Post by Teuta1975 on Jun 21, 2008 11:24:13 GMT -5
Illyris, Rome and Macedon in 229-205 B.C.
Author(s): N. G. L. Hammond
Source: The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 58, Parts 1 and 2, (1968), pp. 1-21
Published by: Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies
Stable URL: www.jstor.org/stable/299691
In JRS LVI (I966) I gave a description of the Aoi Stena which was based on autopsy,
and I discussed the campaigns of Rome against Philip V of Macedon in the years 200 to
198 B.C. In this paper I am concerned with the area farther north which Rome acquired
in 229 B.C. and with the actions which took place there before 200 B.c. Many scholars
have discussed Rome's early activities in Illyris but practically none of them has trodden
the ground. My knowledge of most of the area may help me to advance more down-toearth
views of the extent of Rome's sector in Illyris and of Roman and Macedonian policies.
I include some new evidence on the position of Dimallum.1
The salient feature of Central Albania is the belt of coastal plain which extends from
north of Lesh (Lissus) to north of the Gulf of Valona (see fig. i). The widest and richest
part of this plain is in the Myzeqija, which extends southwards from Kavaje. The Myzeqija
in particular is integral to the economy of Central Albania, the area which was called
Southern Illyris in the third century B.C. The transhumance of sheep has always been
practised in this part of the Balkans, and the coastal plain of Albania with months of very
heavy rainfall in October and March affords exceptionally fine pasturage for the winter
period. The owners of the flocks which are driven from the plain to the mountains for
pasture in the summer months have their homes not in the swampy plains but in the hills
of the interior. On the other hand during the summer the coastal plain grows the cereals
which are consumed in the hinterland, where there is a deficiency of arable land.2 Thus
the lord of the plains has a stranglehold on the economy of Central Albania. In the third
century B.C. the Myzeqija was held by the two Greek cities, Apollonia and Epid*mnus.
From a military point of view the coastal plain is difficult to defend. In the spring and
early summer and again in the autumn it is so heavily flooded that movement by an army
across it is not possible,3 and for purposes of movement and communication an occupying
force must possess the rising ground which runs from Apollonia in the south through
Kug, Lushnje and Kavaje to Epid*mnus in the north. Even so there is no possibility of
defence in depth against an enemy who attacks from the hinterland, and the obvious
policy for an occupying power would be to hold or threaten the main route of entry from
the east, namely the Shkumbi valley, and also to hold the range on the southern rim of
the plain. Of this range Mt. Shpiragrit is the most important part because it faces Berat,
through which the subsidiary routes from the east pass as if through a funnel. I became
aware of these economic and military factors when I travelled in late March and early
April from Durres (Epid*mnus) via Kavaje to Elbasan in the Shkumbi valley, seeing the
river in spate, the coastal plain flooded and the numerous herds of sheep assembling on
the higher ground for the move eastwards, and then again in the summer on other occasions
when I went from Elbasan to Berat and from there to Poyani (Apollonia), and when I
walked from Byllis in the Aous valley to Berat via Metoh, taking six and a half hours.
The defence of the coastal plain against an enemy attacking either from the south or from the north raises different problems. Here the occupying force has depth but his
front is narrow and can be easily turned; it is therefore necessary to protect the open
flank by holding some of the hill country. In December I940 the Italian army in central
Albania held a position facing south and covering what General Papagos called 'the
Kelcyre and Tepelene junctions ', i.e. the Aoi Stena together with the passes at either
end of the Stena (see JRS LVI, 40, fig. 2). This was always the strongest position for an
army in Illyris to hold against an attack delivered from within Epirus. Failing this, such
an army would be wise to hold the hilly country just south of and to the east of Apollonia.
Both at the Aoi Stena and at Apollonia a flank guard is needed, reaching into the hills
towards Mt. Tomor, and covering Berat.5 Defence against an enemy attacking from the
north is made difficult by the deep re-entrant through the upper valley of the Black Drin,
which rises in Lake Ochrid. In consequence it is necessary either to hold the area north
of the Drin, that is on a line running inland from Scodra, or to hold the hill country to
the north of the Shkumbi valley running inland from Durres (Epid*mnus).
To the mariner Central Albania is distinctly unattractive. The coast between the
Gulf of Valona and Ulcinj is generally flat and featureless; it offers few roadsteads and
fewer harbours; and it is rendered dangerous not only by the southwesterly gales and in
places by the northerly ' Bora ' but also by the changing positions of offshore banks which
extend out to sea as far as three miles. The advice of The Mediterranean Pilot 6 to the
sailor setting off on the 40 mile stretch from the Bay of Valona to Kep i Gagji is brief and
to the point: ' the utmost caution should be exercised when approaching this portion of
the coast and at night it should be given a wide berth '. 6 Indeed for the hundred miles
between the Gulf of Valona and Ulcinj there are only two sets of harbours. The first was
controlled in ancient times by Epid*mnus. It consists of Durres harbour, formed by two
moles, and of Pali Bay, 6 miles to the north. Each offers shelter from some winds. Between
them runs a high ridge (the name Dyrrachium was derived from it), which is a conspicuous
feature ' showing from afar like an island with five heads ' and of great value for making
a landfall.7 The second set is in the Gulf of the Drin : the mouth of the Drin, navigable to
Lesh; the harbour of Shen-Gjin or S. Giovanni di Medua, entered by a narrow channel
and suitable for small vessels (the Nymphaeum of Caesar, BC 3, 26, 4, ' qui ab Africo
tegebatur, ab Austro non erat tutus '); the navigable river Buene, giving access to the
Lake of Scodra, which is only 6 metres above sea level (Livy's ' Barbanna ... ex Labeatide
palude oriens', 44, 31, 3); 8 and the small harbour of Ulcinj (the Roman Ulcinium),
dangerous in southeasterly winds. Between them this set of harbours offer shelter from
any wind. In antiquity Lissus had a harbour but this has silted up and disappeared. And
in the south the mouth of the Aous (Vijose), navigable as far as Apollonia, was used but
only when conditions of weather were favourable (cf. Plu., Caes. 38). But then, as now,
Epid*mnus was the most important station on the coast; anyone holding Epid*mnus
and denying access to its harbours can make navigation along or towards this coast under
sail extremely difficult in bad weather.9
In the days of sail this coast was important for reasons which no longer obtain (see
fig. 2). The direct crossing of the Straits of Otranto from the all-weather harbour of
Oricum in the Bay of Valona to the heel of Italy was rendered dangerous by exposure to
the Bora and the southwesterlies, which create very rough, steep seas, and by the proximity
of the formidable Acroceraunian coast. In consequence sailors preferred to cross the Ionian Gulf from Epid*mnus to Bari or Brindisi.10 Thus Epid*mnus served Greeks
trading to the west and Italians trading to the east. At the same time it was the main port
of call in the Ionian Gulf for shipping up and down the Adriatic Sea, and so was of paramount
importance to those Illyrians who concerned themselves with the sea. The coast of Central
Albania has never bred a seafaring tradition, not surprisingly in view of its nature, but the
islands off the river Narenta (the ancient Naro) and the fjords such as that of Kotor (' Sinus
Rhizonicus ') produced Illyrian navies from time to time. The Illyrian warship, whether
developed by the Liburnians or the Ardiaeans, was small and extremely fast under oar and
under sail, and it was more fitted for raiding than for set engagements at sea.11 Such
Illyrian navies were always anxious to gain possession of Epid*mnus. The Liburnians held
the site in the seventh century, Monunius early in the third century; and the Ardiaeans,
whose naval power was based on the area of the islands and fjords but extended to the
southern Ardiaeans by the Gulf of the Drin, were inevitably drawn towards it in the latter
part of the third century.
The first occasion of Roman intervention across the Adriatic Sea was a naval occasion.
It was prompted by the scale and success of the piratical Illyrian raiders, who had made
a habit of raiding the coasts of Elis and Messenia, defeated an Aetolian army at Medeon
in Acarnania in 231, and then in 230 not only raided the coasts of Elis and Messenia once
more but captured Phoenice in Epirus and compelled the Epirote League to enter into
alliance. More than piracy at sea was involved; for a land force under Scerdilaidas invaded
Epirus at such short notice that we may infer that the Illyrians held the area between
Berat and the lower Aous valley as well as 'some parts of Epirus ' (App., Illyr. 7, T-rS
'HrrEipovu rvca).12 In 230 this expanding Illyrian state was in alliance with Macedon,
Acarnania and Epirus (Plb. 2, 6, 9). In spring 229 B.C. an Illyrian fleet, assisted by
Acarnanian ships, defeated the fleets of the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, gained possession
of Corcyra and laid siege to Epid*mnus. The Illyrians, led by Teuta, widow of Agron,
king of the Ardiaei,13 were within an ace of controlling the entire coast from Dubrovnik
to the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf.14 Meanwhile Rome was on the move. Italians
trading by sea towards the east had been molested repeatedly in recent years by the
Illyrians, and in the course of 230 B.C. more Italians than usual had been intercepted at
sea, robbed, kidnapped or killed.15 The Senate sent ambassadors to Queen Teuta late in 230 B.C. The conversations ended in a fracas, and one of the ambassadors was assassinated
on the way back.16 The Senate then began to organize a naval and military force. However,
it did not declare its intentions to Teuta, and she operated during the first part of the
campaigning season of 229 B.C. as if her position was not under threat from Rome.
In the first Punic War Rome had become painfully aware of sea power, and she had
realized that the long coast of Italy was vulnerable to seaborne attack. Hamilcar Barca
had raided Locri and other places in south Italy, and in 246 Rome had planted a colony
at Brundisium, which faces the Ionian Gulf. During the war Italy had traded very intensively across the Ionian Gulf,17 partly because the Carthaginian raiders had not penetrated into
these waters. If the Illyrians now succeeded in their aims, they would close the mouth
of the Adriatic Sea and control the approaches to South Italy through the Ionian Gulf
from their bases on the coast and on Corcyra. For a variety of reasons 18 the Senate was
not prepared to let this happen. In the second part of the campaigning season Rome sent
into action 200 ships, 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry-a large force, but not unduly
large for the task the Senate envisaged.19 The campaign was brilliantly conducted (Plb.
2, i). The Roman fleet sailed first to Corcyra, where Teuta's commander, Demetrius
of Pharos, having previously come to a secret understanding with Rome, handed over the
island. It then sailed to Apollonia, which joined the Roman cause, and met there the
Roman army which had been brought over from Italy. They advanced next towards
Epid*mnus, the fleet sailing along the coast and the army probably moving along the
eastern side of the Myzeqija plain, where the 2,000 cavalry had excellent ground for
manoeuvre and plenty of pasture. The Illyrians abandoned the siege of Epid*mnus, which
now joined the Roman cause. The Roman army then turned further inland and overran
the Ardiaei,20 probably in the lowlands and the hinterland between the Mati and the
Drin,21 and the Roman fleet, sailing up the coast and taking some places by assault, relieved
the island of Issa, which the Illyrians were besieging. Army and fleet then returned to
Epid*mnus. Casualties had been suffered during the last phase only, for instance at an
unidentified place called Noutria.
The spectacular success of Roman arms was due to careful planning, the suddenness
of the unheralded attack (critics might have called it a treacherous attack),22 the doubledealing
of Demetrius of Pharos and the accession of Apollonia. The strategy was good:
the seizure of Corcyra cut off the possibility of naval reinforcements from Acarnania, the
occupation of Apollonia and the Myzeqija cut off the possibility of land reinforcements from Epirus, and the rolling up of the Illyrians on a narrow front with naval support and
a mobile cavalry force cost Rome few casualties. The whole campaign was over so quickly
that Teuta's other ally, Macedon, could not have intervened in time to forestall the Illyrian
collapse, even if she had wished to do so.
Victory won, Rome had several courses open to her. She could pursue the defeated
Illyrians to Arbon and Rhizon, where they had taken refuge, and give a knock-out blow
to the Ardiaean monarchy. She could occupy with troops or with colonists the strategic
points in the areas she had overrun, e.g. Corcyra, Apollonia, Epid*mnus, Issa and Pharos,
and thus control the approaches by sea to the outlet of the Adriatic Sea; she would then
hold safe ports on the eastern coast of that sea to balance Brundisium. She could treat the
whole operation as a punitive raid and withdraw her forces, having taught Teuta a salutary
lesson and leaving her friends in Illyris and the islands to maintain their independence as
they had done hitherto. In fact she chose a course intermediate between the second and
the third of those which I have suggested. She set up Demetrius as ruler of a kingdom 23
based on Pharos and including most of the Illyrians overrun by Rome (particularly, I
imagine, in the area of Scodra), and she no doubt hoped he would act as a buffer between
Rome and the Ardiaean monarchy. Issa in the north and Corcyra in the south became in
effect dependents of Rome, Issa providing a contingent later to the Roman navy. On the
mainland, although the Romans were approached by the envoys of a number of tribes
during the advance northwards from Epid*mnus (Plb. 2, I, I , cavyjj4av-rTcv 6 TwpEcyUEvrTOV
ca-rTOisK Cal XrAEovc1v), they accepted only the Parthini and the Atintani into what was or
became a position of dependency. They already had Epid*mnus and Apollonia on their
side. During the winter of 229-8 one of the consuls stayed with forty ships and conscripted
a force " from the surrounding states " which kept an eye on the Ardiaei and the other
(Illyrians) who had submitted to Rome. In spring 228 B.C. Teuta opened negotiations
with Rome and concluded a treaty under which she undertook to pay an indemnity,
evacuate all " Illyris " except for a few districts, and not sail beyond Lissus with more than
two lembi even unarmed.24 On the conclusion of the treaty the Roman consul sent envoys
to the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, explaining the reasons for Rome's initiative and
the terms of the treaty she had concluded with the Illyrians. They doubtless emphasized
the fact that they had delivered the Greek cities of Corcyra, Apollonia, Epid*mnus and Issa
from the common enemy, the Illyrians. The envoys received a friendly welcome and then
returned to Corcyra.
