Post by Bozur on Feb 17, 2005 14:05:24 GMT -5
Just how allied are Turkey and the USA while tensions over Kurds in Iraq persist?
President Bush’s strategists would do best to seek common ground between the two neighbors
EPAKurds living in Cyprus stage a rally outside the German Embassy in Nicosia yesterday. They are demanding the release of Remzi Kartal, a founder member of the Kurdish National Congress and former MP who was arrested in Nuremburg and is awaiting extradition.
By Burak Bekdil - Kathimerini English Edition
Turks often have an exaggerated love affair with the idea of their leaders showing teeth to foreign states. Decades ago, during a round of Cyprus negotiations in London, Suleyman Demirel, then premier, had occupied the entire front-page news coverage when newspapers unanimously said in bold headlines: “Demirel bangs his fist on the negotiating table.” There was just one problem, though; there was no table in the room where the meetings had taken place.
Last week, the Turkish press claimed that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had sent a: “very tough warning to the Washington administration” over Iraqi Kurds who have recently stepped up efforts for an eventual Kurdish state. How tough a warning, really, could Mr Erdogan have sent to Washington?
True, every passing hour is adding to the tension in the complex web of relationships between the Turks, Americans and Kurds. Ankara is increasingly concerned that the Kurds may wrest control of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk at the expense of local Arabs and Turkish-speaking Turkmens. It has said it reserves the right to take unspecified action to protect its security interests.
In response, Masoud Barzani, head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, has told Turkey it had no right to meddle in Iraq’s affairs and said any military intervention by Ankara aimed at stalling the creation of a Kurdish state would end in “disaster.” Does all that mean a looming war in Turkey’s southeast?
The story goes back to March 1, 2003, possibly the only single date that shapes the present dynamics of Turkish-American relations, the day when Turkey’s Parliament rejected a government resolution that would have allowed US troops to use Turkish soil as a northern front against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
Only a few days before the vote, Ankara and Washington had signed a memorandum of understanding to the effect that: (a) Iraq’s provinces and territory shall not belong to any particular ethnic group, but to the entire Iraqi people; (b) all terrorist groups in Iraq, including the PKK, shall be eliminated; and (c) Iraq’s natural resources shall belong, as a whole, to the Iraqi people and be used for the welfare of all Iraqis. As part of the understanding, Turkish troops would have entered northern Iraq together with the US forces and helped the allies restore stability there.
The vote failed, as some of Mr Erdogan’s MPs voted against it and some abstained from the session. Today, the Americans still suspect that it is basically impossible that MPs would fail to vote their party line. Thus, they think, Mr Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) controlled the vote to bring about a defeat of the US initiative, but softened the blow by making it close.
That was not the end of the episode. The AKP proposed to the United States that a second vote be taken and that that would have a good possibility of passing. The United States, in good faith, held two divisions off the Turkish coast, waiting for the vote, but the AKP eventually told the United States that the vote would not occur.
This had the effect of freezing 33 percent of the intended invasion force and keeping these forces from participating in the invasion. Further complicating matters was the fact that the two divisions that missed the invasion were the most powerful units in the US Army, and they were assigned the mission of driving rapidly through the Kurdish north and into the Sunni heartland. The Americans today think the fact that this did not happen led to the survival of the Sunni infrastructure that their troops are now fighting in Iraq.
Also, later, Turkey agreed to let aerospace rescue units deploy out of a Turkish-US airbase in southern Anatolia for the rescue of downed pilots. In fact, after the forces were moved to this base, the Turkish government refused to allow any rescue flights. As a result, the US aircraft were reassigned to Cyprus and Bulgaria, making their jobs vastly more dangerous and inefficient.
Thus, the Americans think, the Turkish actions were timed to attempt to inflict a military defeat on the allied forces. A flurry of bizarre comments from AKP bigwigs has further pushed the Americans into the suspicion of “deception.”
Last year, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul commented on the March 1 vote: “We did what we did because of our solidarity with the Iraqi people.” That was followed by a senior AKP deputy who labeled the United States’s military offensive against Falluja as “genocide.” Finally, Mr Erdogan himself referred to the vote as an aversion to siding with “oppression.”
Today many in the US administration believe that the AKP was in solidarity with the Sunni/Baathists, not the Iraqi people.
This may account for the current problems between Turkey and its traditionally closest Western ally. Despite a raft of very important Americans visiting Ankara in the span of a few weeks, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, there is clearly a lack of mutual trust. The heart of the matter is that the Turks do not trust the Americans about their intentions over the future of Iraq; and the Americans have not forgotten the March 1 vote.
Ankara keeps on saying that it could not stand idly by if Kirkuk fell into Kurdish hands. Although Mr Erdogan stops short of saying Turkey would send troops into northern Iraq, it is an open secret that all options are under review.
For example, the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based international conflict resolution think tank, has said that ethnic tensions in the disputed Kirkuk could spark a regional conflict and even prompt Turkish intervention.
”In northern Iraq, largely unnoticed, a conflict is brewing which, if allowed to boil over, could precipitate civil war, break up the country and, in a worst-case scenario, involve Turkish intervention,” the group said in a January 26 report titled “Iraq: Allaying Turkey’s Fears Over Kurdish Ambitions.”
