla at the town of Puracic.
Q. You saw that battle through your field glasses?
A. Yes, sir, I witnessed that from the distance of about two or two-and-a-half kilometers. We were up on a mountain top with seven airmen who were with me, my radio operator and one guide and myself. Two Moslems arrived wearing the typical Moslem dress; I questioned them and they said the Chetniks were battling the Partisans down in the valley, and I could see the smoke if the mortars.
We moved along, coming to the area of Boljanic. We also witnessed prisoners from that battle, 37 to be exact.
Q. 37 Partisans?
A. 37 Partisan prisoners. They arrived barefooted, very poorly clothed, and they were wearing the red star.
Q. Did you personally question them?
A. Yes.
Q. What did they tell you?
A. I asked them what was their reason for fighting the Chetniks, and they told me that they were forced to fight. Well, I asked them what they meant. They said, well, they have to come into our homes, and at the point of*gun we went to battle. 32 of these men were Moslems and 5 of them were Serbians. I took pictures of them. I do not have them with me.------------------------ BY MR. CHANDLER: During your period in Yugoslavia I think you told us at the beginning you were on the lookout for any evidence of collaboration, because you had been told to be on the lookout?
A. That is right.
Q. That rumors of collaboration had come back to Cairo?
A. That is right, sir, and back to Bari, too.
Q. You carried out that mission, and your eyes were open for that sort of thing?
A. Yes, sir. I was able to speak the language and I could understand the language; and living in Mihailovich’s house, right in his headquarters, from November 1st to December 11th, when I left General Mihailovich in the Sarajevo district, I had an opportunity to listen and talk, and during all that time I did not see any signs of collaboration or any talking of collaboration, and I was listening for it and trying to detect anything of that nature I could. It interested me very much. I was the last one there after Colonel McDowell left, and I had the opportunity of reading many, many messages coming out of Yugoslavia as the assistant operations officer at Bari, Italy.
Q. Did you file reports that you found no evidence of collaboration?
A. Yes, sir, I filed reports with the State Department and with the OSS.
Q. I think in the last few questions and answers you said that during the period you lived with General Mihailovich, November and December, you saw no signs of collaboration of any kind?
A. That is right, sir.
Q. Is the same thing true as to the rest of the period that you were in Yugoslavia?
A. Yes, positively.--------------------------- Q. You would say that from this period of August to December, 1944, if there had been any collaboration, in view of the freedom which was allowed you, you would have been bound to know about it?
A. Positively.
Q. What was the purpose of this trip, this 500-mile trip that you have been talking about?
A. The Partisans were trying to capture General Mihailovich and trying to get the American mission out of Yugoslavia.
Q. And did all of them make this 500-mile trip, all the Chetniks.
A. So many troops would go forward with us maybe for a month, and then we would pick up other troops in eastern Bosnia; because they had large concentrations of troops in different areas.
Before I went to Yugoslavia, after reading all of the reports and having access to all the information from Yugoslavia, I always believed that eastern Bosnia—in fact when you mentioned the word Bosnia to me, I always felt that that was a Partisan stronghold; but that was not true. When I entered eastern Bosnia there were thousands of troops waiting for General Mihailovich.
Q. So this trip that you are talking about was largely an attempt to get away from Partisan threats?
A. Yes, sir.^ The Halyard Mission Team confers with General Mihailovich, August 1944. Lt. Nick A. Lalich is standing in the center. To his right is General Mihailovich and to his left is Captain George Musulin. ^Captain Nick A. Lalich, left, with General Draza Mihailovich, center, and O.S.S. Radioman Arthur Jibilian, right, preparing to say Good-bye, December 1944, in Bosnia. ^ Captain Nick A. Lalich and General Draza Mihailovich sharing a light moment in September of 1944. RICHARD L. FELMANQ. Tell us in your own words what happened to you when you finally landed in Yugoslavia.
A. Well, we bailed out at 16,000 feet, and I delayed my jump for fear that the fighter planes might attack us. And when I hit the ground there were about 15 or 20 Chetniks waiting for me. They had seen my parachute open and were waiting on the ground to pick me up. In the distance I heard a few shots, and we started to run for cover. They told me that a few Germans had followed our descent down and were trying to get us. So we took cover in the hills. And then I was taken to Colonel Dragisa Vasic’s headquarters.
Q. Who was Colonel Vasic?
A. Colonel Vasic was a well-known writer and lawyer in Belgrade.
Q. Was he a member of Mihailovich’s Army?
Q. Yes, he was. I believe he was the corps commander in the Chetnik area that I dropped in. [Editor’s note: D. Vasic was a reserve officer and political adviser to Mihailovich, not a corps commander.]
Q. Tell us what happened there.
A. Well, he greeted me very warmly; we sat down and had a drink, slivovitz.---------------------- Q. What happened to you that first night in Yugoslavia, do you remember?
A. The first night I was there I was taken to a farmhouse and given a large bed all to myself, and I was assured by the interpreter, who was a Chetnik, that I could sleep soundly and that there was no fear of Germans, that I should not fear the Germans because they posted a 10-man guard outside of my house. And they told me that should the occasion arise where the Germans would be in the vicinity they would awaken me immediately.
Q. That 10-man guard consisted of Chetnik soldiers, did it not?
A. Yes, sir. I awoke the next morning and looked outside my door, and these 10 men were huddled together outside in the pouring rain. And I asked them how come that they had not come inside the hut for shelter, and they told me that they were afraid that they might awaken me if they did come in, and that according to Mihailovich’s orders they were never supposed to leave any Americans unprotected.----------------------- Q. Did you see any evidence of collaboration between the German occupation troops and the Chetniks during the whole period you were in Yugoslavia?