The Roman settlement needs some clarification on the geographical side (see fig. i
with Inset). Epid*mnus and Apollonia were both wealthy Greek city-states with a very copious silver coinage which had a wide circulation. There is no doubt that each of them
had an extensive territory. We have more information about Apollonia. In her coinage
from 229 B.C. onwards she showed the Nymphaeum, which we know was close to her
frontier with Byllis and Amantia, independent states which held the north side of the
Aous valley above the vicinity of Romes.25 The mass of Apollonia's territory was then not
to the south but in the Mizeqija, extending northwards certainly to the Semeni (Apsus) 26
and probably to the Shkumbi (Genusus) and inland towards Mt. Shpiragrit. Epid*mnus
is likely to have controlled both the plain of the Arzen river and the northern part of the
Myzeqija as far south at least as the north bank of the Shkumbi river. As Asparagium
(probably Rogozine) was in her territory,27 she formed the outlet through which all trade
following the north side of the Shkumbi valley had to pass. The Parthini were a tribe
adjacent to Epid*mnus (Appian, BC 5, 75, gevos 'ETrBl&a,vcp-r apoiKov; cf. Dio. 41, 49, 2).
When Pompey moved from Epid*mnus to the north bank of the Semeni (Apsus) and Caesar
moved from Apollonia to the south bank of the Semeni (Apsus), they faced each other
probably at Ku9. When Caesar entered the Shkumbi (Genusus) valley probably through the
sink southwest of Elbasan in order to pursue Pompey down the valley to Asparagium, he
captured on his way a Parthinian town which Pompey had garrisoned (Caesar, BC 3, 41, I,
and Dio 4I, 47, I). Thus the Parthini held at least the middle valley of the Shkumbi
(Genusus) river. Moreover, as Pliny reported that the Parthini had the Dassaretii 'behind
them ' (NH 3, I45) and as the Dassaretii extended as far east as at least Lychnidus (Livy 43,
9, 7), the Parthini held the upper valley too.28 The Atintani, as I have shown elsewhere,29
have nothing to do with the Atintanes in the upper Drin valley in Epirus but are an Illyrian
tribe about one day's journey from Epid*mnus in the direction of Macedonia, and occupying
very high country, visible from Epid*mnus and near the (Macedonian) frontier of Illyris
(Polyaenus 4, 11, 4). This tribe evidently held the region of ?(ermenike, which extends
from just north of Elbasan to the watershed of the highest reaches of the Black Drin.
The dispositions of Rome in the northern part of Central Albania are now clear.
First Demetrius of Pharos as suzerain of some Illyrian tribes from north of Epid*mnus to
the vicinity perhaps of Scodra acted as a buffer between the Ardiaean monarchy and the
zone of direct dependence on Rome. Second, a continuous line was held by the dependents
of Rome-Epid*mnus, the Parthini and the Atintani-from the coast to the highest westerly
sources of the Black Drin and in sufficient depth to be defensible against attack from the
north. At the same time this defensive position not only cut off the Ardiaean monarchy
from its ally, Macedon, since the Dardani were pressing down upon Pelagonia at this
time,30 but also blocked the main route from Macedonia to the Adriatic coast, that later
followed by the Via Egnatia. The chief threat to this defensive position might come from
Dassaretis, the high territory between the two arms of the Semeni river, which are called the
Devoli and the Osum, and extending inland to the main watershed through which the
Tsangon pass and the pass of Vatokhorion lead into the Macedonian canton of Orestis.
In 230 B.C. Dassaretis was evidently under the control of the Illyrians, because Agron
held ' parts of Epirus ' and Scerdilaidas was able to move swiftly to Antigonea in Epirus
at a time when neither Agron nor Scerdilaidas held Apollonia (App., Illyr. 7 and Plb.
2, 5, 6). The defeat of Teuta's forces and Rome's alliance with Epid*mnus, the Parthini
and the Atintani left Dassaretis without any direct political affinity. Rome had the good
sense not to include it in the zone of direct dependence upon herself. Thus Dassaretis
became an independent area and formed a buffer between Macedon and Rome.
In the south the zone of direct dependence ended with the territory of Apollonia
(the Apolloniatis) which had a footing on the southern bank of the Vijose (Aous) but did
not include Aulon, Byllis, Amantia or Oricum. These four small states formed an
independent or neutral group situated between Rome and the Epirote League, of which
the northernmost cantons were Chaonia and Parauaea. The boundary to the southeast
will be defined more closely when we consider the position of Dimallum.31
Rome now had access by right to harbours in Demetrius' realm, at Lissus, Epid*mnus,
and the Vijose river, then navigable as far inland as Apollonia. On the other hand, the
Illyrians of Teuta's kingdom were not only debarred by treaty from sailing south of
Lissus with more than two unarmed lembi, but were in effect dependent on Rome's favour for
the peaceful use of these indispensable harbours. The economic interest of the neighbouring
coastal areas, that round Scodra32 in the north and that round the Gulf of Valona in the south,
drew them strongly to Rome, because Italy offered an excellent market for their products.
The inland areas of the Parthini, the Atintani and the Dassaretii depended, as we have seen,
upon the Myzeqija for winter pastures and for cereals and also upon Epid*mnus and
Apollonia for import and export, so that they too had an economic interest in adhering to
the political power which was lord of the plain. It is customary to call the zone of direct
dependence on Rome 'the Roman protectorate ', a vaguely benevolent and flattering
euphemism for an extremely shrewd extension of Roman power. Rome's dependents,
whether they enjoyed the title of ally or subject,33 were to be her dependents for good and
not free agents, able to transfer their allegiance to other states with impunity. We do not
know whether, once the treaty with Teuta was completed, Rome left any troops at
Epid*mnus or Apollonia, but the point is unimportant, since in a matter of hours she
could send an army across to her treaty-ports in order to hold the position defended by
her subjects. To use a modern phrase, she intended to maintain ' not a military presence
but a military capability-a capability to get troops there if they were needed '.
Having completed her dispositions, Rome disregarded Macedon, the Epirote League
and Acarnania, the very states which were most immediately affected by the appearance
of Rome as a new constellation on the eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea. Instead, Rome
sent embassies to the enemies of those three states, that is to the Aetolian and Achaean
Leagues, which had at least the superficial merit of being in opposition to Teuta's Illyrians,
and later to Corinth and Athens, both hostile to Macedon. This deliberate and public
move by Rome made it clear to Macedon and the Greeks that in any war in the southern
Balkans Rome's sympathies would lie initially with Aetolia and Achaea and against Macedon,
Epirus and Acarnania. The announcement of this alignment, coupled with the astute
organization of Roman interests in southern Illyris, could not fail to cause alarm in Macedon,
Epirus and Acarnania. It would be naive to suppose that Rome was unaware of the fact.34
The Roman successes at sea and on land had damaged the prestige but not the power
of the Ardiaean monarchy, which was based upon Dubrovnik and the Dalmatian coast; 35
and even within Illyris, an area which began probably around Scodra, a few districts were
still in Teuta's hands (Plb. 2, 12, 3). Demetrius of Pharos, who had the skill of a Perdiccas
in changing sides, became the successor of Teuta on her death and married Triteuta,
mother of the infant king, Pinnes, so that the first or northernmost part of the Roman
settlement collapsed completely. There was no longer any buffer between the Ardiaean
monarchy and the zone of direct dependence on Rome. Meanwhile Rome became deeply
involved in a war with the Gauls in the Po valley which lasted from 225 to 222 B.C., and
within these years Demetrius advanced both at sea and on land, engaging in piracy south
of the Lissus line and winning over the Atintani from Rome.36 The latter step was the more
important; for Demetrius was thereby opening the door to co-operation with Antigonus
Doson, king of Macedon, and also making infiltration into Dassaretis possible if he gained
Antigonus' co-operation. In 223 B.C. Demetrius accompanied Antigonus on his invasion
of the Peloponnese and in 222 B.C. Demetrius' force of i,6oo Illyrians played an important
part in the battle of Sellasia. Polybius enumerates them among Macedon's allies (2, 65, 4).37
Early in 220 Demetrius and Scerdilaidas sailed south of Lissus with 90 lembi and carried
their raids into the Cyclades (Plb. 3, i6, 3 ; cf. 4, i6, 6-9, and 4, 19, 7-9). In this year a
Roman fleet suppressed some pirates, probably the Istrians (App., Illyr. 8).38 In this year also Demetrius was ravaging the territory of ' the states in Illyris subject to Rome ' and
was trying to subdue them (Plb. 3, i6, 3).39 In order to do this effectively, he came through
the gap opened by the defection of the Atintani, entered Dassaretis and attacked the
Parthini and the Apolloniates from there.
In 2i9 the Romans sent the two consuls with an army which was probably as large as
that of 229 B.C. to punish Demetrius and his Illyrian collaborators (Appian, ibid.). The
attack was again unheralded, but Demetrius had laid his plans in advance. He placed a
considerable garrison with suitable supplies in Dimallum, evidently a town of which he
already had possession, and he brought about changes of government in his favour 'in the
other states ', which presumably now for the first time he took under his influence (Plb.
3, I8, i).40 Having established Dimallum as a strong point, he went to Pharos and prepared
to hold Pharos with a picked force. On landing in Illyris, the Romans attacked Dimallum
first; knowing it was thought to be impregnable, the consuls hoped to capture it and spread
alarm among the Illyrians. Dimallum fell in a week. Envoys came in from ' all the states '
with offers of submission. The consuls made appropriate agreements in each case and then
moved on to attack Pharos. The island fell, but Demetrius escaped. At Actium he joined
Philip of Macedon, who had inherited Antigonus' friendship with him and had himself
visited Scerdilaidas in the winter of 220-219. The Romans crossed over from Pharos to
Illyris, gained control of the rest of Illyris and made a settlement of all its affairs. A triumph
was accorded to the consuls on their return to Rome at the end of the summer.41
The Roman intervention of 2I9 needs little explanation. Demetrius had flouted the
Roman settlement of 229 all along the line by deserting with the dependents Rome had given
him, by detaching the Atintani from their allegiance to Rome, by sailing in strength south
of Lissus, by ravaging the territories of Rome's dependents (evidently those of the Parthini,
Epid*mnus and Apollonia) and by trying to subdue them and so eliminate Rome's holding
on the mainland. The Senate must have seen that inaction would be fatal to her position
in Illyris. Once in control, with Macedon, Epirus and Acarnania as his accomplices, if
not his formal allies, Demetrius rather than Rome would control the Ionian Gulf and the
Straits of Otranto at the very time when a renewal of war with Carthage might be expected. 42
The terms of the Roman settlement in 219 are not described in our sources. It should be noted that even less than in 229 did Rome attack the basis of Illyrian power which lay
farther north, and it may be doubted whether on this occasion her forces penetrated even
to Scodra. Moreover, no steps were taken against Scerdilaidas, though he also had sailed
south of Lissus and he also was an ally of Philip. Clearly Rome had no desire at this time
to go too far or to increase her commitment in Illyris. Wherever she went, she certainly
put pro-Roman parties in power, but it seems as if Dimallum may have been the only
addition she made to the number of dependents she had had since 229; for in 215, when
Hannibal and Philip made an alliance, one of their aims was to prevent Rome from being
in control of Corcyra, of Apollonia and Epid*mnus, of Pharos, of ' Dimale' and the
Parthini, and of Atintanis (Plb. 7, 9, I3). Thus in 219 the Senate seems to have been
content to restore her full control of the 229 group of states, which interposed a barrier
between the Illyrians and the Macedonians, blocked the easiest route from Macedonia
into this group of states, and left independent or buffer areas north of Epid*mnus, in
Dassaretis and in the Gulf of Valona and its hinterland. No doubt she reiterated the ban
on Illyrian lembi sailing south of Lissus. Once again Rome did nothing either to ease or
to exacerbate relations with Macedon or Epirus. Yet her determination to stand firm in
Illyris was itself alarming in view of Rome's record and reputation. On the other side
Antigonus' and Philip's acceptance of Demetrius as an ally in good fortune and in bad
made it equally clear that Macedon favoured Rome's enemies in Illyris and was prepared to
show it.43 In modern terminology Rome and Macedon were now engaged in a ' cold war '.
