Post by Arxileas on Oct 11, 2007 23:17:19 GMT -5
Greece’s role in Russia’s plans for Southeast Europe
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to Greece – beyond producing the expected agreement on the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline – marked a reawakening of Russian interest in the region of Southeast Europe. Until recently, this region was low on Moscow’s foreign policy agenda, but the gradual revival of Russian influence, however opportunistic, is creating a context within which the Kremlin can attempt a total comeback on the international stage. Fast-paced development of its influence in its near-abroad – the post-Soviet space – and optimum use of the tools that give it political influence – energy and arms – are part of Moscow’s attempt to extend its base into regions where it traditionally had a voice or
held sway.
Serbia and Montenegro, which up until recently was Russia’s closest ally in the Balkans, has split, on the one hand, and, on the other, is at the eye of the international community storm, so Moscow has a justifiable need to seek new, more reliable partners, and apparently sees in Greece a viable strategic partner that can be particularly useful in promoting its interests in the wider region, because:
• Greece has a stable political and economic environment that offers, via imminent privatisations, investment opportunities, and is without a doubt the most reliable country in the Balkans.
• Greece is the only country in the region that is a member state of the EU and NATO, and might, in given circumstances, be able to work for smoother progress on critical issues on the EU-Russian agenda.
• Greece has a political and economic base in the Balkans, and can provide a network to support Russian investments in a Balkan market with a population of 65 million.
• Due to its geographical position, Greece can function as a foothold in (stepping stone to) the wider Mediterranean region.
• A strengthening of Russian influence in Greece would send a clear message not only to the states of the regions, but also to strong outside players, such as the US.
• Compared with other European states, Greece has historically had close relations with Moscow. Greece and Russia have consistently had good political relations, in the sense that there is no distrust of, or ingrained negative attitude to, Russia in Greek society, whereas this is not the case in many new EU member states in Eastern Europe. This makes it easier for a given Greek government to enter into mutually beneficial agreements without meeting domestic resistance.
• Greece can in fact develop into a transit hub – not just for energy, but also for trade – promoting road and rail transport and linking Russian ports in the Black Sea with Thessaloniki and the wider Mediterranean region. The Russian side wants to utilise Greece’s shipping potential to move perishable agricultural products quickly and cheaply.
• The consistently good, if not particularly strong, political relations between Greece and Russia necessitate a strengthening of Greek-Russian economic relations to supplement the recent Moscow-Ankara rapprochement aimed at strengthening trade ties.
• Greece is seen as a key to the Kremlin’s endeavour to break into the arms market in the West.
• In energy-rich southern Russia, Moscow is seeking to limit dependence on Turkey by securing an outlet on the Mediterranean that bypasses the Bosporus, which can be achieved via Greek territory.
Russia sees conditions as being ripe for Greece – making the necessary moves on its own part – to redefine its priorities, making Russia an important ally. This will entail efforts on the part of the Kremlin to bolster the Greek economy with Russian capital in exchange for benefits of a geopolitical nature.
Putin’s visit showed that Greece is now part of Russia’s broader planning for the region extending from the Black Sea to Africa and the Middle East. The strong likelihood of Greece’s being called upon in the future to move within US-EU-Russia triangle augurs both well and ill. In any case, careful handling – based on sound assessment of the regional state of affairs, balance of power, and cost-benefit – will be required if a strengthened relationship with Moscow is to be rendered a valuable negotiating chip, rather than a pitfall, in Greece’s future transactions with the West.
Dr. Constantinos Filis
Coordinator, Center for Russia and Eurasia (www.cere.gr)
Institute International Relations
Panteion University
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to Greece – beyond producing the expected agreement on the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline – marked a reawakening of Russian interest in the region of Southeast Europe. Until recently, this region was low on Moscow’s foreign policy agenda, but the gradual revival of Russian influence, however opportunistic, is creating a context within which the Kremlin can attempt a total comeback on the international stage. Fast-paced development of its influence in its near-abroad – the post-Soviet space – and optimum use of the tools that give it political influence – energy and arms – are part of Moscow’s attempt to extend its base into regions where it traditionally had a voice or
held sway.
Serbia and Montenegro, which up until recently was Russia’s closest ally in the Balkans, has split, on the one hand, and, on the other, is at the eye of the international community storm, so Moscow has a justifiable need to seek new, more reliable partners, and apparently sees in Greece a viable strategic partner that can be particularly useful in promoting its interests in the wider region, because:
• Greece has a stable political and economic environment that offers, via imminent privatisations, investment opportunities, and is without a doubt the most reliable country in the Balkans.
• Greece is the only country in the region that is a member state of the EU and NATO, and might, in given circumstances, be able to work for smoother progress on critical issues on the EU-Russian agenda.
• Greece has a political and economic base in the Balkans, and can provide a network to support Russian investments in a Balkan market with a population of 65 million.
• Due to its geographical position, Greece can function as a foothold in (stepping stone to) the wider Mediterranean region.
• A strengthening of Russian influence in Greece would send a clear message not only to the states of the regions, but also to strong outside players, such as the US.
• Compared with other European states, Greece has historically had close relations with Moscow. Greece and Russia have consistently had good political relations, in the sense that there is no distrust of, or ingrained negative attitude to, Russia in Greek society, whereas this is not the case in many new EU member states in Eastern Europe. This makes it easier for a given Greek government to enter into mutually beneficial agreements without meeting domestic resistance.
• Greece can in fact develop into a transit hub – not just for energy, but also for trade – promoting road and rail transport and linking Russian ports in the Black Sea with Thessaloniki and the wider Mediterranean region. The Russian side wants to utilise Greece’s shipping potential to move perishable agricultural products quickly and cheaply.
• The consistently good, if not particularly strong, political relations between Greece and Russia necessitate a strengthening of Greek-Russian economic relations to supplement the recent Moscow-Ankara rapprochement aimed at strengthening trade ties.
• Greece is seen as a key to the Kremlin’s endeavour to break into the arms market in the West.
• In energy-rich southern Russia, Moscow is seeking to limit dependence on Turkey by securing an outlet on the Mediterranean that bypasses the Bosporus, which can be achieved via Greek territory.
Russia sees conditions as being ripe for Greece – making the necessary moves on its own part – to redefine its priorities, making Russia an important ally. This will entail efforts on the part of the Kremlin to bolster the Greek economy with Russian capital in exchange for benefits of a geopolitical nature.
Putin’s visit showed that Greece is now part of Russia’s broader planning for the region extending from the Black Sea to Africa and the Middle East. The strong likelihood of Greece’s being called upon in the future to move within US-EU-Russia triangle augurs both well and ill. In any case, careful handling – based on sound assessment of the regional state of affairs, balance of power, and cost-benefit – will be required if a strengthened relationship with Moscow is to be rendered a valuable negotiating chip, rather than a pitfall, in Greece’s future transactions with the West.
Dr. Constantinos Filis
Coordinator, Center for Russia and Eurasia (www.cere.gr)
Institute International Relations
Panteion University