A. During my entire stay in Yugoslavia I never at any time did see any signs of collaboration.----------------- Q. Tell us in your own words what General Mihailovich said and what happened when he was at that place.
A. Well, at first he came up on the field with his staff and he stood in the center of the field and he shook hands with each and every one of the 200 Americans. And if one of the boys happened to speak French he carried on a lengthy conversation with that individual, because he spoke fluent French, but no English. And he signed our short-snorters; and we asked him to pose for photographs, and he posed for photographs with almost every one of the boys there.
After this more or less individual reception that he granted each and every one of us he put on a display of strength more or less of all his troops, and I would say there were about 400 soldiers participating in this review and about a thousand soldiers watching the review.
Q. Did General Mihailovich himself say anything to you to the other American airmen there assembled?
A. After this particular review we all adjourned to the side of the airfield, and we all sat underneath a large shady tree, and Mihailovich sat at the center of the group, and all the American airmen assembled around Mihailovich. And a few feet away from Mihailovich stood the interpreter, and Mihailovich spoke to the interpreter, and he translated to us. First, Mihailovich started off by welcoming us to Yugoslavia. And then he apologized for the poor conditions with which he welcomed us and the inconvenience we had to endure while there. After which he gave us a brief history of Yugoslavia, starting with the invasion of Yugoslavia by Germany, and the way he took his staff and fled to the hills to carry on his fight for freedom, and “never to surrender” in his words. And the way they carried on sabotage activities against the Germans.
Well, he mentioned the fact that the only thing that kept him from waging a large scale attack against he Germans is the fact that his equipment is very poor and that he has not been given any equipment, and if he did have the proper equipment he would be able to carry on much stronger attacks against the Germans.
Then he started to praise the American government, and he said he had always believed in democracy and he always looked highly at the American government.
And in closing he told us that he will try his utmost to get us back to our bases as soon as possible to resume our fight against the enemy.
He said, “After the war you can all go back to your great land, our great country,” and he said, “The Serbian people and myself have considered it a great honor to be of assistance to you.”^ A tearful first meeting between Richard Felman and Misha Stefanovich from Cacak, the son of the Chetnik corporal who saved his life over 50 years ago. After the war, the Communists killed Stefanovich’s father for allegedly turning Felman over to the Germans. Lt. John DevlinQ. How many Partisans were there in the band that picked you up?
A. I would say about 25.
Q. And you had just one Chetnik guide?
A. Yes, we had just one Chetnik guide.
Q. Who was taken into custody and you never saw him again?
A. No, we never saw him again.
Q. What did they do to you or to your party?
A. They immediately took us under escort; we had lost our interpreter; I could speak a little Serbian.
Q. And who was your interpreter?
A. Bobby Musulin.
Q. What became of him?
A. He refused to go on this journey with us, he wanted to stay with the Chetniks.
Q. So he had not been with you?
A. He had not been with us from the time we left Nevesinje.
Q. Go ahead.
A. We attempted to ask where we were going, and they said we were going to headquarters. They took us to headquarters and we met a major general there—we met so many darn generals there, they had quite a few in their army.
Q. How far away was headquarters?
A. This was 3 o’clock, and we arrived there about 9; it was about a 6 hour march. There they had a Yugoslav who could speak English, and he questioned us to a great extent on Chetnik activities. Of course they realized that we had been with the Chetniks. He questioned us to great length about Chetnik activities, and none of us would reveal anything. Then we were housed, we were told to shave—several of us had beards, which was the custom in Serbia—and we were told to immediately shave. And I refused to shave because I wanted to bring my beard back to Italy and get a few pictures taken. I was told in very strong language that I had better shave. So, not to antagonize anybody, I and the other members of the crew shaved. We were housed with the soldiers; in fact during our stay of 2 weeks with the Partisans we were always housed with the military.
Q. Did you ever go out somewhere else?
A. That was impossible.
Q. How do you mean it was impossible?
A. We were not allowed. If we stopped to have food the peasants were told to get out, and they brought food in to us, and then if we moved our quarters anywhere for the night the peasants were told to get out of the house. We were never separated.
Q. You were never allowed to talk to any people freely?
A. No; I was sorry about that, that I never had the opportunity to talk to the people.--------------------------- Q. Did you see any of these Chetniks leave that town to go on any mission?
A. Yes, several times that is where they would start from, they would gather at Pranjani and we would see them prepare to leave, and they would march off singing; they had a favorite song “Spremte se Spremte Chetnici.”
Q. Do you have any information of what the purpose of the mission was?
A. To aid other areas, other corps areas, who were being attacked either by the Germans or the Partisans. I must be honest, I take it sometimes by the Germans and sometimes by the Partisans.
Q. Did any of these men come back to the place so you had an opportunity to hear their story?
A. Yes, they lived in the vicinity, some of them.
Q. Some of them?
A. Yes.
Q. Did any of them tell you whether they were off on activities either against the Partisans or the Germans?
A. Yes, some of them boasted of activities on both sides. They boasted of derailing a train and of robbing a train, and they also boasted of clashes they had had with the Partisans, but they were fighting with both elements.
Q. When you speak of robbing a train you are referring to Germans?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know of any instances where the Partisans attacked the Chetniks?
A. That seemed to be a constant thing. The Chetniks had to remain on the defense because of lack of equipment.^ German supply train derailed by Serbian Chetnik Forces during WWII.
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Post by SKORIC on Nov 7, 2008 1:43:18 GMT -5
Captain George S. Musulin Q. Tell us in your own way juts where you went, who you saw and what you did during this period of your inspection.