We must pause in the narrative to consider the position of Dimallum. It has been
placed by scholars on the coast, not on the coast, near Epid*mnus, in the territory of the
Parthini and not in the territory of the Parthini.44 Consideration of the texts and of the
geographical conditions can reduce the number of alternatives. The coast between
Epid*mnus and the Gulf of Valona is low and swampy; a broken line of low hills runs
parallel to the coast, except at Barderoll where the hill comes down to the coast itself;
and then inland of the line of hills there is a swampy plain once again. Now Dimallum
was so strongly situated as to be thought impregnable (Plb. 3, i8, 3). It would be difficult
to find even at Barderoll an impregnable site along this coast. Moreover, Dimallum was
in dispute between Rome and Macedon (Livy 29, i2, 13); we therefore need a place on
the Macedonian side of the Roman block of territory and not on this coast which belonged
mainly (and had done for centuries) to Epid*mnus and Apollonia. As regards the Parthini
and Dimallum the one is a tribal state, subsuming under its name the ' urbes Parthinorum '
(Livy 43, 23, 6), and the other is a city, probably autonomous, negotiable as a separate entity
between Rome and Macedon. The two are always mentioned as separate units by Polybius
and Livy Plb. 7, 9, I3, UIr8' ETvatiP coiaious KUvpOUKvE pKupacioJvi rS' 'Aro ovIcTrovK iI
'ETricbavicov tr&8 Oa)povu pTr6s Atip&?aAr1KsC I TapeE0ivcov lPr6' 'A-rVravia ; Livy 29, I2, 3,
' Parthinosque et propinquas gentes alias motas esse ad spem novandi res, Dimallumque
oppugnare (sc. Romanos)
' ; Livy 29, 12, 13 'ut Parthini et Dimallum et Bargullum et
Eugenium Romanorum essent '. I conclude then that Dimallum (and also Bargullum and
Eugenium) are not Parthinian towns 45 nor in Parthinian territory, which extended from
the upper valley of the Shkumbi to somewhere inland of Asparagium (probably Rogozine),
which was in the territory of Epid*mnus. It follows then that Dimallum lay either north
of the line of Epid*mnian and Parthinian territory, that is facing northern Illyris, or south
of Parthinian territory and east of Apolloniatis, that is facing Dassaretis.
Those who
place Dimallum near Epid*mnus do not rely on any ancient evidence. But there is a clue
to the contrary in Livy 29, I2, 5, where the Roman consul who had gone from Epid*mnus
to Dimallum, abandoning the siege, retired to Apollonia (' quo Sempronius se receperat '),
and from this I infer that Dimallum lay nearer to Apollonia than to Epid*mnus. But the
decisive point is that Dimallum was in dispute between Rome and Macedon at a time when
Macedon held nothing north of Epid*mnus but did hold Dassaretis. Dimallum, then,
lay between Apolloniatis and Dassaretis, to the south of the Shkumbi valley, and therefore
probably on the range of Mt. Shpiragrit.
' La decouverte de la cite illyrienne de Dimale' is the title of an article published by
Burhan Dautaj in Studia Albanica 1965, I, 65-7I, of which an offprint was very kindly
sent to me in 1967 by Professor Frano Prendi. In I963 and I964 Dautaj excavated the
fortress of Krotine,46 which is situated on ' a fine peak' of the Shpiragrit range (see fig. 3).
This peak, being 404 metres above sea-level, is the highest of the western outliers of the
range; it has ravines on three sides of it, and there are traces of a circuit-wall on the steep
slopes. It was an exceptionally strong place and might well have been thought impregnable.
There are two summits inside the circuit, the higher being the acropolis and the lower
providing accommodation for three-quarters of the population. Praschniker estimated
the circuit of the wall to be 2,400 metres. When the acropolis was excavated the most
important discovery was that of numerous stamped tiles of Hellenistic date, rectangular,
red to grey in colour, some long and narrow with squared edges, others broad with slightly
rounded edges. Within an excavated area of some 500 square metres Dautaj found no less than 150 tiles stamped on the edge with the monogram shown in fig. 4(a), and he deduced
that these tiles were local to the site. In addition to the monogram i6 tiles were stamped
with the name NEYTQP or NE22TQP in the nominative, which appears to be that of a
local potter since it is not found on stamped tiles elsewhere in Albania. Four tiles bear
stamped monograms and the stamped word AIMAAAITAN, cf. (fig. 4(b). Twelve tiles are
stamped HPAIQN, a name which appears also on tiles of Apollonia; but these tiles are
smaller and poorly made compared with those of Apollonia. They were made presumably
for members of a cult in honour of Hera or for a group so-called, like the Heraeis of early
Megara.47 One tile had a genitive plural ending in - OANIQN. Names in the genitive,
evidently of magistrates, were stamped on other tiles: AMYNTA, APMHNOC,
API:TOMENEOS and - MAXOY.48
The word AIMAAAITAN written with the broken-bar alpha has the same form of
genitive and much the same lettering as AlX:ITAN on coins of Lissus attributable to
some time within the period 250-200 B.C.49 The name of the city at this time was evidently
Ai|caXAoSo r AhiaAAXoavs we find Dimallum in Livy. It is a Greek word meaning ' of double fleece ', very suitable to a place overlooking the rich sheep-pastures of the Myzeqija.50
Another independent city, Eugenium, in this region has a Greek name, used of a type of
laurel.51 Coins were found on the acropolis of Dimallum. The earliest of these were
coins of Epid*mnus dating to the period 320-270 B.C. The city may have been founded
c. 290 B.C. by Pyrrhus or his successors, to control the route along the side of the plain
to the sink between the Semeni and the Shkumbi rivers, just as Antigonea was founded by
him farther south.52 In any case it seems beyond doubt that this is the city into which
Demetrius put a garrison in 219 when he had overrun Dassaretis. We do not know its
earlier history. It may have been taken by Rome already in 229, because it threatened
the route along the side of the Myzeqija, and it may then have gone over to or been acquired
by Demetrius at some time before 219. In any case, once captured by assault in 219,
Dimallum was regarded by Rome as her possession, as Plb. 7, 9, 13 shows.
The Roman settlement of 219 was treated with scant respect. In 218 Demetrius may
have indulged in raiding again (App., Illyr. 8 fin.), and Scerdilaidas certainly sailed south
of Lissus and supported Philip in his naval enterprises that year. Rome may have sent a
punitive force against Demetrius at or near Pharos, and she kept on good terms with the
young king, Pinnes, ruler of the Ardiaean state (App., Illyr. ibid.). Scerdilaidas had
troubles in Illyris with' city-dynasts ' (Plb. 5, 4, 3 -roAtluvv&orraas)n d these troubles limited
the help he gave to Philip in this year; the ' city-dynasts ' may have been persons set up
under the Roman settlement of 219, but many other explanations for their activities are
possible in an area so split by tribal feuds. In 217 Rome sent envoys to Philip of Macedon
demanding the surrender of Demetrius (Livy 22, 33, 3). If this was her first diplomatic
contact with Macedon, it was an inauspicious one; for the demand was of the kind made
to a subject state and not to an equal and independent state, and Philip naturally refused
to comply. At this time Pinnes was visited by Roman envoys, who demanded arrears of
'tribute ', evidently a war-indemnity payable in instalments (Livy, ibid.); one wonders
if they got any change out of Pinnes. These actions are probably to be connected with
Rome's alarm when Hannibal reached Picenum and then Apulia on the Adriatic coast,
having won the battle of Lake Trasimene in summer 217.
At the same time Scerdilaidas had struck out on his own. By sea he sent 15 lembi
south of Lissus to attack Philip's friends off Leucas (Plb. 5, 95, i f., and 5, IOI) ; by land
he plundered Pissaeum, a Macedonian town in Pelagonia, won over by threats or promises 53
three towns in Dassaretis, namely Antipatrea, Chrysondyon and Gertous, and overran
much of that part of Macedonia which was conterminous with Pelagonia and Dassaretis
(Plb. 5, io8, I-2). As Demetrius had done in 220, Scerdilaidas passed through the high
country by Lake Lychnitis between the Parthinian territory of the Roman sector and
Macedonia and so entered Dassaretis, which Rome had left as a weak and unassigned buffer
area in her settlement of 219. Now Scerdilaidas used Dassaretis as a springboard for
attacking Macedonia, as the Romans were to do later in 200 B.C.54 Philip's counter-stroke was the obvious one, to cut the line of entry from northern Illyris into Dassaretis by
capturing the district round Lake Lychnitis. Philip therefore ' won back' (Plb. 5, io8, 8,
avEKTilacro) Antipatrea, Chrysondyon and Gertous, and then ' captured' (KcTErEAasTo)
a number of places: Creonium and Gerous in Dassaretis; of the people round Lake
Lychnitis Enchelanae, Cerax, Sation and Boii; in the territory of the Caloecini Bantia;
and also of the so-called Pisantini Orgyssus.55 The winter of 217 was now upon him and
he disbanded his troops. He had put a stopper on Scerdilaidas, but he had done something
which might be more dangerous than anything Scerdilaidas could ever do. He had made
himself the immediate neighbour of Rome by occupying Dassaretis. On her side Rome
accepted the defeated Scerdilaidas as an ally, just as Philip had recently accepted Demetrius.
Polybius believed that in acting against Scerdilaidas in 2I7 Philip wished to consolidate
his position in Illyris and then to cross over to Italy, a course advised especially by Demetrius
(Plb. 5, Ioi, 6 f. ; 5, 105, i and 5 ; 5, io8, 4 f.). It is possible that Polybius formed this
belief in view of Philip's actions in 216 and 214; for in 217, whatever ideas he did or did
not have about Italy, Philip was compelled by his interests at home to stop Scerdilaidas'
raids on Macedonian territory. When Philip occupied Dassaretis, then the question of
a move westwards became possible for the first time. But to anyone harbouring such an
ambition the strength of Rome's position in Illyris was clear. As we have seen, the coast
offers very few harbours. Not one of them was in Philip's hands. Scerdilaidas, who was
now seeking help from Rome, held the coast from Lissus northwards; Epid*mnus and
Apollonia held the coast as far as the entry to the Gulf of Valona; the buffer states of
Byllis, Amantia and Oricum held the coast of the Gulf; the Acroceraunian shore offered
no anchorages at all; and even the harbours of the Epirote League by Buthrotum were
blanketed by Rome's naval base on Corcyra. Yet, unless Philip could establish himself
on this coast, he had little or no chance of gaining control of Illyris; for so long as the
harbours of Apollonia and Epid*mnus were open and accessible to reinforcements and
supplies, Philip could not hope to reduce the cities by blockade or by siege. Any plan to
cross over to Italy would be pointless, if Philip did not already hold ports on the coast of
Illyris from which to despatch, supply and reinforce any troops he might want to land in
Italy.56 In addition, any lembi which he proposed to build would not be capable of meeting Rome's quinqueremes in a naval action; therefore he could not challenge Rome's naval
supremacy. So far as Illyris was concerned, he might be able to deliver an assault force
unexpectedly at a strategic place,57 provided that there were no quinqueremes within
range, and so capture a port which he could then defend. The obvious target was Apollonia;
it was farthest away from Scerdilaidas' bases in the Adriatic Sea, it was closest to Macedonian
troops in Dassaretis, and the navigable river, the Aous, was not only easy for an assault
force to seize by surprise but also would give harbourage to an attacking fleet.
Philip made two attempts. In the winter of 217/6 he used Illyrian shipwrights to
build him a hundred lembi in Macedonian ports. Setting out from Macedonia he rounded
the Peloponnese and reached Leucas in early summer 216. There he ascertained that the
Roman fleet was lying off Lilybaeum in western Sicily. He sailed on northwards, passed
Corcyra and at night time was close to the mouth of the river Aous and ready to deliver
his assault force,58 when the report reached him that Roman quinqueremes were actually
crossing over, bound for Apollonia (Plb. 5, 109-I IO). It appears that Scerdilaidas, knowing
that Illyrian shipwrights were being employed by Philip, had informed Rome and had
asked for help in order to stiffen his own naval forces, and it was in answer to this request
that some quinqueremes were detached from the fleet at Lilybaeum and sent across the
Ionian Gulf (Plb. 5, IIo, 8-9). The timing was in fact fortuitous. But Philip could not
know that, nor could he tell how many quinqueremes were on the way (in fact there were
only ten). He therefore withdrew hastily.59 An actual clash between Macedonian and
Roman troops was thus averted.
The expedition had two effects. In 215 Philip approached Hannibal and obtained
an alliance, under which, if they made peace with Rome, one condition would be that
Rome would never make war on Macedon and Rome should no longer be in control of
Corcyra, or of Apollonia and Epid*mnus, or of Pharos, or of Dimallum and the Parthini,
or of Atintanis, and should surrender to Demetrius of Pharos those of his friends who were
interned on Roman soil (Plb. 7, 9, I3). This would give Philip what he wanted most,
a guarantee against Roman attack and the removal of Roman power from Illyris. Meanwhile
he may have hoped for naval help from Carthage in another attack on Apollonia and
Hannibal may have hoped for some military help in Italy from Macedon. But nothing
specific was arranged and nothing came of it. The phrase in Polybius' report of the treaty
(7, 9, II) pOT]i0e'UET5EE IITV cS &v XpEia1 i Kiai cos &v vp90 vilocopEv provided for a future
rather than an immediate contingency.60 On the Roman side the attempt by Philip on
Apollonia had revealed Philip's intentions; moreover, the treaty between Philip and
Hannibal became known to Rome when Philip's envoy fell into Roman hands. Consequently
Rome placed a fleet at Tarentum to guard the coast and watch Macedon (Livy 23, 38, 9).
A state of war now existed in fact between Macedon and Rome.
In 214 Hannibal and Philip undertook concerted, if not simultaneous, actions against
Tarentum on the one hand and Apollonia on the other hand. The action at Tarentum
engaged the attention of the Roman fleet and enabled Philip to reach the Aous river without
being intercepted. This time he sailed up the Aous with izo lembi and attacked the town.
On the landward side an army which had marched up through the territory of his ally the
Epirote League,61 and also probably some troops from Dassaretis, joined in the attack.
