Post by engers on Nov 7, 2007 5:27:07 GMT -5
4 November 2007
William Montgomery
Over the past few years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has consolidated and strengthened his control over Russia and reversed a decade-long process of democratic transition. He has benefited by the enormous increase in the price of oil, gas, and other natural resources, which Russia has, in abundance. The end result is that Russia has gone from an economic basket case to a major power in the energy field almost overnight.
This economic freedom and strength has enabled him to take an increasingly hostile approach with the West. This stems at least in some significant measure from Western actions in the period immediately after the fall of Communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Despite its fierce objections, Russia was too weak to prevent its Cold War enemy, NATO, from expanding not only into the former Warsaw Pact countries, but into the Baltic States as well.
It watched helplessly as other countries in its "near abroad" developed independent relationships with the West. It is hard to overestimate the negative impact this "impotence" had on Vladimir Putin, a life-long member of the KGB, who devoted his career to the Cold War and opposition to the West and its military component, NATO.
We are now reaping the fruit of those actions. Russia is back and wants to take - not be given - its place on the world stage.
It is seeking to restore its influence in its "near-abroad" and has not hesitated to use whatever pressure required to achieve its objectives. This includes cutting off oil and gas supplies, embargoing products from uncooperative states, and continuing to encourage separatist movements in Georgia and Moldova.
For several years now, the Western reaction to the increasingly aggressive steps and statements made by Putin was deliberately muted. We focused on some of areas where there was cooperation and hoped to build on them. We were also concerned that responding in kind to Putin's actions would only make matters worse.
At the same time, however, we continued to take steps which even further alienated Russia - such as the supporting and encouraging the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, announcing the anti-missile defense plan which included bases in the Czech Republic and Poland, and supporting "democratic" forces in other countries of Russia's "near abroad."
The result was that while we believed we were bending over backwards to be conciliatory on Russian actions and statements, Putin saw a continued pattern of Western "aggression" in countries traditionally under Russian influence or domination. In other words, both sides saw the other as being needlessly provocative.
The result of these radically different perceptions is that the gap between Russia and the West is now the largest it has been in at least 16 years.
The rhetoric increasingly sounds like a parody of the Cold War. The latest examples would be Putin's threat to re-direct nuclear missiles at Western Europe if the U.S. builds its anti-missile defense shield; the U.S. determination to proceed with it; Russian suspension of compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; and Putin's recent comparison of current U.S. actions in building the missile-defense bases as comparable to the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Putin is less inclined than ever to be accommodating or supportive of Western concerns around the world.
At the same time, there is an increasing consensus in the West that the policy of accommodating Russian "misbehavior" and ignoring its aggressive statements and actions has been counter-productive. According to this view, Western lack of response has been interpreted by Putin as weakness and has encouraged him to take even more radical measures.
Moreover, Western "patience" on several key issues where Russia has obstructed action is rapidly fading. The end result will be a more confrontational approach to Russia's actions and the likelihood that the relationship with Russia will get worse, perhaps far worse, before it gets better.
This clash of wills is currently being played out in Iran and in the Balkans. While in both cases, we have permitted Russia to block action in the UN Security Council, we are increasingly looking at ways around what we see as "Russian obstructionism."
This will accomplish two objectives. First of all, it will enable us to move forward on issues we view as important. Secondly, it will be a shot across Russia's bow.
On Iran, the challenges and consequences are far greater. Despite the enormous risks involved, the West is looking once again at a variety of military options. These include not only strikes against the Iranian nuclear facilities, but alternatively, targeted attacks on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
The rationale would be that these targeted attacks would be in response to the provision by the Revolutionary Guards of sophisticated military equipment, including Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to Shiite extremists in Iraq for use against our forces.
But it would also be a way of demonstrating to Iran that no measures, including military, are off the table when it comes to their nuclear program. The naming by the United States of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the banks that they use as supporters of terrorism is an important step in that direction.
It is entirely possible that this is all simply "saber rattling" with the hope it will encourage Iran to slow down or stop actions, which we view as threatening our security. But despite all the downsides of any military action, it would be foolish to discount it entirely by this Administration.
Finally, and most importantly for this region, Russian support for Serbia's position on Kosovo and now for the Bosnian Serb objections to actions taken by the High Representative to strengthen the central institutions of Bosnia may well turn out to be counter-productive for the Serbs. My sense is that there is a growing feeling in Western capitals that both Russia and the Serbs have "overplayed their hand."
In other words, the patience of key countries in the West on the issues of Bosnia and Kosovo is running out. There is a strong belief that the Serbian positions on both these issues have been hardened by Russia's role.
So as the West considers its actions in both cases, it is looking not only at the issues themselves, but also at demonstrating to Russia that there are limits to how far we can be pushed.
Moreover, unlike in Iran, where the downsides to unilateral Western actions are daunting, to say the least, the comparative risk in the Balkans is very small. If the West wants to stand up to Russia, this region is probably the place where it will happen.