A. It happened that on November 26th—it was Thanksgiving Day if I recall—and Mihailovich in respect to this great American holiday was going to put on a display of his strength. This display was to take place in all the areas that were under his control. And large bonfires were to be built on the mountain-top, and he had sent a telegram to Cairo prior to Thanksgiving asking American planes to come over the area and see for themselves the extent of the territory that was under his control. We sent to the little town of Konjusa [pronounced Kohn-yushah], which happened to be Colonel Seitz’s headquarters at that time. We had a very good turkey dinner; I do not know where they got the turkey, but we had two turkeys for the occasion. And we were very enthusiastically received, and we had to speak before the different members of Mihailovich’s staff, the local staff, and we came in contact with the people, who asked hundreds of questions, most of them pertaining to the war and America’s part in it, etc.; I mean generally speaking about the war conditions in Europe at that time.
During this inspection tour we had seen many thousands of Chetnik troops, most of them were ill clad, many of them were barefooted, they had primitive arms, they did not have any ammunition to speak of, they were suffering from diseases due to malnutrition, it was easy to see a lot of skin diseases because of unhygienic conditions that they were living under; and it was a very poor, poor-looking army; but they were strong in morale and weak in material.
Q. Did you have occasion to observe just how the Chetnik Army was organized?
A. Yes, it seems to me that the Chetnik army was composed of two groups; they had any active standing army which was composed of about sixty to seventy thousand members constantly under arms that could be called upon in case of an emergency in any part of Yugoslavia. The other part of Mihailovich’s army was a territorial army composed of peasants who lived on little farms, who worked their little farms, and were a potential strength in Mihailovich’s army. I would say this potential would be anywhere from two hundred to three hundred thousand men. Mihailovich only kept enough men under arms to take care of an immediate emergency, and he allowed these territorials to go back and work their farms until the army would be able to have proper food or what food could be developed in the areas which they occupied; and in case of a total mobilization this territorial army would become a regular active army. There were no arms to speak of amongst this territorial army, there would be one rifle to ten men, or maybe less than that.----------------------- Q. During the course of this tour of inspection did you see any collaboration between the Germans and the Chetniks?
A. None whatsoever.
Q. And were you looking for such acts of collaboration?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. If there had been any in the area in which you were observing would you have seen it?
A. Yes, I believe I would have. I would like to enlarge upon that. We were instructed to see if there was any new material coming into the corps which we inspected. I mean in the way of arms and ammunition and medical supplies. That was one of the reasons for our tour, to find out if there were any German shipments of ammunition and medical supplies, and we failed to see any.
Q. You were looking for them?
A. Yes, sir, I was looking for them.
Q. And if they had been there you would have seen them?
A. Yes, sir.---------------------------- Q. What was the purpose of the conference?
A. The purpose of the conference at that time was to ask General Mihailovich for help, material help, to destroy an antimony mine that was producing 75 to 100 tons of antimony-blend for the German war effort.
Q. What is antimony, do you know?
A. Antimony is a metal that is used in tempering steel for shells, bombs, etc.
Q. Where was this mine located?
A. This mine was located in Lisa, in the county of Dragacevo, which happened to be in my area of operation.
Q. Can you tell the Commission in a bit more detail what specific plans were discussed between you and General Mihailovich with relation to the destruction of that mine? And tell us first what you mean by destruction of the mine.
A. We were interested in putting the mine out of commission. You could not destroy the mine, it was almost impossible; what we wanted to do was to destroy the compressors, the smelt[er]s and the electrical equipment which helped to operate this mine and produce this antimony. Mihailovich told me that he would give me his fullest cooperation; and he also instructed me to contact a Captain Vuckovic, who would give me the necessary men to do the job. But before we could get into the antimony mine we had to destroy the garrison that was entrenched there.
Q. Was that a German garrison?
A. Yes, sir, a German garrison.
Q. Of how many men, do you know?
A. Our intelligence reports claimed that there were about 200 men in that area.
Q. Do you know what personnel was operating the mine?
A. Native personnel was operating the mine under more or less instructions by the Germans, the German military command.
Q. When Mihailovich told you that he would give you the necessary men and personnel to carry out this operation, what did he mean? Did he tell you that he would give you Chetnik military personnel?
A. He told me that he would give me all the soldiers in his forces that were necessary to knock that mine out of commission.
Q. How many soldiers did you estimate were necessary?
A. I felt with the arms that we had and the arms that we probably could get through Allied sources we would need about 100 well-equipped Chetniks to do the job.
Q. And General Mihailovich assured you of that number of men?
A. He assured me of any number that I would desire.
Q. You proceeded on the assumption that one Chetnik could take care of two Germans entrenched?
A. Well, I felt that if we had mortars and bazookas we could reduce the garrison with 100 men who were excellent guerrilla fighters.
Q. The Germans I suppose did not have any heavy guns or ammunition?
A. I do not think so; they had machine guns and rifles, and they depended more on the stronger garrisons in the vicinity like Belgrade and Cacak [pronounced Chaa-Chaak] that could reinforce that garrison if necessary.---------------------- Q. And the bulk of Mihailovich’s forces were where?
A. His strength seemed to be in Serbia, eastern Bosnia, with elements in Hercegovina, Dalmatia, Slovenia, and Montenegro; but his strength was in Serbia, his main strength, the disposition of his troops.
Q. Did you ever talk with General Mihailovich about the destruction of other targets?
A. Yes, I talked to General Mihailovich about all the targets in the area in which I was operating as liaison officer that could be used for eventual sabotage.