His siege engines tried to breach the circuit wall, which exceeded four kilometres in length.
When he did not obtain immediate success, he switched his attack one night to Oricum
and captured that city and its capacious harbour.62 By now news had reached the Roman
fleet at Brundisium. Laevinus crossed over, probably with 50 warships and a legio classica
(Livy 24, 1i, 3), and captured Oricum. He then passed a relieving force into Apollonia
at night unobserved. This force together with the Apolloniates made a sortie the following
night, killed almost 3,000 men, captured rather more, and brought the Macedonian siege
train inside the walls. The Roman fleet then entered the mouth of the Aous river. Philip
burnt his fleet and withdrew his army through Dassaretis into Macedonia. Rome now
took Oricum into its zone of dependent states and stationed a fleet there, in order to extend
its naval holdings and to patrol both sides of the straits (Livy 24, 40,17 ; Plb. 8, I).63 The first
clash between Macedonian and Roman troops had resulted in a severe defeat for Macedon.
The failure of his two attempts on Apollonia caused Philip to change his strategy.
He set out now to reduce the area of the Roman sector gradually and to open up an entry
into the territory of the Ardiaei. This he achieved in the course of 213 and 212. He
captured Dimallum (now, if not in the campaign of 214) and probably Gerunium and
Orgessus; he consolidated his control of Dassaretis; he brought the Atintani and the
Parthini over to his side and so opened up the way into northern Illyris. He was probably
operating in Atintanis, when he marched in two days to Lissus and Acrolissus, which were
his next objective (Plb. 8, I3-I4). These two strong places were defended not only by their
inhabitants but also by troops from the neighbouring parts of Illyris. Philip captured both
places by a brilliant stratagem and by hard fighting, and his success led to the surrender or
reduction of all the Illyrians of the neighbourhood (&CravTc-Trr o0ST rrppi). Now or soon
afterwards his rule extended over the southern group of Ardiaei around Scodra, the subjects
hitherto of Rome's friend Scerdilaidas.64 These successes enabled Philip to isolate
Epid*mnus and Apollonia and to put economic pressure upon them. It was now possible
for him to build and man a fleet of lembi on the Adriatic coast, instead of in the Thermaic
Gulf; if the earliest coinages of Lissus and Scodra are correctly dated c. 211, they may
have been issued to pay shipwrights and purchase timber for Macedon. With such a fleet
he could attempt to capture Apollonia or Epid*mnus or both and so eliminate the Roman
holding in Illyris. He might also make contact at sea with his Carthaginian allies; for the
Carthaginian fleet was operating off Syracuse, and Hannibal held Tarentum and most of
the harbours in Magna Graecia. A combined attack by Philip's lembi and the Carthaginian
fleet upon the Roman fleet based at Oricum was well within the realm of possibility.
The commander of the Roman fleet took the initiative by forming an alliance probably
in 21i between Rome and the Aetolian League. The alliance was directed against Macedon 65
and defined the spheres of looting (these divided at Corcyra, Livy 26, 24, i) ; Rome was
to act at sea with not less than 25 quinqueremes, the hope being expressed that Scerdilaidas
and his son Pleuratus would join the alliance (and provide their fleet of lembi) ; and the
Aetolians were to attack Macedon on land. When Philip heard at Pella of the alliance, he
made a sudden attack upon the territory of Oricum and Apollonia, and when the army of
Apollonia made a sortie he routed it (Livy 26, 25, I-2).66 It is clear that the Roman fleet
and troops were away at the time of Philip's attack, and that Philip's army was not large if the Apolloniates alone made a sortie. It is possible, then, that Philip made his attack both
from the land and from the sea, using his Illyrian lembi based on Lissus at a time when the
Roman fleet was away. This suggestion gains some support from the statement in the
annalistic tradition that after the pact with Aetolia Philip advanced as far as Corcyra but
was frightened away by Laevinus, the commander of the Roman fleet (Zonaras 9, 6).
It also fits into Livy's account of Laevinus after the conclusion of the Aetolian treaty
operating against Zacynthos and Acarnania and then returning to Corcyra (Livy 26, 24,
15-i6).67 Immediately after these operations Philip laid waste the' nearest part of Illyricum',
translating the Greek word 'XlAupis( ' vastatis proximis Illyrici '), a very vague phrase,
which may refer to the tribes of the upper Drilon valley, as he then moved into Pelagonia.
Thereafter we hear no more of him in Illyris, although Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus threatened
trouble in 207 (Plb. 10, 41, 4; Livy 28, 5, 7). For a time the Aetolian League served
Rome's interest well. At an unsuccessful peace conference in 208 the League demanded
inter alia that Atintanis should be restored to Rome and the Ardiaei to Scerdilaidas and
Pleuratus (thus excluding Philip from northern Illyris and its coast). In 206 the League
made a separate peace with Philip and naturally made no demands on Rome's behalf as
regards Illyris.
The peace left Philip free to concentrate on Illyris, where only Epid*mnus and
Apollonia and farther south Oricum were hostile to him. However, the Romans moved
first, probably in spring 205, sending io,ooo infantry, I,ooo cavalry and 35 warships to
land at Epid*mnus (Livy 29, 12, i). The Myzeqija was then flooded and the rivers were
in spate. The first impact of the army was on the Parthini in the Shkumbi valley, through
which it had to move in order to lay siege to Dimallum. The first objective of the Romans
was to secure the line of communication between Epid*mnus and Apollonia, which runs
along the inland side of the plain on rising ground overlooked by Dimallum and other
places situated on the range of Mt. Shpiragrit. The news reached Philip, who was probably
in Macedonia, that the Roman force had come to Dyrrachium (Epid*mnus), that the
Parthini and other tribes in the vicinity were moved to hope for a revolutionary change
in the situation, and that the Romans were besieging Dimallum.68 If Philip took the shortest
route from Lower Macedonia, he went via Florina and through the Tsangon pass and
descended to Antipatrea (Berat).69 He found that the enemy had withdrawn to Apollonia.
He laid waste the territory of Apollonia, and he offered battle; but the Romans and the
Apolloniates remained behind the walls. The Roman commander had sent part of his
force by sea to Aetolia, asking the League to break its recently sworn treaty of peace
with Macedon. The Aetolians refused. The Epirote League then took the initiative and
negotiated a peace under which the Parthini, Dimallum, Bargullum and Eugenium were
to belong to Rome and Atintanis was to belong to Macedon, if the Senate agreed (as it
later did).70 Rome bargained well to get more than she possessed at the time,71 but Philip
was able to keep the door open towards northern Illyris through holding Atintanis and he
may still have controlled the southern Ardiaei, as no mention was made of any concessions
to Pleuratus 72 who was a signatory on the Roman side (Livy 29, I2, I4). Nevertheless Rome retained the essential bases at Epid*mnus, Apollonia and Oricum and the ability
to defend them at sea and on land. One factor made this settlement more likely to lead to
war than the settlement of 228. The buffer zones between the Roman sector and Macedonia
had disappeared. For Philip had taken control of northern Illyris and of Dassaretis, and
his acquisition of Atintanis made him an immediate neighbour of the Parthini in the upper
Shkumbi valley. We may think Philip would have been wiser now to have withdrawn and
disengaged. But we know from recent experience that that is difficult to achieve. Even if
Philip had disengaged in 205, it is doubtful if Rome would have played a different tune in
200.
When we consider the springs of Roman and Macedonian policy in Illyris, we must
remember that the Roman state and the Macedonian state alike were imperialist in the
proper sense of the term, that is in desiring power, the power of commanding other states,
and were not at any time in their history quietist or pacific states. This imperialistic
quality in Rome is obvious from the first act in Illyris. If Rome had desired only to punish
Teuta for the kidnapping or killing of Italian merchants or for the killing of her ambassador
allegedly or actually at Teuta's command, Rome would have attacked Teuta's kingdom
at its centre, that is in the region of Dubrovnik. In fact, Teuta escaped lightly. What
Rome took was not revenge on Teuta but command of a strategic area in Illyris, strategic
not only in a military and naval sense but also in an economic sense; and to this command
she clung consistently until in 200 her other major commitments were so much reduced
that she could exploit her strategic position against Macedonia. If it is claimed that Rome
took command of this strategic area in Illyris in order to stop Illyrian piracy, the facts are
that neither earlier nor now nor later did the independence of this sector of Illyris prevent
or even hinder substantially the practice of piracy by the Illyrians, nor did Rome ever use
her bases in her sector of Illyris to try to stop Illyrian piratical expeditions. An accurate
consideration of the geographical situation does much to make these conclusions clear and
convincing.
Between 228 and 205 Rome made enormous calls upon her manpower to meet her very
numerous commitments elsewhere, and the fact that she did not exploit her position in
Illyris in order to obtain further positions of command until 2II in the case of Greece
and until 200 in that of Macedonia is due to the overstraining of her resources in other
fields and not to a deep-seated pacificism or indifference. The deliberate choice of Rome
in 228 to send envoys not to her new near-neighbours, Macedon and the Epirote League,
but to the Aetolian League and the Achaean League, who were enemies of her nearneighbours,
showed once and for all that she was concerned not with the establishment of
pacific relations but with her future intentions. Again Rome's choice of an occasion on which
to open diplomatic negotiations with Macedon was not calculated to ease relations; for it
was a straight demand in 2I7 to surrender to Rome a man who had been for many years an
ally of Macedon. And her first positive step in Greece was to incite the Aetolian League
to attack Macedon by the treaty of alliance which Rome herself initiated in 211.
The Macedonian position was in many respects similar. From the outset Macedon
took no steps to cultivate diplomatic relations with Rome. When Demetrius defected from
Rome, Macedon accepted him as an ally and remained faithful to him even when Rome
had defeated him in 219. In the same way in 2 7 or 216 Rome accepted as an ally Scerdilaidas
who had attacked Macedon and been defeated by Macedon, and Rome remained faithful
to him. In the early years Macedon was careful not to exacerbate Rome; thus she did not
occupy Dassaretis or support Demetrius in his attacks on the Roman sector in Illyris or
in his piratical expeditions. The outbreak of the Second Punic War changed the situation
on both sides. Rome was alarmed lest Macedon enter the War, and her demand to Philip
to surrender Demetrius in 217 forced the issue for Macedon of compliance or resistance.
Macedon chose resistance because she aspired to power not only in Illyris but elsewhere
even as Rome did, and Macedon went on to occupy Dassaretis which invited friction with
Rome as an immediate neighbour. Rome's support of Scerdilaidas after his attack on Macedon
did nothing to lessen the chance of friction. Indeed it was at this point, if not earlier, that Philip of Macedon must have become convinced that Rome's intention was to make war
sooner or later on Macedon.
The decisive step which involved a serious risk of an armed clash between Rome and
Macedon was taken by Philip of Macedon. His attempt to take Apollonia by surprise in
216 before the battle of Cannae and before any understanding with Carthage was only part
of a plan to eliminate the Roman sector in Illyris, whether Rome reinforced her dependents
there or not. It was chance rather than design which averted a clash on this occasion
between Macedonian troops and Roman troops. Again, Macedon took the first step in
constructing an alliance directed specifically against Rome in 215 ; the riposte to this was
made by Rome in 211 when she allied herself with the Aetolian League against Macedon.
And it was Macedon's attack on Apollonia in 214 which led to the first clash between
Macedonian troops and Roman troops; in this instance Macedon was certainly the
aggressor. From then on until the peace of Phoenice in 205 hostilities continued if and when
their other commitments allowed.
There are some who excuse the desire for power, which is the basis of imperialism,
on the grounds that it is a form of defence against domination or subjugation by some other
power. When they apply this doctrine to Rome, they see in her acts this form of defence
magnified to the nth degree. In this context, however, we must excuse not Rome but
Macedon on these grounds. For in occupying a sector of Illyris Rome was not averting any
threat of domination or destruction by Illyrians or by anyone else in 229; and again in
keeping this sector of Illyris in the final settlement she was not averting such a threat by
Macedon or anyone else in 205. On the other hand in 228 and in 2I7 Macedon had good
reason to suspect that Rome intended to dominate her and in the end destroy her independence.
This basic fear came to the surface in the clause which Philip must have inspired in the
Punic-Macedonian pact of 215, under which the first condition of a joint peace with Rome
was (Plb. 7, 9, I3) 'that it shall not be possible ever for Rome to begin a war against
Macedon'. Moreover Macedon's fear was a realistic one; for Rome's resources far
exceeded Macedon's on any estimate,73 and Rome enrolled against Macedon not only in
216 the Ardiaean monarchy, which she had originally set out in 229 to chastise, but also
in 211 a strong coalition of Greek states led by the Aetolian League.
In the final analysis the incidents which we have been studying in Illyris arose from
a Roman settlement in 229 which had little to do with precautions against piracy and
everything to do with her own desire for power. If there had been no imperialistic power in
that part of the Balkans, Rome would have stood still in Illyris until after 200, not from
lack of desire to go further but from the pressure of other commitments. But there was
another imperialistic power in the vicinity, aware of Rome's desire for power and alarmed
by Rome's technique in diplomacy. Under these conditions a conflict between these two
imperialistic states, both strong in the desire for power, was as likely to break out as the
conflict between Athens and Sparta had been in 432. The attendant circumstance of the
second Punic War delayed the ultimate conflict but helped to incite actions on both sides
which led to the state of war which culminated in 205. Once Carthage was defeated the
delay was brief indeed, not because Macedon wanted the ultimate conflict in 200 but because
Rome did.