[ftp]http://www.b92.net/eng/insight/opinions.php?yyyy=2007&mm=11&nav_id=45116[/ftp]
William Montgomery
Over the past few years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has consolidated and strengthened his control over Russia and reversed a decade-long process of democratic transition. He has benefited by the enormous increase in the price of oil, gas, and other natural resources, which Russia has, in abundance. The end result is that Russia has gone from an economic basket case to a major power in the energy field almost overnight.
This economic freedom and strength has enabled him to take an increasingly hostile approach with the West. This stems at least in some significant measure from Western actions in the period immediately after the fall of Communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Despite its fierce objections, Russia was too weak to prevent its Cold War enemy, NATO, from expanding not only into the former Warsaw Pact countries, but into the Baltic States as well.
It watched helplessly as other countries in its "near abroad" developed independent relationships with the West. It is hard to overestimate the negative impact this "impotence" had on Vladimir Putin, a life-long member of the KGB, who devoted his career to the Cold War and opposition to the West and its military component, NATO.
We are now reaping the fruit of those actions. Russia is back and wants to take - not be given - its place on the world stage.
It is seeking to restore its influence in its "near-abroad" and has not hesitated to use whatever pressure required to achieve its objectives. This includes cutting off oil and gas supplies, embargoing products from uncooperative states, and continuing to encourage separatist movements in Georgia and Moldova.
For several years now, the Western reaction to the increasingly aggressive steps and statements made by Putin was deliberately muted. We focused on some of areas where there was cooperation and hoped to build on them. We were also concerned that responding in kind to Putin's actions would only make matters worse.
At the same time, however, we continued to take steps which even further alienated Russia - such as the supporting and encouraging the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, announcing the anti-missile defense plan which included bases in the Czech Republic and Poland, and supporting "democratic" forces in other countries of Russia's "near abroad."
The result was that while we believed we were bending over backwards to be conciliatory on Russian actions and statements, Putin saw a continued pattern of Western "aggression" in countries traditionally under Russian influence or domination. In other words, both sides saw the other as being needlessly provocative.
The result of these radically different perceptions is that the gap between Russia and the West is now the largest it has been in at least 16 years.
The rhetoric increasingly sounds like a parody of the Cold War. The latest examples would be Putin's threat to re-direct nuclear missiles at Western Europe if the U.S. builds its anti-missile defense shield; the U.S. determination to proceed with it; Russian suspension of compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; and Putin's recent comparison of current U.S. actions in building the missile-defense bases as comparable to the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Putin is less inclined than ever to be accommodating or supportive of Western concerns around the world.
At the same time, there is an increasing consensus in the West that the policy of accommodating Russian "misbehavior" and ignoring its aggressive statements and actions has been counter-productive. According to this view, Western lack of response has been interpreted by Putin as weakness and has encouraged him to take even more radical measures.
Moreover, Western "patience" on several key issues where Russia has obstructed action is rapidly fading. The end result will be a more confrontational approach to Russia's actions and the likelihood that the relationship with Russia will get worse, perhaps far worse, before it gets better.
This clash of wills is currently being played out in Iran and in the Balkans. While in both cases, we have permitted Russia to block action in the UN Security Council, we are increasingly looking at ways around what we see as "Russian obstructionism."
This will accomplish two objectives. First of all, it will enable us to move forward on issues we view as important. Secondly, it will be a shot across Russia's bow.
On Iran, the challenges and consequences are far greater. Despite the enormous risks involved, the West is looking once again at a variety of military options. These include not only strikes against the Iranian nuclear facilities, but alternatively, targeted attacks on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
The rationale would be that these targeted attacks would be in response to the provision by the Revolutionary Guards of sophisticated military equipment, including Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to Shiite extremists in Iraq for use against our forces.
But it would also be a way of demonstrating to Iran that no measures, including military, are off the table when it comes to their nuclear program. The naming by the United States of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the banks that they use as supporters of terrorism is an important step in that direction.
It is entirely possible that this is all simply "saber rattling" with the hope it will encourage Iran to slow down or stop actions, which we view as threatening our security. But despite all the downsides of any military action, it would be foolish to discount it entirely by this Administration.
Finally, and most importantly for this region, Russian support for Serbia's position on Kosovo and now for the Bosnian Serb objections to actions taken by the High Representative to strengthen the central institutions of Bosnia may well turn out to be counter-productive for the Serbs. My sense is that there is a growing feeling in Western capitals that both Russia and the Serbs have "overplayed their hand."
In other words, the patience of key countries in the West on the issues of Bosnia and Kosovo is running out. There is a strong belief that the Serbian positions on both these issues have been hardened by Russia's role.
So as the West considers its actions in both cases, it is looking not only at the issues themselves, but also at demonstrating to Russia that there are limits to how far we can be pushed.
Moreover, unlike in Iran, where the downsides to unilateral Western actions are daunting, to say the least, the comparative risk in the Balkans is very small. If the West wants to stand up to Russia, this region is probably the place where it will happen.
[ftp]http://www.b92.net/eng/insight/opinions.php?yyyy=2007&mm=11&nav_id=45116[/ftp]