Q. What sort of targets to do you refer to?
A. I refer to targets such as railroads, bridges, roads, garrisons, ammunition dumps, and airfields and other targets of military nature.------------------ Q. What did those security measures consist of?
A. Those security measures consisted of 30 or 40 armed men.
Q. Chetnik soldiers?
A. Yes, Chetnik soldiers. We would pack the supplies up in the mountains that were not very easily accessible, and to transport these airmen to areas of safety in case there was any danger in that area. They lived off the land, and the people gave up their beds, they gave us the food they had, which was not very much, corn bread and cheese and some potatoes and things like that, but it was the best they had.
Q. Did soldiers or officers acting under the direct orders from General Mihailovich keep a constant surveillance over these American and Allied airmen who were awaiting evacuation?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And was it the purpose of that to keep them out of the hands of the Germans?
A. That is right.
Q. To your knowledge did that surveillance ever fail?
A. It never failed, because we had never lost a man to the Germans at that time.
Q. Did General Mihailovich receive any compensation in any form, shape or manner for this work?
A. He did not receive anything in return for this work, and we told him that he could not expect to receive anything for that work.
He felt that he was an Ally, and that his contribution was saving these airmen to go back to their bases and go out and fight the enemy again.
Q. You mean he conveyed that to you, when you say he felt that?
A. He felt that he was doing one of his duties when he sent these airmen back to Italy----------------- Q. Now, Captain, in the spring of 1944 did the Partisans attack the Chetniks within your territory?
A. In the spring of 1944 they made determined efforts to get into Serbia. These attempts came from the area of Guca [pronounced Goo-Cha] and Ivanjica [pronounced Eva-nee-tsa].
Q. Tell us what you observed, if anything, in connection with the Partisan offensive.
A. Well, during this period I got malaria and I was not very active for about a month, but I was getting intelligence reports from Mihailovich’s corps commanders which I was sending to the headquarters about this fight. I did not witness the fighting myself.
Q. As the result of the reports which came to you in your official capacity as American liaison officer in that area what observations did you make?
A. The observation that I made, which I thought was a very significant one, was that during these operations we would plot the activities of the Partisan troops on the map, and we found that they had been avoiding German garrisons in order to get at the Chetniks.-------------------- Q. You stated that when you were over there one of your duties was to find out if there was any collaboration. Did you other than by mere observation make a special effort to inquire into that?
A. Yes, I did. I made special attempts to find out in what form this collaboration was taking place.
Q. And what method did you pursue to find that out, merely talking to Mihailovich and officers, or did you do anything else?
A. I talked to the peasantry that I met and I have talked to officers. And I did know that there was some setup, that was told to me, there was some setup of obtaining ammunition and arms, whatever method they could get.
Q. I would like to know what you did find along that line. To whom did you talk about possible collaboration? Who said anything about it? What was the explanation of it, and things of that sort?
A. Well, I talked directly to General Mihailovich about these accusations directed against him.
Q. And what did he say?
A. He said only a fool could believe those accusations. He said, “After the death of one hundred thousand Serbs during the reprisal measures of 1941, 1942 and 1943 how could I ever do any work among the Germans and still remain a loyal subject of my people?”
Q. What did he say about Tito and his relations with Tito and the fighting with Tito?
A. The fighting against Tito was very bitter, there had been a pool of blood between the two groups. I asked Mihailovich what he thought could be done to avoid this clash between his troops and Partisan troops.
Q. Did he say anything about how the differences between himself and Tito occurred, as to who started the fighting?
A. Well, he accused Tito of attacking him during the early days of 1941 while they had been collaborating together against the activities of the Germans. But Mihailovich proposed to me, seeing that this civil war was just helping the Germans—he proposed to me a plan, and the plan was supposed to have been this, that the British, the Russians and the Americans should send a commission to his headquarters, and that a commission composed of the same elements be sent into Tito’s headquarters, and this commission with his help could set up zones of operation where they would receive material help and aid from the Allies to use it in the common effort against the Germans. In this way he felt that this commission would prevent a clash between the Chetniks and the Partisans.
Q. Now the Chetniks and the Partisans in general in most instances were in different parts of Yugoslavia, were they not?
A. That is right.
Q. And what was the occasion, if you knew, that would bring them into a clash?
A. Well, it seemed that during this period of time that I had spent in Yugoslavia, it seems that the Partisans wanted to take over the territory that was under the control of General Mihailovich and his officers.^ Captain George S. Musulin in Chetnik headgear during his first mission to Mihailovich's forces in 1943 ^ General Draza Mihailovich with Captain George S. Musulin 1944 ^ Gathering at Pranjani Air Strip in Serbia 1944 for the evacuation of American and Allied Airmen by the Mihailovich forces.
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Post by SKORIC on Nov 9, 2008 7:02:44 GMT -5
CAPTAIN WALTER MANSFIELD, of the FIRST AMERICAN MISSION TO MIHAILOVICH DURING WORLD WAR TWOSpeech given in Canada in 1953“There is no nation which would, more than you Serbs, appreciate human freedoms and rights. Not only appreciate, but give everything for them. It happened on Kosovo, the Salonika Front and Ravna Gora. The first thing that I learned from your brothers in your mountains was “Freedom or Death.” The great law and ideal for great men and times.