University of Bristol
Author(s): N. G. L. Hammond
Source: The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 58, Parts 1 and 2, (1968), pp. 1-21
Published by: Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies
Stable URL: www.jstor.org/stable/299691
In JRS LVI (I966) I gave a description of the Aoi Stena which was based on autopsy,
and I discussed the campaigns of Rome against Philip V of Macedon in the years 200 to
198 B.C. In this paper I am concerned with the area farther north which Rome acquired
in 229 B.C. and with the actions which took place there before 200 B.c. Many scholars
have discussed Rome's early activities in Illyris but practically none of them has trodden
the ground. My knowledge of most of the area may help me to advance more down-toearth
views of the extent of Rome's sector in Illyris and of Roman and Macedonian policies.
I include some new evidence on the position of Dimallum.1
The salient feature of Central Albania is the belt of coastal plain which extends from
north of Lesh (Lissus) to north of the Gulf of Valona (see fig. i). The widest and richest
part of this plain is in the Myzeqija, which extends southwards from Kavaje. The Myzeqija
in particular is integral to the economy of Central Albania, the area which was called
Southern Illyris in the third century B.C. The transhumance of sheep has always been
practised in this part of the Balkans, and the coastal plain of Albania with months of very
heavy rainfall in October and March affords exceptionally fine pasturage for the winter
period. The owners of the flocks which are driven from the plain to the mountains for
pasture in the summer months have their homes not in the swampy plains but in the hills
of the interior. On the other hand during the summer the coastal plain grows the cereals
which are consumed in the hinterland, where there is a deficiency of arable land.2 Thus
the lord of the plains has a stranglehold on the economy of Central Albania. In the third
century B.C. the Myzeqija was held by the two Greek cities, Apollonia and Epid*mnus.
From a military point of view the coastal plain is difficult to defend. In the spring and
early summer and again in the autumn it is so heavily flooded that movement by an army
across it is not possible,3 and for purposes of movement and communication an occupying
force must possess the rising ground which runs from Apollonia in the south through
Kug, Lushnje and Kavaje to Epid*mnus in the north. Even so there is no possibility of
defence in depth against an enemy who attacks from the hinterland, and the obvious
policy for an occupying power would be to hold or threaten the main route of entry from
the east, namely the Shkumbi valley, and also to hold the range on the southern rim of
the plain. Of this range Mt. Shpiragrit is the most important part because it faces Berat,
through which the subsidiary routes from the east pass as if through a funnel. I became
aware of these economic and military factors when I travelled in late March and early
April from Durres (Epid*mnus) via Kavaje to Elbasan in the Shkumbi valley, seeing the
river in spate, the coastal plain flooded and the numerous herds of sheep assembling on
the higher ground for the move eastwards, and then again in the summer on other occasions
when I went from Elbasan to Berat and from there to Poyani (Apollonia), and when I
walked from Byllis in the Aous valley to Berat via Metoh, taking six and a half hours.
The defence of the coastal plain against an enemy attacking either from the south or from the north raises different problems. Here the occupying force has depth but his
front is narrow and can be easily turned; it is therefore necessary to protect the open
flank by holding some of the hill country. In December I940 the Italian army in central
Albania held a position facing south and covering what General Papagos called 'the
Kelcyre and Tepelene junctions ', i.e. the Aoi Stena together with the passes at either
end of the Stena (see JRS LVI, 40, fig. 2). This was always the strongest position for an
army in Illyris to hold against an attack delivered from within Epirus. Failing this, such
an army would be wise to hold the hilly country just south of and to the east of Apollonia.
Both at the Aoi Stena and at Apollonia a flank guard is needed, reaching into the hills
towards Mt. Tomor, and covering Berat.5 Defence against an enemy attacking from the
north is made difficult by the deep re-entrant through the upper valley of the Black Drin,
which rises in Lake Ochrid. In consequence it is necessary either to hold the area north
of the Drin, that is on a line running inland from Scodra, or to hold the hill country to
the north of the Shkumbi valley running inland from Durres (Epid*mnus).
To the mariner Central Albania is distinctly unattractive. The coast between the
Gulf of Valona and Ulcinj is generally flat and featureless; it offers few roadsteads and
fewer harbours; and it is rendered dangerous not only by the southwesterly gales and in
places by the northerly ' Bora ' but also by the changing positions of offshore banks which
extend out to sea as far as three miles. The advice of The Mediterranean Pilot 6 to the
sailor setting off on the 40 mile stretch from the Bay of Valona to Kep i Gagji is brief and
to the point: ' the utmost caution should be exercised when approaching this portion of
the coast and at night it should be given a wide berth '. 6 Indeed for the hundred miles
between the Gulf of Valona and Ulcinj there are only two sets of harbours. The first was
controlled in ancient times by Epid*mnus. It consists of Durres harbour, formed by two
moles, and of Pali Bay, 6 miles to the north. Each offers shelter from some winds. Between
them runs a high ridge (the name Dyrrachium was derived from it), which is a conspicuous
feature ' showing from afar like an island with five heads ' and of great value for making
a landfall.7 The second set is in the Gulf of the Drin : the mouth of the Drin, navigable to
Lesh; the harbour of Shen-Gjin or S. Giovanni di Medua, entered by a narrow channel
and suitable for small vessels (the Nymphaeum of Caesar, BC 3, 26, 4, ' qui ab Africo
tegebatur, ab Austro non erat tutus '); the navigable river Buene, giving access to the
Lake of Scodra, which is only 6 metres above sea level (Livy's ' Barbanna ... ex Labeatide
palude oriens', 44, 31, 3); 8 and the small harbour of Ulcinj (the Roman Ulcinium),
dangerous in southeasterly winds. Between them this set of harbours offer shelter from
any wind. In antiquity Lissus had a harbour but this has silted up and disappeared. And
in the south the mouth of the Aous (Vijose), navigable as far as Apollonia, was used but
only when conditions of weather were favourable (cf. Plu., Caes. 38). But then, as now,
Epid*mnus was the most important station on the coast; anyone holding Epid*mnus
and denying access to its harbours can make navigation along or towards this coast under
sail extremely difficult in bad weather.9
In the days of sail this coast was important for reasons which no longer obtain (see
fig. 2). The direct crossing of the Straits of Otranto from the all-weather harbour of
Oricum in the Bay of Valona to the heel of Italy was rendered dangerous by exposure to
the Bora and the southwesterlies, which create very rough, steep seas, and by the proximity
of the formidable Acroceraunian coast. In consequence sailors preferred to cross the Ionian Gulf from Epid*mnus to Bari or Brindisi.10 Thus Epid*mnus served Greeks
trading to the west and Italians trading to the east. At the same time it was the main port
of call in the Ionian Gulf for shipping up and down the Adriatic Sea, and so was of paramount
importance to those Illyrians who concerned themselves with the sea. The coast of Central
Albania has never bred a seafaring tradition, not surprisingly in view of its nature, but the
islands off the river Narenta (the ancient Naro) and the fjords such as that of Kotor (' Sinus
Rhizonicus ') produced Illyrian navies from time to time. The Illyrian warship, whether
developed by the Liburnians or the Ardiaeans, was small and extremely fast under oar and
under sail, and it was more fitted for raiding than for set engagements at sea.11 Such
Illyrian navies were always anxious to gain possession of Epid*mnus. The Liburnians held
the site in the seventh century, Monunius early in the third century; and the Ardiaeans,
whose naval power was based on the area of the islands and fjords but extended to the
southern Ardiaeans by the Gulf of the Drin, were inevitably drawn towards it in the latter
part of the third century.
The first occasion of Roman intervention across the Adriatic Sea was a naval occasion.
It was prompted by the scale and success of the piratical Illyrian raiders, who had made
a habit of raiding the coasts of Elis and Messenia, defeated an Aetolian army at Medeon
in Acarnania in 231, and then in 230 not only raided the coasts of Elis and Messenia once
more but captured Phoenice in Epirus and compelled the Epirote League to enter into
alliance. More than piracy at sea was involved; for a land force under Scerdilaidas invaded
Epirus at such short notice that we may infer that the Illyrians held the area between
Berat and the lower Aous valley as well as 'some parts of Epirus ' (App., Illyr. 7, T-rS
'HrrEipovu rvca).12 In 230 this expanding Illyrian state was in alliance with Macedon,
Acarnania and Epirus (Plb. 2, 6, 9). In spring 229 B.C. an Illyrian fleet, assisted by
Acarnanian ships, defeated the fleets of the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, gained possession
of Corcyra and laid siege to Epid*mnus. The Illyrians, led by Teuta, widow of Agron,
king of the Ardiaei,13 were within an ace of controlling the entire coast from Dubrovnik
to the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf.14 Meanwhile Rome was on the move. Italians
trading by sea towards the east had been molested repeatedly in recent years by the
Illyrians, and in the course of 230 B.C. more Italians than usual had been intercepted at
sea, robbed, kidnapped or killed.15 The Senate sent ambassadors to Queen Teuta late in 230 B.C. The conversations ended in a fracas, and one of the ambassadors was assassinated
on the way back.16 The Senate then began to organize a naval and military force. However,
it did not declare its intentions to Teuta, and she operated during the first part of the
campaigning season of 229 B.C. as if her position was not under threat from Rome.
In the first Punic War Rome had become painfully aware of sea power, and she had
realized that the long coast of Italy was vulnerable to seaborne attack. Hamilcar Barca
had raided Locri and other places in south Italy, and in 246 Rome had planted a colony
at Brundisium, which faces the Ionian Gulf. During the war Italy had traded very intensively across the Ionian Gulf,17 partly because the Carthaginian raiders had not penetrated into
these waters. If the Illyrians now succeeded in their aims, they would close the mouth
of the Adriatic Sea and control the approaches to South Italy through the Ionian Gulf
from their bases on the coast and on Corcyra. For a variety of reasons 18 the Senate was
not prepared to let this happen. In the second part of the campaigning season Rome sent
into action 200 ships, 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry-a large force, but not unduly
large for the task the Senate envisaged.19 The campaign was brilliantly conducted (Plb.
2, i). The Roman fleet sailed first to Corcyra, where Teuta's commander, Demetrius
of Pharos, having previously come to a secret understanding with Rome, handed over the
island. It then sailed to Apollonia, which joined the Roman cause, and met there the
Roman army which had been brought over from Italy. They advanced next towards
Epid*mnus, the fleet sailing along the coast and the army probably moving along the
eastern side of the Myzeqija plain, where the 2,000 cavalry had excellent ground for
manoeuvre and plenty of pasture. The Illyrians abandoned the siege of Epid*mnus, which
now joined the Roman cause. The Roman army then turned further inland and overran
the Ardiaei,20 probably in the lowlands and the hinterland between the Mati and the
Drin,21 and the Roman fleet, sailing up the coast and taking some places by assault, relieved
the island of Issa, which the Illyrians were besieging. Army and fleet then returned to
Epid*mnus. Casualties had been suffered during the last phase only, for instance at an
unidentified place called Noutria.
The spectacular success of Roman arms was due to careful planning, the suddenness
of the unheralded attack (critics might have called it a treacherous attack),22 the doubledealing
of Demetrius of Pharos and the accession of Apollonia. The strategy was good:
the seizure of Corcyra cut off the possibility of naval reinforcements from Acarnania, the
occupation of Apollonia and the Myzeqija cut off the possibility of land reinforcements from Epirus, and the rolling up of the Illyrians on a narrow front with naval support and
a mobile cavalry force cost Rome few casualties. The whole campaign was over so quickly
that Teuta's other ally, Macedon, could not have intervened in time to forestall the Illyrian
collapse, even if she had wished to do so.
Victory won, Rome had several courses open to her. She could pursue the defeated
Illyrians to Arbon and Rhizon, where they had taken refuge, and give a knock-out blow
to the Ardiaean monarchy. She could occupy with troops or with colonists the strategic
points in the areas she had overrun, e.g. Corcyra, Apollonia, Epid*mnus, Issa and Pharos,
and thus control the approaches by sea to the outlet of the Adriatic Sea; she would then
hold safe ports on the eastern coast of that sea to balance Brundisium. She could treat the
whole operation as a punitive raid and withdraw her forces, having taught Teuta a salutary
lesson and leaving her friends in Illyris and the islands to maintain their independence as
they had done hitherto. In fact she chose a course intermediate between the second and
the third of those which I have suggested. She set up Demetrius as ruler of a kingdom 23
based on Pharos and including most of the Illyrians overrun by Rome (particularly, I
imagine, in the area of Scodra), and she no doubt hoped he would act as a buffer between
Rome and the Ardiaean monarchy. Issa in the north and Corcyra in the south became in
effect dependents of Rome, Issa providing a contingent later to the Roman navy. On the
mainland, although the Romans were approached by the envoys of a number of tribes
during the advance northwards from Epid*mnus (Plb. 2, I, I , cavyjj4av-rTcv 6 TwpEcyUEvrTOV
ca-rTOisK Cal XrAEovc1v), they accepted only the Parthini and the Atintani into what was or
became a position of dependency. They already had Epid*mnus and Apollonia on their
side. During the winter of 229-8 one of the consuls stayed with forty ships and conscripted
a force " from the surrounding states " which kept an eye on the Ardiaei and the other
(Illyrians) who had submitted to Rome. In spring 228 B.C. Teuta opened negotiations
with Rome and concluded a treaty under which she undertook to pay an indemnity,
evacuate all " Illyris " except for a few districts, and not sail beyond Lissus with more than
two lembi even unarmed.24 On the conclusion of the treaty the Roman consul sent envoys
to the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, explaining the reasons for Rome's initiative and
the terms of the treaty she had concluded with the Illyrians. They doubtless emphasized
the fact that they had delivered the Greek cities of Corcyra, Apollonia, Epid*mnus and Issa
from the common enemy, the Illyrians. The envoys received a friendly welcome and then
returned to Corcyra.
The Roman settlement needs some clarification on the geographical side (see fig. i
with Inset). Epid*mnus and Apollonia were both wealthy Greek city-states with a very copious silver coinage which had a wide circulation. There is no doubt that each of them
had an extensive territory. We have more information about Apollonia. In her coinage
from 229 B.C. onwards she showed the Nymphaeum, which we know was close to her
frontier with Byllis and Amantia, independent states which held the north side of the
Aous valley above the vicinity of Romes.25 The mass of Apollonia's territory was then not
to the south but in the Mizeqija, extending northwards certainly to the Semeni (Apsus) 26
and probably to the Shkumbi (Genusus) and inland towards Mt. Shpiragrit. Epid*mnus
is likely to have controlled both the plain of the Arzen river and the northern part of the
Myzeqija as far south at least as the north bank of the Shkumbi river. As Asparagium
(probably Rogozine) was in her territory,27 she formed the outlet through which all trade
following the north side of the Shkumbi valley had to pass. The Parthini were a tribe
adjacent to Epid*mnus (Appian, BC 5, 75, gevos 'ETrBl&a,vcp-r apoiKov; cf. Dio. 41, 49, 2).
When Pompey moved from Epid*mnus to the north bank of the Semeni (Apsus) and Caesar
moved from Apollonia to the south bank of the Semeni (Apsus), they faced each other
probably at Ku9. When Caesar entered the Shkumbi (Genusus) valley probably through the
sink southwest of Elbasan in order to pursue Pompey down the valley to Asparagium, he
captured on his way a Parthinian town which Pompey had garrisoned (Caesar, BC 3, 41, I,
and Dio 4I, 47, I). Thus the Parthini held at least the middle valley of the Shkumbi
(Genusus) river. Moreover, as Pliny reported that the Parthini had the Dassaretii 'behind
them ' (NH 3, I45) and as the Dassaretii extended as far east as at least Lychnidus (Livy 43,
9, 7), the Parthini held the upper valley too.28 The Atintani, as I have shown elsewhere,29
have nothing to do with the Atintanes in the upper Drin valley in Epirus but are an Illyrian
tribe about one day's journey from Epid*mnus in the direction of Macedonia, and occupying
very high country, visible from Epid*mnus and near the (Macedonian) frontier of Illyris
(Polyaenus 4, 11, 4). This tribe evidently held the region of ?(ermenike, which extends
from just north of Elbasan to the watershed of the highest reaches of the Black Drin.
The dispositions of Rome in the northern part of Central Albania are now clear.
First Demetrius of Pharos as suzerain of some Illyrian tribes from north of Epid*mnus to
the vicinity perhaps of Scodra acted as a buffer between the Ardiaean monarchy and the
zone of direct dependence on Rome. Second, a continuous line was held by the dependents
of Rome-Epid*mnus, the Parthini and the Atintani-from the coast to the highest westerly
sources of the Black Drin and in sufficient depth to be defensible against attack from the
north. At the same time this defensive position not only cut off the Ardiaean monarchy
from its ally, Macedon, since the Dardani were pressing down upon Pelagonia at this
time,30 but also blocked the main route from Macedonia to the Adriatic coast, that later
followed by the Via Egnatia. The chief threat to this defensive position might come from
Dassaretis, the high territory between the two arms of the Semeni river, which are called the
Devoli and the Osum, and extending inland to the main watershed through which the
Tsangon pass and the pass of Vatokhorion lead into the Macedonian canton of Orestis.
In 230 B.C. Dassaretis was evidently under the control of the Illyrians, because Agron
held ' parts of Epirus ' and Scerdilaidas was able to move swiftly to Antigonea in Epirus
at a time when neither Agron nor Scerdilaidas held Apollonia (App., Illyr. 7 and Plb.
2, 5, 6). The defeat of Teuta's forces and Rome's alliance with Epid*mnus, the Parthini
and the Atintani left Dassaretis without any direct political affinity. Rome had the good
sense not to include it in the zone of direct dependence upon herself. Thus Dassaretis
became an independent area and formed a buffer between Macedon and Rome.
In the south the zone of direct dependence ended with the territory of Apollonia
(the Apolloniatis) which had a footing on the southern bank of the Vijose (Aous) but did
not include Aulon, Byllis, Amantia or Oricum. These four small states formed an
independent or neutral group situated between Rome and the Epirote League, of which
the northernmost cantons were Chaonia and Parauaea. The boundary to the southeast
will be defined more closely when we consider the position of Dimallum.31
Rome now had access by right to harbours in Demetrius' realm, at Lissus, Epid*mnus,
and the Vijose river, then navigable as far inland as Apollonia. On the other hand, the
Illyrians of Teuta's kingdom were not only debarred by treaty from sailing south of
Lissus with more than two unarmed lembi, but were in effect dependent on Rome's favour for
the peaceful use of these indispensable harbours. The economic interest of the neighbouring
coastal areas, that round Scodra32 in the north and that round the Gulf of Valona in the south,
drew them strongly to Rome, because Italy offered an excellent market for their products.
The inland areas of the Parthini, the Atintani and the Dassaretii depended, as we have seen,
upon the Myzeqija for winter pastures and for cereals and also upon Epid*mnus and
Apollonia for import and export, so that they too had an economic interest in adhering to
the political power which was lord of the plain. It is customary to call the zone of direct
dependence on Rome 'the Roman protectorate ', a vaguely benevolent and flattering
euphemism for an extremely shrewd extension of Roman power. Rome's dependents,
whether they enjoyed the title of ally or subject,33 were to be her dependents for good and
not free agents, able to transfer their allegiance to other states with impunity. We do not
know whether, once the treaty with Teuta was completed, Rome left any troops at
Epid*mnus or Apollonia, but the point is unimportant, since in a matter of hours she
could send an army across to her treaty-ports in order to hold the position defended by
her subjects. To use a modern phrase, she intended to maintain ' not a military presence
but a military capability-a capability to get troops there if they were needed '.
Having completed her dispositions, Rome disregarded Macedon, the Epirote League
and Acarnania, the very states which were most immediately affected by the appearance
of Rome as a new constellation on the eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea. Instead, Rome
sent embassies to the enemies of those three states, that is to the Aetolian and Achaean
Leagues, which had at least the superficial merit of being in opposition to Teuta's Illyrians,
and later to Corinth and Athens, both hostile to Macedon. This deliberate and public
move by Rome made it clear to Macedon and the Greeks that in any war in the southern
Balkans Rome's sympathies would lie initially with Aetolia and Achaea and against Macedon,
Epirus and Acarnania. The announcement of this alignment, coupled with the astute
organization of Roman interests in southern Illyris, could not fail to cause alarm in Macedon,
Epirus and Acarnania. It would be naive to suppose that Rome was unaware of the fact.34
The Roman successes at sea and on land had damaged the prestige but not the power
of the Ardiaean monarchy, which was based upon Dubrovnik and the Dalmatian coast; 35
and even within Illyris, an area which began probably around Scodra, a few districts were
still in Teuta's hands (Plb. 2, 12, 3). Demetrius of Pharos, who had the skill of a Perdiccas
in changing sides, became the successor of Teuta on her death and married Triteuta,
mother of the infant king, Pinnes, so that the first or northernmost part of the Roman
settlement collapsed completely. There was no longer any buffer between the Ardiaean
monarchy and the zone of direct dependence on Rome. Meanwhile Rome became deeply
involved in a war with the Gauls in the Po valley which lasted from 225 to 222 B.C., and
within these years Demetrius advanced both at sea and on land, engaging in piracy south
of the Lissus line and winning over the Atintani from Rome.36 The latter step was the more
important; for Demetrius was thereby opening the door to co-operation with Antigonus
Doson, king of Macedon, and also making infiltration into Dassaretis possible if he gained
Antigonus' co-operation. In 223 B.C. Demetrius accompanied Antigonus on his invasion
of the Peloponnese and in 222 B.C. Demetrius' force of i,6oo Illyrians played an important
part in the battle of Sellasia. Polybius enumerates them among Macedon's allies (2, 65, 4).37
Early in 220 Demetrius and Scerdilaidas sailed south of Lissus with 90 lembi and carried
their raids into the Cyclades (Plb. 3, i6, 3 ; cf. 4, i6, 6-9, and 4, 19, 7-9). In this year a
Roman fleet suppressed some pirates, probably the Istrians (App., Illyr. 8).38 In this year also Demetrius was ravaging the territory of ' the states in Illyris subject to Rome ' and
was trying to subdue them (Plb. 3, i6, 3).39 In order to do this effectively, he came through
the gap opened by the defection of the Atintani, entered Dassaretis and attacked the
Parthini and the Apolloniates from there.
In 2i9 the Romans sent the two consuls with an army which was probably as large as
that of 229 B.C. to punish Demetrius and his Illyrian collaborators (Appian, ibid.). The
attack was again unheralded, but Demetrius had laid his plans in advance. He placed a
considerable garrison with suitable supplies in Dimallum, evidently a town of which he
already had possession, and he brought about changes of government in his favour 'in the
other states ', which presumably now for the first time he took under his influence (Plb.
3, I8, i).40 Having established Dimallum as a strong point, he went to Pharos and prepared
to hold Pharos with a picked force. On landing in Illyris, the Romans attacked Dimallum
first; knowing it was thought to be impregnable, the consuls hoped to capture it and spread
alarm among the Illyrians. Dimallum fell in a week. Envoys came in from ' all the states '
with offers of submission. The consuls made appropriate agreements in each case and then
moved on to attack Pharos. The island fell, but Demetrius escaped. At Actium he joined
Philip of Macedon, who had inherited Antigonus' friendship with him and had himself
visited Scerdilaidas in the winter of 220-219. The Romans crossed over from Pharos to
Illyris, gained control of the rest of Illyris and made a settlement of all its affairs. A triumph
was accorded to the consuls on their return to Rome at the end of the summer.41
The Roman intervention of 2I9 needs little explanation. Demetrius had flouted the
Roman settlement of 229 all along the line by deserting with the dependents Rome had given
him, by detaching the Atintani from their allegiance to Rome, by sailing in strength south
of Lissus, by ravaging the territories of Rome's dependents (evidently those of the Parthini,
Epid*mnus and Apollonia) and by trying to subdue them and so eliminate Rome's holding
on the mainland. The Senate must have seen that inaction would be fatal to her position
in Illyris. Once in control, with Macedon, Epirus and Acarnania as his accomplices, if
not his formal allies, Demetrius rather than Rome would control the Ionian Gulf and the
Straits of Otranto at the very time when a renewal of war with Carthage might be expected. 42
The terms of the Roman settlement in 219 are not described in our sources. It should be noted that even less than in 229 did Rome attack the basis of Illyrian power which lay
farther north, and it may be doubted whether on this occasion her forces penetrated even
to Scodra. Moreover, no steps were taken against Scerdilaidas, though he also had sailed
south of Lissus and he also was an ally of Philip. Clearly Rome had no desire at this time
to go too far or to increase her commitment in Illyris. Wherever she went, she certainly
put pro-Roman parties in power, but it seems as if Dimallum may have been the only
addition she made to the number of dependents she had had since 229; for in 215, when
Hannibal and Philip made an alliance, one of their aims was to prevent Rome from being
in control of Corcyra, of Apollonia and Epid*mnus, of Pharos, of ' Dimale' and the
Parthini, and of Atintanis (Plb. 7, 9, I3). Thus in 219 the Senate seems to have been
content to restore her full control of the 229 group of states, which interposed a barrier
between the Illyrians and the Macedonians, blocked the easiest route from Macedonia
into this group of states, and left independent or buffer areas north of Epid*mnus, in
Dassaretis and in the Gulf of Valona and its hinterland. No doubt she reiterated the ban
on Illyrian lembi sailing south of Lissus. Once again Rome did nothing either to ease or
to exacerbate relations with Macedon or Epirus. Yet her determination to stand firm in
Illyris was itself alarming in view of Rome's record and reputation. On the other side
Antigonus' and Philip's acceptance of Demetrius as an ally in good fortune and in bad
made it equally clear that Macedon favoured Rome's enemies in Illyris and was prepared to
show it.43 In modern terminology Rome and Macedon were now engaged in a ' cold war '.