…I have not many opportunities to meet many great men. One of them is my good and never forgotten Chicha [General Mihailovich]. He will live in my heart as long as I last. I observed him in all conditions, mostly difficult ones. Then one can see better. It made no difference whether the gunpowder was burning the eyes, or death was waiting, or injustice was hurting. He was always great and sincere in victory as well as in defeat. He loved his country, his people and the cause of freedom, sacrificing himself for the glory of living…
Calm, courageous, and resourceful, during all operations from Ivanjica, Drina, Zlatibor, Valjevo and Sabac, he remained always legendary. I remember one night near Rudo, when a battle lasted three hours and the Germans were firing on us from all sides and from the air, Chicha went from one to another, from one part of the battlefield to another, bringing fate and force into our weakened bodies. To him we have to be grateful for breaking out of the encirclement. Yes, I might add, and for our lives. If there was no General I would not be alive today…
He spared innocent blood and avoided hopeless battles at all cost – although it is always easier to sacrifice others for one’s own glory, or build that glory on thousands of innocent and unneeded graves.
‘When the times of*general uprising comes,’ said Chicha, ‘we will give everything for freedom and victory. But, for that day we must be ready so that we can hit harder and win for sure. Before that day arrived they chose Tito. By such an act, they have sinned against God, faithfulness, justice, victory and freedom,’ Chicha declared.
During the very difficult winter of 1943, together, we were pushing to break out of the Valley of Death. Already the perspective was changing. The BBC glorified a man who had been sent to Yugoslavia to convert the liberation struggle into fratricidal war, and on the ruins of a state to build a Communist ‘Celekula’. [The Turkish Pasha of Nish, in 1809, had ordered that the heads of Serbian insurgents who had tried to liberate a town near Nish be shaved [Cele] and used to erect a tower [kula] as testimony to what happened if Turkish control was challenged in Serbia.] There is no cruel, dishonest, or bestial road that this Red monster did not take to to accomplish his task. The naïve Allies, to accommodate Stalin, nurtured a snake in their bosoms.
On his account fables were converted into history. Other people’s successes into his red feather. We were in Rogatica after Ostojic’s troops won the victory at Visegrad. That same night the BBC gave our victory to Tito and announced that victorious Partisans had entered Rogatica. We, the Yugoslav Army of the Homeland, were in Rogatica. At that time, around the town there was not a single German or a Tito Commie.
When we parted after a brotherly hug, Chicha was smiling but his eyes were sad. We knew what kind of days were to follow.”
Captain Walter Mansfield 1953 In a Speech given in Canada
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Post by SKORIC on Nov 9, 2008 7:23:32 GMT -5
American Military Forces treated as Prisoners by Tito's Partisans.^ Lt. Col. James M. Inks, United States Air ForceYUGOSLAV MILITARY ATTACHE QUESTIONS CAPTAIN OF THE U.S. AIR CORPS ABOUT HIS EXPERIENCES IN WORLD WAR II YUGOSLAVIA AND LT. COL. JAMES M. INKS RESPONDS.July 13, 1946
Dear Lt. Inks:
I have learned that you parachuted from your plane on the 28th of July, 1944, near Podgorica, Yugoslavia and that you were liberated by the Partisans April 26, 1945, and returned to your base. As the military attaché to the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington, your experiences and impressions regarding this matter, interest me very much and I would appreciate it very much if you would inform me in detail about your experience. I am especially interested in your impressions of our units and the various parts of the country through which you passed, their treatment towards you, what observations you can make concerning the enemy and how you happened to be liberated by the Partisans and returned to your authorities. I would like to know how you were received by the various units in Yugoslavia and how they treated you.
Anticipating a quick reply to my inquiries, accept my sincerest regards and my congratulations on your safe return to your home and to your loved ones after all you have gone through in this horrible war.
Sincerely yours,
Colonel Mihovil Tartalja Military and Air Attache Yugoslav EmbassyLT. COL. JAMES M. INKS REPLIES:July 17, 1946
Colonel Mihovil Tartalja Military and Air Attache Yugoslav Embassy
Colonel Tartalja:
At dawn this morning, 17 July 1946, the Partisans took the life of the greatest man yet to show his face in the political situation of Yugoslavia. Yes, General Mihailovich was truly a great man. His honesty, integrity and straight-forwardness was in direct contract to the slinky and crafty Partisans that I was unfortunate enough to come in contact with.
I am writing this at your request, and my views are my own and are not to be interpreted as to represent those of the army or my government, however, you can rest assured that I am going to do my utmost to expose this monstrosity of a crime that your government has just this morning committed.
I spent months in Yugoslavia and came in contact with all of the factions there. I lived with General Mihailovich for three months and learned a great deal about the man and his ways of accomplishing things. I jumped in the same fox-holes with his Chetniks, when American and English planes bombed and strafed them on Tito’s information that Germans were there. True, the Chetniks were not openly fighting the Germans in the last year of the war, but they were powerless to do so. However I witnessed and took part in numerous skirmishes with the Germans, which we were forced to give the Partisans credit for.
As for the treatment by the different groups, the Chetniks treated us like free men and allies. They gave us food that should have normally gone to their underfed troops. They gave us guns and ammunition and money and allowed us to do just about anything we were physically able to. After we were captured by the Partisans, we were treated as prisoners and certainly not like allies. They took our guns and ammunition from us, kept us with their prisoners, and even forced us to carry wounded Partisans off the field of battle under fire.
I kept an accurate account of what happened to me and my comrades while we were in Yugoslavia. This has recently had its secret classification removed by the army and is now cleared for publication. I hope in the near future to have it before every citizen in the United States, in one of our popular magazines and you can rest assured that I will leave nothing out that reflects my contempt for your present form of Government. Furthermore, several hundred other American airmen are not going to forget General Mihailovich and I sincerely hope that we see to it that you are reminded forcefully of the supreme injustice that you have committed against him.
JAMES M. INKS Captain, Air Corps U.S.Lieutenant Colonel James M. Inks of the United States Air Force flew 135 combat missions during twenty years of his distinguished military service. His Liberator bomber was forced to go down in Yugoslavia in July of 1944 as he was flying his 43rd mission, last mission during World War II. Inks and his fellow airmen would stay in Yugoslavia for 10 ½ months after being rescued by the Chetniks. He witnessed firsthand what was going on in Yugoslavia as he traveled with the Chetniks. Three of those 10 ½ months were spent directly with General Mihailovich near Loznica. Lt. Col. Inks would learn much about both the General and his forces and kept a diary during his time in Yugoslavia. This diary would later be published in book form in 1954. Eight Bailed Out, published by W.W. Norton & Company, New York, is the story of an American airman’s experience in World War II Yugoslavia among the people who were fighting not just for their lives against the Axis occupier but for the integrity and future of their nation after the war.
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Post by SKORIC on Nov 9, 2008 8:19:49 GMT -5
Winston Churchill Regrets Decision to Abandon Mihailovich Even after General Draza Mihailovich was abandoned by the Allies, he and his forces continued to aid them, which is probably the single most significant indicator of the nature of his character. Unfortunately, despite the aid that he had given to the British, continued to give to the British and the British lives he saved, the disinformation campaign against him continued. Richard Lamb, in Churchill as War Leader describes one such rescue operation and its aftermath: “Some British Liaison Officers traveled 150 miles from their operational areas in southern Serbia to Pranjani for evacuation. The party, after picking up rescued air crews, totaled 110 men, and they encountered no Partisans (Tito’s forces) on the march which was all through Chetnik held territory. Mihailovich’s troops defended the aerodrome against the Germans for their departure. On arrival in Bari, Italy, they were shown a map with pins showing the whole of their escape route held by Tito’s forces. An identical map was prepared for the Prime Minister by SOE in Cairo. The British Liaison Officers were so angry that they pulled out the pins. This shows how Klugmann in Cairo was duping his superiors.”Author Lamb summarizes his assessments of the Mihailovich-Allies problem with a review of how the Allies viewed this problem in immediate hindsight. He touches on the American role in the abandonment by writing: “Roosevelt had always believed Tito to be a ruthless communist, and he had never shared Churchill’s short lived enthusiasm for the man in late 1943 and early 1944. . .Churchill’s decision to back Tito against Mihailovich produced little if any military benefits and was a disaster for the people of Yugoslavia.”Lamb concludes that Winston Churchill himself knew this well and never denied it after the war was over. At a dinner in Brussels, Belgium in December of 1945, Churchill made the following comment, a comment which still resonates today: “During the war I thought I could trust Tito. . .but now I am aware I committed one of the biggest mistakes of the war.”Lest the “mistake” be attributed to Churchill being a “victim of deceit”, it is a fact that there were those British officials, both in London and on the ground in Yugoslavia, who witnessed first-hand what was going on and reported on it, who warned Churchill about Tito, and the misguided decision to abandon General Draza Mihailovich. As much as he was misled, when one looks at everything that transpired in those few years of war, one must conclude that Winston Churchill chose to be misled. After the war was over, Anthony Eden, head of the British Foreign Office in London, who had always believed in Mihailovich, stated unequivocally that “My biggest regret of the war was abandoning Mihailovich.”Even though Lamb attributes the abandonment of Mihailovich to Churchill being a victim of deceit, he does concede that this is a big mark against Churchill when one appraises his legacy as a wartime leader: “Churchill and his advisors had been misled by SOE in Cairo into believing that the Royalist guerrilla leader, Mihailovich, was collaborating with the Germans and fighting only against the Partisan communists under Tito. The reverse was true. Tito’s communists were not fighting the Germans, and his sole aim was to make Yugoslavia a communist state after the war. Against the advice of Eden and the Foreign Office, Churchill insisted on all-out support for Tito and none for Mihailovich. This was a disastrous error.”There is another implication in all of this, which is outside the realm that Lamb discusses, but that is integral to any discussion of this appraisal. Despite all the British provisions and support provided to Tito and his forces, despite the brutal bombings of Mihailovich positions in Yugoslavia by the Allies which compounded the tragedy of the betrayal and abandonment, and despite the fact that Mihailovich was not receiving help or aid from anyone in the world, Tito and his communists could not have taken Serbia from Mihailovich without the direct involvement of the Soviet Army and Tito knew that. Tito therefore insisted that the Soviets break the Yalta Agreement which prohibited foreign troops from entering Yugoslavia, by sending their Third Ukrainian Front into Serbia, and the Soviets complied. At the same time, the former Nazi troops of Bulgaria entered Serbia from the east. Finally, Tito’s partisans were able to successfully penetrate into Serbia and enter Belgrade after it was “liberated” by the Soviet troops. The reason this is relevant here is that had the British not built up Tito and his communists and abandoned Mihailovich and his freedom fighters, Yugoslavia may never have fallen to communism with all of the subsequent consequences that were to follow, consequences we see unfolding daily as the country succumbs to civil war today, a half century later. Richard Lamb has written an important work, if for no other reason but that he is a British historian who has honestly investigated and exposed certain historical facts about the role that the British leadership of his nation has played in the Balkan arena. Although he ends his analysis by concluding that “Churchill was a great wartime leader,” he does concede that: “Churchill falsified history. . . his memoirs are tendentious in places. . . he put pressure on the official historians in the Cabinet Office to conceal chunks from the archives. . . and many facets of the history of the war have been distorted.”