We must pause in the narrative to consider the position of Dimallum. It has been
placed by scholars on the coast, not on the coast, near Epid*mnus, in the territory of the
Parthini and not in the territory of the Parthini.44 Consideration of the texts and of the
geographical conditions can reduce the number of alternatives. The coast between
Epid*mnus and the Gulf of Valona is low and swampy; a broken line of low hills runs
parallel to the coast, except at Barderoll where the hill comes down to the coast itself;
and then inland of the line of hills there is a swampy plain once again. Now Dimallum
was so strongly situated as to be thought impregnable (Plb. 3, i8, 3). It would be difficult
to find even at Barderoll an impregnable site along this coast. Moreover, Dimallum was
in dispute between Rome and Macedon (Livy 29, i2, 13); we therefore need a place on
the Macedonian side of the Roman block of territory and not on this coast which belonged
mainly (and had done for centuries) to Epid*mnus and Apollonia. As regards the Parthini
and Dimallum the one is a tribal state, subsuming under its name the ' urbes Parthinorum '
(Livy 43, 23, 6), and the other is a city, probably autonomous, negotiable as a separate entity
between Rome and Macedon. The two are always mentioned as separate units by Polybius
and Livy Plb. 7, 9, I3, UIr8' ETvatiP coiaious KUvpOUKvE pKupacioJvi rS' 'Aro ovIcTrovK iI
'ETricbavicov tr&8 Oa)povu pTr6s Atip&?aAr1KsC I TapeE0ivcov lPr6' 'A-rVravia ; Livy 29, I2, 3,
' Parthinosque et propinquas gentes alias motas esse ad spem novandi res, Dimallumque
oppugnare (sc. Romanos)
' ; Livy 29, 12, 13 'ut Parthini et Dimallum et Bargullum et
Eugenium Romanorum essent '. I conclude then that Dimallum (and also Bargullum and
Eugenium) are not Parthinian towns 45 nor in Parthinian territory, which extended from
the upper valley of the Shkumbi to somewhere inland of Asparagium (probably Rogozine),
which was in the territory of Epid*mnus. It follows then that Dimallum lay either north
of the line of Epid*mnian and Parthinian territory, that is facing northern Illyris, or south
of Parthinian territory and east of Apolloniatis, that is facing Dassaretis.
Those who
place Dimallum near Epid*mnus do not rely on any ancient evidence. But there is a clue
to the contrary in Livy 29, I2, 5, where the Roman consul who had gone from Epid*mnus
to Dimallum, abandoning the siege, retired to Apollonia (' quo Sempronius se receperat '),
and from this I infer that Dimallum lay nearer to Apollonia than to Epid*mnus. But the
decisive point is that Dimallum was in dispute between Rome and Macedon at a time when
Macedon held nothing north of Epid*mnus but did hold Dassaretis. Dimallum, then,
lay between Apolloniatis and Dassaretis, to the south of the Shkumbi valley, and therefore
probably on the range of Mt. Shpiragrit.
' La decouverte de la cite illyrienne de Dimale' is the title of an article published by
Burhan Dautaj in Studia Albanica 1965, I, 65-7I, of which an offprint was very kindly
sent to me in 1967 by Professor Frano Prendi. In I963 and I964 Dautaj excavated the
fortress of Krotine,46 which is situated on ' a fine peak' of the Shpiragrit range (see fig. 3).
This peak, being 404 metres above sea-level, is the highest of the western outliers of the
range; it has ravines on three sides of it, and there are traces of a circuit-wall on the steep
slopes. It was an exceptionally strong place and might well have been thought impregnable.
There are two summits inside the circuit, the higher being the acropolis and the lower
providing accommodation for three-quarters of the population. Praschniker estimated
the circuit of the wall to be 2,400 metres. When the acropolis was excavated the most
important discovery was that of numerous stamped tiles of Hellenistic date, rectangular,
red to grey in colour, some long and narrow with squared edges, others broad with slightly
rounded edges. Within an excavated area of some 500 square metres Dautaj found no less than 150 tiles stamped on the edge with the monogram shown in fig. 4(a), and he deduced
that these tiles were local to the site. In addition to the monogram i6 tiles were stamped
with the name NEYTQP or NE22TQP in the nominative, which appears to be that of a
local potter since it is not found on stamped tiles elsewhere in Albania. Four tiles bear
stamped monograms and the stamped word AIMAAAITAN, cf. (fig. 4(b). Twelve tiles are
stamped HPAIQN, a name which appears also on tiles of Apollonia; but these tiles are
smaller and poorly made compared with those of Apollonia. They were made presumably
for members of a cult in honour of Hera or for a group so-called, like the Heraeis of early
Megara.47 One tile had a genitive plural ending in - OANIQN. Names in the genitive,
evidently of magistrates, were stamped on other tiles: AMYNTA, APMHNOC,
API:TOMENEOS and - MAXOY.48
The word AIMAAAITAN written with the broken-bar alpha has the same form of
genitive and much the same lettering as AlX:ITAN on coins of Lissus attributable to
some time within the period 250-200 B.C.49 The name of the city at this time was evidently
Ai|caXAoSo r AhiaAAXoavs we find Dimallum in Livy. It is a Greek word meaning ' of double fleece ', very suitable to a place overlooking the rich sheep-pastures of the Myzeqija.50
Another independent city, Eugenium, in this region has a Greek name, used of a type of
laurel.51 Coins were found on the acropolis of Dimallum. The earliest of these were
coins of Epid*mnus dating to the period 320-270 B.C. The city may have been founded
c. 290 B.C. by Pyrrhus or his successors, to control the route along the side of the plain
to the sink between the Semeni and the Shkumbi rivers, just as Antigonea was founded by
him farther south.52 In any case it seems beyond doubt that this is the city into which
Demetrius put a garrison in 219 when he had overrun Dassaretis. We do not know its
earlier history. It may have been taken by Rome already in 229, because it threatened
the route along the side of the Myzeqija, and it may then have gone over to or been acquired
by Demetrius at some time before 219. In any case, once captured by assault in 219,
Dimallum was regarded by Rome as her possession, as Plb. 7, 9, 13 shows.
The Roman settlement of 219 was treated with scant respect. In 218 Demetrius may
have indulged in raiding again (App., Illyr. 8 fin.), and Scerdilaidas certainly sailed south
of Lissus and supported Philip in his naval enterprises that year. Rome may have sent a
punitive force against Demetrius at or near Pharos, and she kept on good terms with the
young king, Pinnes, ruler of the Ardiaean state (App., Illyr. ibid.). Scerdilaidas had
troubles in Illyris with' city-dynasts ' (Plb. 5, 4, 3 -roAtluvv&orraas)n d these troubles limited
the help he gave to Philip in this year; the ' city-dynasts ' may have been persons set up
under the Roman settlement of 219, but many other explanations for their activities are
possible in an area so split by tribal feuds. In 217 Rome sent envoys to Philip of Macedon
demanding the surrender of Demetrius (Livy 22, 33, 3). If this was her first diplomatic
contact with Macedon, it was an inauspicious one; for the demand was of the kind made
to a subject state and not to an equal and independent state, and Philip naturally refused
to comply. At this time Pinnes was visited by Roman envoys, who demanded arrears of
'tribute ', evidently a war-indemnity payable in instalments (Livy, ibid.); one wonders
if they got any change out of Pinnes. These actions are probably to be connected with
Rome's alarm when Hannibal reached Picenum and then Apulia on the Adriatic coast,
having won the battle of Lake Trasimene in summer 217.
At the same time Scerdilaidas had struck out on his own. By sea he sent 15 lembi
south of Lissus to attack Philip's friends off Leucas (Plb. 5, 95, i f., and 5, IOI) ; by land
he plundered Pissaeum, a Macedonian town in Pelagonia, won over by threats or promises 53
three towns in Dassaretis, namely Antipatrea, Chrysondyon and Gertous, and overran
much of that part of Macedonia which was conterminous with Pelagonia and Dassaretis
(Plb. 5, io8, I-2). As Demetrius had done in 220, Scerdilaidas passed through the high
country by Lake Lychnitis between the Parthinian territory of the Roman sector and
Macedonia and so entered Dassaretis, which Rome had left as a weak and unassigned buffer
area in her settlement of 219. Now Scerdilaidas used Dassaretis as a springboard for
attacking Macedonia, as the Romans were to do later in 200 B.C.54 Philip's counter-stroke was the obvious one, to cut the line of entry from northern Illyris into Dassaretis by
capturing the district round Lake Lychnitis. Philip therefore ' won back' (Plb. 5, io8, 8,
avEKTilacro) Antipatrea, Chrysondyon and Gertous, and then ' captured' (KcTErEAasTo)
a number of places: Creonium and Gerous in Dassaretis; of the people round Lake
Lychnitis Enchelanae, Cerax, Sation and Boii; in the territory of the Caloecini Bantia;
and also of the so-called Pisantini Orgyssus.55 The winter of 217 was now upon him and
he disbanded his troops. He had put a stopper on Scerdilaidas, but he had done something
which might be more dangerous than anything Scerdilaidas could ever do. He had made
himself the immediate neighbour of Rome by occupying Dassaretis. On her side Rome
accepted the defeated Scerdilaidas as an ally, just as Philip had recently accepted Demetrius.
Polybius believed that in acting against Scerdilaidas in 2I7 Philip wished to consolidate
his position in Illyris and then to cross over to Italy, a course advised especially by Demetrius
(Plb. 5, Ioi, 6 f. ; 5, 105, i and 5 ; 5, io8, 4 f.). It is possible that Polybius formed this
belief in view of Philip's actions in 216 and 214; for in 217, whatever ideas he did or did
not have about Italy, Philip was compelled by his interests at home to stop Scerdilaidas'
raids on Macedonian territory. When Philip occupied Dassaretis, then the question of
a move westwards became possible for the first time. But to anyone harbouring such an
ambition the strength of Rome's position in Illyris was clear. As we have seen, the coast
offers very few harbours. Not one of them was in Philip's hands. Scerdilaidas, who was
now seeking help from Rome, held the coast from Lissus northwards; Epid*mnus and
Apollonia held the coast as far as the entry to the Gulf of Valona; the buffer states of
Byllis, Amantia and Oricum held the coast of the Gulf; the Acroceraunian shore offered
no anchorages at all; and even the harbours of the Epirote League by Buthrotum were
blanketed by Rome's naval base on Corcyra. Yet, unless Philip could establish himself
on this coast, he had little or no chance of gaining control of Illyris; for so long as the
harbours of Apollonia and Epid*mnus were open and accessible to reinforcements and
supplies, Philip could not hope to reduce the cities by blockade or by siege. Any plan to
cross over to Italy would be pointless, if Philip did not already hold ports on the coast of
Illyris from which to despatch, supply and reinforce any troops he might want to land in
Italy.56 In addition, any lembi which he proposed to build would not be capable of meeting Rome's quinqueremes in a naval action; therefore he could not challenge Rome's naval
supremacy. So far as Illyris was concerned, he might be able to deliver an assault force
unexpectedly at a strategic place,57 provided that there were no quinqueremes within
range, and so capture a port which he could then defend. The obvious target was Apollonia;
it was farthest away from Scerdilaidas' bases in the Adriatic Sea, it was closest to Macedonian
troops in Dassaretis, and the navigable river, the Aous, was not only easy for an assault
force to seize by surprise but also would give harbourage to an attacking fleet.
Philip made two attempts. In the winter of 217/6 he used Illyrian shipwrights to
build him a hundred lembi in Macedonian ports. Setting out from Macedonia he rounded
the Peloponnese and reached Leucas in early summer 216. There he ascertained that the
Roman fleet was lying off Lilybaeum in western Sicily. He sailed on northwards, passed
Corcyra and at night time was close to the mouth of the river Aous and ready to deliver
his assault force,58 when the report reached him that Roman quinqueremes were actually
crossing over, bound for Apollonia (Plb. 5, 109-I IO). It appears that Scerdilaidas, knowing
that Illyrian shipwrights were being employed by Philip, had informed Rome and had
asked for help in order to stiffen his own naval forces, and it was in answer to this request
that some quinqueremes were detached from the fleet at Lilybaeum and sent across the
Ionian Gulf (Plb. 5, IIo, 8-9). The timing was in fact fortuitous. But Philip could not
know that, nor could he tell how many quinqueremes were on the way (in fact there were
only ten). He therefore withdrew hastily.59 An actual clash between Macedonian and
Roman troops was thus averted.
The expedition had two effects. In 215 Philip approached Hannibal and obtained
an alliance, under which, if they made peace with Rome, one condition would be that
Rome would never make war on Macedon and Rome should no longer be in control of
Corcyra, or of Apollonia and Epid*mnus, or of Pharos, or of Dimallum and the Parthini,
or of Atintanis, and should surrender to Demetrius of Pharos those of his friends who were
interned on Roman soil (Plb. 7, 9, I3). This would give Philip what he wanted most,
a guarantee against Roman attack and the removal of Roman power from Illyris. Meanwhile
he may have hoped for naval help from Carthage in another attack on Apollonia and
Hannibal may have hoped for some military help in Italy from Macedon. But nothing
specific was arranged and nothing came of it. The phrase in Polybius' report of the treaty
(7, 9, II) pOT]i0e'UET5EE IITV cS &v XpEia1 i Kiai cos &v vp90 vilocopEv provided for a future
rather than an immediate contingency.60 On the Roman side the attempt by Philip on
Apollonia had revealed Philip's intentions; moreover, the treaty between Philip and
Hannibal became known to Rome when Philip's envoy fell into Roman hands. Consequently
Rome placed a fleet at Tarentum to guard the coast and watch Macedon (Livy 23, 38, 9).
A state of war now existed in fact between Macedon and Rome.
In 214 Hannibal and Philip undertook concerted, if not simultaneous, actions against
Tarentum on the one hand and Apollonia on the other hand. The action at Tarentum
engaged the attention of the Roman fleet and enabled Philip to reach the Aous river without
being intercepted. This time he sailed up the Aous with izo lembi and attacked the town.
On the landward side an army which had marched up through the territory of his ally the
Epirote League,61 and also probably some troops from Dassaretis, joined in the attack.
His siege engines tried to breach the circuit wall, which exceeded four kilometres in length.