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Post by SKORIC on Nov 10, 2008 9:34:48 GMT -5
Adolf Hitler on Mihajlovic'Having in view the danger contained in the Mihailovich movement, I have already, in anticipation of all eventualities, issued orders for the destruction of all his supporters on the territory occupied by my troops. The liquidation of Mihailovich's movement at the present time will no longer be an easy matter because of the forces he has at his disposal.' (February 16, 1943)Heinrich Himler issues orders to destroy Mihailovich‘The basis of every success in Serbia and in the entire southeast of Europe lies in the annihilation of Mihailovich. Concentrate all your forces on locating Mihailovich and his headquarters so that he can be destroyed. Any means may be used to achieve this end. I expect the smoothest cooperation between all agencies concerned, from the Security Police and Security Service to all other branches of the SS and police. The head of the SS and police Meissner has already received instructions from me in this regard. Please let me know which clues we already have of Mihailovich’s whereabouts. Please inform me weekly about the progress of this action.’”Heinrich Himmler Nazi Commander of the SS and Gestapo July 17, 1942
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Post by SKORIC on Nov 10, 2008 12:12:02 GMT -5
Ronald Reagan on Mihajlovic.
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Post by SKORIC on Nov 12, 2008 21:00:00 GMT -5
Hitlers No.1 Headache!"Shooting Germans isnt what i call collaborating with them""We could use a leader like Gen. Mihailovic in America"
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Post by SKORIC on Nov 12, 2008 23:56:09 GMT -5
SERBIA OWES A DEBTBy Aleksandra RebicUnlike his rival, Yugoslav communist leader Marshal Josip Broz Tito, General Draza Mihailovic was, and remained, a true man of the people in his beloved Serbia. Even as he rose to fame for being the first true resistance leader in occupied Europe during World War Two, General Draza remained a humble and simple man whom the people adored. He did not lie to them, he did not seek to rule over them, and the sacrifices they willingly made on behalf of the Allied cause would tear at his heart. The people remained as loyal to General Mihailovich as he remained loyal to the Allies to the very end. There is something very wrong with there being a park of flowers and lovely landscaping, with a bronze likeness of the dictator Tito watching over his white marble mausoleum hung with red velvet curtains and housing his massive marble, gold inscribed tomb, open to citizen and tourist alike to view in awe in Belgrade, and there is no gravesite, not even a marker, for the beloved General Draza whom the people of Serbia remained loyal to during the hardest of times. It is not even known where General Mihailovich is buried. Serbia must rectify this. She owes General Draza Mihailovich that. She owes the people that loved him and their descendants who know only of the legend but who must carry on the legacy that. He was a man of the people in the truest sense of the word - a hands on leader who was down in the trenches with his men, who never took his people for granted, who chose to stay and meet his fate instead of leaving when evacuation was offered to him, and who paid for his love of his country with his life. ^General Mihailovich among the Serbian people during World War Two ------------------------ The Three Things That Must Be Considered in Evaluating The Greatness of MihailovichBy Lt. Col. Albert B. SeitzThere remains little for the physical record of Draza Mihailovic; sparkplug of resistance; abandoned Minister of War to the throne of Yugoslavia. On April 18, 1946 a news item appeared in Il Giornale della Sera in Rome from an unidentified Yugoslav source. It reported that on 13 March, after a sustained air-ground attack, in which poison gas was used, Mihailovic had been captured with eleven living followers. They were all that remained of a force of 1020 men. He became a martyr in July. Three things must be considered in evaluating the greatness of Mihailovich. First - He set the example for Europe and its conquered people in resistance. Second - He was of incalculable benefit to Russia in defeating Germany. His revolt at Ravna Gora caused Hitler to delay his time table of attack on Russia from April to June of 1941, with the result that the Germans found themselves stalled outside Moscow in the middle of the bitter Russian winter. That precious time and the subsequent siphoning of 30 sorely needed Axis divisions to keep the Yugoslavs quiet plus the lend lease from the Allies, was the saving grace of a nation whose salvation was of questionable usefulness to the world. Third – He was a bulwark to the British in their North African Campaign. With Europe occupied, the Germans were able to turn their attention to the Italian war effort in North Africa. In June 1942 Rommel and his Africa Korps in a long counter offensive against Ritchie, had captured Tobruk with 25,000 and pushed on within 70 miles of Alexandria. Auchinleck replaced Ritchie, with Cunningham and Tedder commanding sea and air components. There was no cause for British optimism as the build-up of her ground and air had been seriously influenced by her disastrous campaign in Greece which had cost her 50,000 men. Mihailovich was asked to harass the Germans in this area and retard the flow of supplies through the Vardar Valley to Salonika. How well he did this was attested to by radio messages from Auchinleck, Cunningham and Tedder on 16 August 1942. By October Allied reinforcements swelled the British command in North Africa sufficiently to permit Montgomery to match strength with Rommel in El Alamein. With the Allied landing in French North Africa on 8 November the Axis were through in Africa. During this period Mihailovich suffered 20,000 casualties stopping the German supply route, and on 16 December 1942, 2500 hostages were executed by the Nazis in Belgrade. These are debts of Britain and her Allies! To Mihailovic not Tito.
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Post by SKORIC on Nov 13, 2008 18:23:50 GMT -5
Books on the subject----- This work -- part memoir, part exegesis of new archival material, part polemic -- contends that in the middle of World War II, Britain betrayed a loyal guerrilla ally and sided with a devious guerrilla ally in occupied Yugoslavia. The loyal ally was Draza Mihailovic, the Serbian officer who headed the Yugoslav Army of the Homeland, better known as the Chetniks. The devious ally was Josip Broz Tito, the Stalin-schooled Communist who headed the National Liberation Army, better known as the Partisans. Nazi Germany and its allies, Fascist Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria, had brutally divided and virtually devoured their country. Mihailovic and Tito, in the course of fighting these common enemies, soon found themselves fighting each other. The principal stake was Serbia, the heartland of Yugoslavia and home of its most numerous nationality. Tito was the victor in this civil war, and he had Mihailovic executed in 1946. The argument over the relative merits and allegiances of Mihailovic and Tito has lasted some 48 years and shows no signs of abating -- despite a lopsided advantage on the Tito side, thanks in part to his many defenders and apologists in the West. Now comes Michael Lees, a British officer during World War II with impeccable credentials as a guerrilla fighter on the side of the doomed Mihailovic. He offers fresh and astonishing material in "The Rape of Serbia," culled from long-secret files that turned up in the Public Records Office in London.What makes this material relevant now is that Serbia is troubled again. One could even make a case that Serbia's current agony, ignobly pitting it under a remnant Communist leadership against virtually all other parts of Yugoslavia, had its origins in the "rape" of which the author speaks. Tracking his own experiences in Serbia from June 1943 to May 1944 against some newly discovered files of Britain's wartime Special Operations Executive, the office responsible for overseeing paramilitary operations, Mr. Lees paints a grim picture of official double-dealing. He documents how James Klugmann, a Communist, and Basil Davidson, a self-described leftist, both stationed in the Cairo headquarters of the Special Operations Executive, systematically discredited Mihailovic while undermining British material support for his forces. Their methods included manipulating battle maps and messages from the field, and attributing successful Chetnik military actions to the Partisans.Mr. Lees goes on to show that William Deakin and Fitzroy Maclean, both British emissaries to Tito and both intimate with Winston Churchill, helped persuade the Prime Minister to abandon Mihailovic and back Tito, which Churchill did with finality on Dec. 10, 1943. Until then the Chetniks had received only 30 tons of weaponry from the British, while the Partisans had got 18,000 tons. Tito turned many of those British guns against the Chetniks.Mr. Lees points out that Brigadier Maclean and Captain Deakin derived their evidence for accusing the Mihailovic forces of collaborating with the occupiers almost entirely from Partisan sources, which were blatantly biased. Neither spent any time with the Chetniks. Yet for more than four decades, Fitzroy Maclean and William Deakin -- both prolific writers -- have been the main architects of the widely accepted view that Tito was a positive figure and Mihailovic a negative one. It is because he contests this received wisdom so passionately that Mr. Lees wrote his book. Mr. Lees's fierce assault is leavened periodically by affectionate recollections of his days as a British liaison officer between sabotage raids in the hills of southern Serbia in 1943: "Our simple needs were tended to by two giggling daughters of the house, Milunka and Zagorka, who seemed to greatly enjoy carrying over a pot of bean soup twice daily for our meals, plus our breakfast at dawn -- according to Serbian custom, a double slug of double-strength rakija"----------- Another book photocopied in the link belowGeneral Mihailovich: The World's Verdict
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Post by Caslav Klonimirovic on Dec 16, 2008 1:03:20 GMT -5
Good work Skoric. One thing that strikes me going through all this is that the Cetniks were more of a popular movement & less of an underground movement than portrayed. The Cetniks were such an honorable movement & our neighbors who can't acknowledge that are just being ridiculous.
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Post by SKORIC on Dec 16, 2008 1:32:04 GMT -5
Thanks Yeh it pisses me off when people keep repeating the same old tito age propaganda over and over again. They think its all black and white like their deda's have told them or from the neretva movies that they have watched. Comparing Cetniks to Ustase or Handzar is just another way to demonize them. I find it funny when some say "We dont support Ustase or Handzar so why are Serbs supporting Cetniks" etc its bulls**t. Tadic has even defended Draza against his ex-yu neighbours saying he's not a fascist. While people like Milosevic and his party hate them and refused to give Cetnik veterans pensions. Just shows you what kind of people are against him and are defending him. Tito was just a better manipulator and his men had 20 or so years of underground work experience during the royalist yugoslavia period, while Draza thought that his actions and loyalty to the allies would be enough to keep them on his side. One has to ask questions to the old rhetoric of the Draza haters out there. Why did the communists have to docter photos to prove they collaborated? Why were there bounties on Draza's head over half way through the war? (even though people say Cetniks stopped fighting the occupiers in the end of 1941) Why were there posters put up by the Germans declaring Draza an enemy and declaring they would launch reprisals on Serb civilivians due to Drazas attacks (2 months before the allies switched support to Tito might i add.) Why did Partizan's treat their american airmen that they captured from the Cetniks like prisoners while Cetniks treated them like free men and family. Why werent allied airmen allowed to testify at Draza's "trial"? Why are there photo's of Partizans with Germans? Why did tito need communist british spies to help him get allied support? lol i could go on forever.
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Kralj Vatra
Amicus
Warning: Sometimes uses foul language & insults!!!
20%
Posts: 9,814
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Post by Kralj Vatra on Dec 16, 2008 3:05:37 GMT -5
Pure gold Skoric. This and the other thread of Bob (i think) with huge material on the Srebrenica crimes against Serbs by this satan named Naser Oric, alongside with article by general McKenzy *IS THE ULTIMATE PUNCH* to the face of all neo-leftist satan-worshipers intellectual wannabes and ofcourse serb haters. PLEASE LJUDI, all those threads must be STICKY. Ooops, i just saw that Serbatron included all those in his topic here: illyria.proboards19.com/index.cgi?board=srbijaserbia&action=display&thread=1103however, the topic about Srebrenica and the topic about WWII should be made sticky on themselves.
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