When he did not obtain immediate success, he switched his attack one night to Oricum
and captured that city and its capacious harbour.62 By now news had reached the Roman
fleet at Brundisium. Laevinus crossed over, probably with 50 warships and a legio classica
(Livy 24, 1i, 3), and captured Oricum. He then passed a relieving force into Apollonia
at night unobserved. This force together with the Apolloniates made a sortie the following
night, killed almost 3,000 men, captured rather more, and brought the Macedonian siege
train inside the walls. The Roman fleet then entered the mouth of the Aous river. Philip
burnt his fleet and withdrew his army through Dassaretis into Macedonia. Rome now
took Oricum into its zone of dependent states and stationed a fleet there, in order to extend
its naval holdings and to patrol both sides of the straits (Livy 24, 40,17 ; Plb. 8, I).63 The first
clash between Macedonian and Roman troops had resulted in a severe defeat for Macedon.
The failure of his two attempts on Apollonia caused Philip to change his strategy.
He set out now to reduce the area of the Roman sector gradually and to open up an entry
into the territory of the Ardiaei. This he achieved in the course of 213 and 212. He
captured Dimallum (now, if not in the campaign of 214) and probably Gerunium and
Orgessus; he consolidated his control of Dassaretis; he brought the Atintani and the
Parthini over to his side and so opened up the way into northern Illyris. He was probably
operating in Atintanis, when he marched in two days to Lissus and Acrolissus, which were
his next objective (Plb. 8, I3-I4). These two strong places were defended not only by their
inhabitants but also by troops from the neighbouring parts of Illyris. Philip captured both
places by a brilliant stratagem and by hard fighting, and his success led to the surrender or
reduction of all the Illyrians of the neighbourhood (&CravTc-Trr o0ST rrppi). Now or soon
afterwards his rule extended over the southern group of Ardiaei around Scodra, the subjects
hitherto of Rome's friend Scerdilaidas.64 These successes enabled Philip to isolate
Epid*mnus and Apollonia and to put economic pressure upon them. It was now possible
for him to build and man a fleet of lembi on the Adriatic coast, instead of in the Thermaic
Gulf; if the earliest coinages of Lissus and Scodra are correctly dated c. 211, they may
have been issued to pay shipwrights and purchase timber for Macedon. With such a fleet
he could attempt to capture Apollonia or Epid*mnus or both and so eliminate the Roman
holding in Illyris. He might also make contact at sea with his Carthaginian allies; for the
Carthaginian fleet was operating off Syracuse, and Hannibal held Tarentum and most of
the harbours in Magna Graecia. A combined attack by Philip's lembi and the Carthaginian
fleet upon the Roman fleet based at Oricum was well within the realm of possibility.
The commander of the Roman fleet took the initiative by forming an alliance probably
in 21i between Rome and the Aetolian League. The alliance was directed against Macedon 65
and defined the spheres of looting (these divided at Corcyra, Livy 26, 24, i) ; Rome was
to act at sea with not less than 25 quinqueremes, the hope being expressed that Scerdilaidas
and his son Pleuratus would join the alliance (and provide their fleet of lembi) ; and the
Aetolians were to attack Macedon on land. When Philip heard at Pella of the alliance, he
made a sudden attack upon the territory of Oricum and Apollonia, and when the army of
Apollonia made a sortie he routed it (Livy 26, 25, I-2).66 It is clear that the Roman fleet
and troops were away at the time of Philip's attack, and that Philip's army was not large if the Apolloniates alone made a sortie. It is possible, then, that Philip made his attack both
from the land and from the sea, using his Illyrian lembi based on Lissus at a time when the
Roman fleet was away. This suggestion gains some support from the statement in the
annalistic tradition that after the pact with Aetolia Philip advanced as far as Corcyra but
was frightened away by Laevinus, the commander of the Roman fleet (Zonaras 9, 6).
It also fits into Livy's account of Laevinus after the conclusion of the Aetolian treaty
operating against Zacynthos and Acarnania and then returning to Corcyra (Livy 26, 24,
15-i6).67 Immediately after these operations Philip laid waste the' nearest part of Illyricum',
translating the Greek word 'XlAupis( ' vastatis proximis Illyrici '), a very vague phrase,
which may refer to the tribes of the upper Drilon valley, as he then moved into Pelagonia.
Thereafter we hear no more of him in Illyris, although Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus threatened
trouble in 207 (Plb. 10, 41, 4; Livy 28, 5, 7). For a time the Aetolian League served
Rome's interest well. At an unsuccessful peace conference in 208 the League demanded
inter alia that Atintanis should be restored to Rome and the Ardiaei to Scerdilaidas and
Pleuratus (thus excluding Philip from northern Illyris and its coast). In 206 the League
made a separate peace with Philip and naturally made no demands on Rome's behalf as
regards Illyris.
The peace left Philip free to concentrate on Illyris, where only Epid*mnus and
Apollonia and farther south Oricum were hostile to him. However, the Romans moved
first, probably in spring 205, sending io,ooo infantry, I,ooo cavalry and 35 warships to
land at Epid*mnus (Livy 29, 12, i). The Myzeqija was then flooded and the rivers were
in spate. The first impact of the army was on the Parthini in the Shkumbi valley, through
which it had to move in order to lay siege to Dimallum. The first objective of the Romans
was to secure the line of communication between Epid*mnus and Apollonia, which runs
along the inland side of the plain on rising ground overlooked by Dimallum and other
places situated on the range of Mt. Shpiragrit. The news reached Philip, who was probably
in Macedonia, that the Roman force had come to Dyrrachium (Epid*mnus), that the
Parthini and other tribes in the vicinity were moved to hope for a revolutionary change
in the situation, and that the Romans were besieging Dimallum.68 If Philip took the shortest
route from Lower Macedonia, he went via Florina and through the Tsangon pass and
descended to Antipatrea (Berat).69 He found that the enemy had withdrawn to Apollonia.
He laid waste the territory of Apollonia, and he offered battle; but the Romans and the
Apolloniates remained behind the walls. The Roman commander had sent part of his
force by sea to Aetolia, asking the League to break its recently sworn treaty of peace
with Macedon. The Aetolians refused. The Epirote League then took the initiative and
negotiated a peace under which the Parthini, Dimallum, Bargullum and Eugenium were
to belong to Rome and Atintanis was to belong to Macedon, if the Senate agreed (as it
later did).70 Rome bargained well to get more than she possessed at the time,71 but Philip
was able to keep the door open towards northern Illyris through holding Atintanis and he
may still have controlled the southern Ardiaei, as no mention was made of any concessions
to Pleuratus 72 who was a signatory on the Roman side (Livy 29, I2, I4). Nevertheless Rome retained the essential bases at Epid*mnus, Apollonia and Oricum and the ability
to defend them at sea and on land. One factor made this settlement more likely to lead to
war than the settlement of 228. The buffer zones between the Roman sector and Macedonia
had disappeared. For Philip had taken control of northern Illyris and of Dassaretis, and
his acquisition of Atintanis made him an immediate neighbour of the Parthini in the upper
Shkumbi valley. We may think Philip would have been wiser now to have withdrawn and
disengaged. But we know from recent experience that that is difficult to achieve. Even if
Philip had disengaged in 205, it is doubtful if Rome would have played a different tune in
200.
When we consider the springs of Roman and Macedonian policy in Illyris, we must
remember that the Roman state and the Macedonian state alike were imperialist in the
proper sense of the term, that is in desiring power, the power of commanding other states,
and were not at any time in their history quietist or pacific states. This imperialistic
quality in Rome is obvious from the first act in Illyris. If Rome had desired only to punish
Teuta for the kidnapping or killing of Italian merchants or for the killing of her ambassador
allegedly or actually at Teuta's command, Rome would have attacked Teuta's kingdom
at its centre, that is in the region of Dubrovnik. In fact, Teuta escaped lightly. What
Rome took was not revenge on Teuta but command of a strategic area in Illyris, strategic
not only in a military and naval sense but also in an economic sense; and to this command
she clung consistently until in 200 her other major commitments were so much reduced
that she could exploit her strategic position against Macedonia. If it is claimed that Rome
took command of this strategic area in Illyris in order to stop Illyrian piracy, the facts are
that neither earlier nor now nor later did the independence of this sector of Illyris prevent
or even hinder substantially the practice of piracy by the Illyrians, nor did Rome ever use
her bases in her sector of Illyris to try to stop Illyrian piratical expeditions. An accurate
consideration of the geographical situation does much to make these conclusions clear and
convincing.
Between 228 and 205 Rome made enormous calls upon her manpower to meet her very
numerous commitments elsewhere, and the fact that she did not exploit her position in
Illyris in order to obtain further positions of command until 2II in the case of Greece
and until 200 in that of Macedonia is due to the overstraining of her resources in other
fields and not to a deep-seated pacificism or indifference. The deliberate choice of Rome
in 228 to send envoys not to her new near-neighbours, Macedon and the Epirote League,
but to the Aetolian League and the Achaean League, who were enemies of her nearneighbours,
showed once and for all that she was concerned not with the establishment of
pacific relations but with her future intentions. Again Rome's choice of an occasion on which
to open diplomatic negotiations with Macedon was not calculated to ease relations; for it
was a straight demand in 2I7 to surrender to Rome a man who had been for many years an
ally of Macedon. And her first positive step in Greece was to incite the Aetolian League
to attack Macedon by the treaty of alliance which Rome herself initiated in 211.
The Macedonian position was in many respects similar. From the outset Macedon
took no steps to cultivate diplomatic relations with Rome. When Demetrius defected from
Rome, Macedon accepted him as an ally and remained faithful to him even when Rome
had defeated him in 219. In the same way in 2 7 or 216 Rome accepted as an ally Scerdilaidas
who had attacked Macedon and been defeated by Macedon, and Rome remained faithful
to him. In the early years Macedon was careful not to exacerbate Rome; thus she did not
occupy Dassaretis or support Demetrius in his attacks on the Roman sector in Illyris or
in his piratical expeditions. The outbreak of the Second Punic War changed the situation
on both sides. Rome was alarmed lest Macedon enter the War, and her demand to Philip
to surrender Demetrius in 217 forced the issue for Macedon of compliance or resistance.
Macedon chose resistance because she aspired to power not only in Illyris but elsewhere
even as Rome did, and Macedon went on to occupy Dassaretis which invited friction with
Rome as an immediate neighbour. Rome's support of Scerdilaidas after his attack on Macedon
did nothing to lessen the chance of friction. Indeed it was at this point, if not earlier, that Philip of Macedon must have become convinced that Rome's intention was to make war
sooner or later on Macedon.
The decisive step which involved a serious risk of an armed clash between Rome and
Macedon was taken by Philip of Macedon. His attempt to take Apollonia by surprise in
216 before the battle of Cannae and before any understanding with Carthage was only part
of a plan to eliminate the Roman sector in Illyris, whether Rome reinforced her dependents
there or not. It was chance rather than design which averted a clash on this occasion
between Macedonian troops and Roman troops. Again, Macedon took the first step in
constructing an alliance directed specifically against Rome in 215 ; the riposte to this was
made by Rome in 211 when she allied herself with the Aetolian League against Macedon.
And it was Macedon's attack on Apollonia in 214 which led to the first clash between
Macedonian troops and Roman troops; in this instance Macedon was certainly the
aggressor. From then on until the peace of Phoenice in 205 hostilities continued if and when
their other commitments allowed.
There are some who excuse the desire for power, which is the basis of imperialism,
on the grounds that it is a form of defence against domination or subjugation by some other
power. When they apply this doctrine to Rome, they see in her acts this form of defence
magnified to the nth degree. In this context, however, we must excuse not Rome but
Macedon on these grounds. For in occupying a sector of Illyris Rome was not averting any
threat of domination or destruction by Illyrians or by anyone else in 229; and again in
keeping this sector of Illyris in the final settlement she was not averting such a threat by
Macedon or anyone else in 205. On the other hand in 228 and in 2I7 Macedon had good
reason to suspect that Rome intended to dominate her and in the end destroy her independence.
This basic fear came to the surface in the clause which Philip must have inspired in the
Punic-Macedonian pact of 215, under which the first condition of a joint peace with Rome
was (Plb. 7, 9, I3) 'that it shall not be possible ever for Rome to begin a war against
Macedon'. Moreover Macedon's fear was a realistic one; for Rome's resources far
exceeded Macedon's on any estimate,73 and Rome enrolled against Macedon not only in
216 the Ardiaean monarchy, which she had originally set out in 229 to chastise, but also
in 211 a strong coalition of Greek states led by the Aetolian League.
In the final analysis the incidents which we have been studying in Illyris arose from
a Roman settlement in 229 which had little to do with precautions against piracy and
everything to do with her own desire for power. If there had been no imperialistic power in
that part of the Balkans, Rome would have stood still in Illyris until after 200, not from
lack of desire to go further but from the pressure of other commitments. But there was
another imperialistic power in the vicinity, aware of Rome's desire for power and alarmed
by Rome's technique in diplomacy. Under these conditions a conflict between these two
imperialistic states, both strong in the desire for power, was as likely to break out as the
conflict between Athens and Sparta had been in 432. The attendant circumstance of the
second Punic War delayed the ultimate conflict but helped to incite actions on both sides
which led to the state of war which culminated in 205. Once Carthage was defeated the
delay was brief indeed, not because Macedon wanted the ultimate conflict in 200 but because
Rome did.
University of Bristol