Going back to the million-dollar question, does all this mean a looming war? Assuming that the Iraqi Kurds will not take bold action or a systematic offensive against the Turkmens, or do not provoke tensions with Ankara, a Turkish military incursion into Iraq is unlikely.
No one in Ankara is so senseless as to miss the bitter truth that any unilateral Turkish intervention will almost mean a de facto war with America. Besides, it would effectively kill Turkey’s chances to join the European Union.
But an all-out war against Iraqi Kurds (and America) is possibly not the only option for Ankara. After all, the Americans will not stay in this very volatile part of the world forever. If President George W. Bush’s strategists are wise enough and serious about their plans to democratize the Middle East, they should find common ground between the Turks and Kurds, rather than risking deeper hostilities.
www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/news/content.asp?aid=52704
President Bush’s strategists would do best to seek common ground between the two neighbors
EPAKurds living in Cyprus stage a rally outside the German Embassy in Nicosia yesterday. They are demanding the release of Remzi Kartal, a founder member of the Kurdish National Congress and former MP who was arrested in Nuremburg and is awaiting extradition.
By Burak Bekdil - Kathimerini English Edition
Turks often have an exaggerated love affair with the idea of their leaders showing teeth to foreign states. Decades ago, during a round of Cyprus negotiations in London, Suleyman Demirel, then premier, had occupied the entire front-page news coverage when newspapers unanimously said in bold headlines: “Demirel bangs his fist on the negotiating table.” There was just one problem, though; there was no table in the room where the meetings had taken place.
Last week, the Turkish press claimed that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had sent a: “very tough warning to the Washington administration” over Iraqi Kurds who have recently stepped up efforts for an eventual Kurdish state. How tough a warning, really, could Mr Erdogan have sent to Washington?
True, every passing hour is adding to the tension in the complex web of relationships between the Turks, Americans and Kurds. Ankara is increasingly concerned that the Kurds may wrest control of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk at the expense of local Arabs and Turkish-speaking Turkmens. It has said it reserves the right to take unspecified action to protect its security interests.
In response, Masoud Barzani, head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, has told Turkey it had no right to meddle in Iraq’s affairs and said any military intervention by Ankara aimed at stalling the creation of a Kurdish state would end in “disaster.” Does all that mean a looming war in Turkey’s southeast?
The story goes back to March 1, 2003, possibly the only single date that shapes the present dynamics of Turkish-American relations, the day when Turkey’s Parliament rejected a government resolution that would have allowed US troops to use Turkish soil as a northern front against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
Only a few days before the vote, Ankara and Washington had signed a memorandum of understanding to the effect that: (a) Iraq’s provinces and territory shall not belong to any particular ethnic group, but to the entire Iraqi people; (b) all terrorist groups in Iraq, including the PKK, shall be eliminated; and (c) Iraq’s natural resources shall belong, as a whole, to the Iraqi people and be used for the welfare of all Iraqis. As part of the understanding, Turkish troops would have entered northern Iraq together with the US forces and helped the allies restore stability there.
The vote failed, as some of Mr Erdogan’s MPs voted against it and some abstained from the session. Today, the Americans still suspect that it is basically impossible that MPs would fail to vote their party line. Thus, they think, Mr Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) controlled the vote to bring about a defeat of the US initiative, but softened the blow by making it close.
That was not the end of the episode. The AKP proposed to the United States that a second vote be taken and that that would have a good possibility of passing. The United States, in good faith, held two divisions off the Turkish coast, waiting for the vote, but the AKP eventually told the United States that the vote would not occur.
This had the effect of freezing 33 percent of the intended invasion force and keeping these forces from participating in the invasion. Further complicating matters was the fact that the two divisions that missed the invasion were the most powerful units in the US Army, and they were assigned the mission of driving rapidly through the Kurdish north and into the Sunni heartland. The Americans today think the fact that this did not happen led to the survival of the Sunni infrastructure that their troops are now fighting in Iraq.
Also, later, Turkey agreed to let aerospace rescue units deploy out of a Turkish-US airbase in southern Anatolia for the rescue of downed pilots. In fact, after the forces were moved to this base, the Turkish government refused to allow any rescue flights. As a result, the US aircraft were reassigned to Cyprus and Bulgaria, making their jobs vastly more dangerous and inefficient.
Thus, the Americans think, the Turkish actions were timed to attempt to inflict a military defeat on the allied forces. A flurry of bizarre comments from AKP bigwigs has further pushed the Americans into the suspicion of “deception.”
Last year, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul commented on the March 1 vote: “We did what we did because of our solidarity with the Iraqi people.” That was followed by a senior AKP deputy who labeled the United States’s military offensive against Falluja as “genocide.” Finally, Mr Erdogan himself referred to the vote as an aversion to siding with “oppression.”
Today many in the US administration believe that the AKP was in solidarity with the Sunni/Baathists, not the Iraqi people.
This may account for the current problems between Turkey and its traditionally closest Western ally. Despite a raft of very important Americans visiting Ankara in the span of a few weeks, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, there is clearly a lack of mutual trust. The heart of the matter is that the Turks do not trust the Americans about their intentions over the future of Iraq; and the Americans have not forgotten the March 1 vote.
Ankara keeps on saying that it could not stand idly by if Kirkuk fell into Kurdish hands. Although Mr Erdogan stops short of saying Turkey would send troops into northern Iraq, it is an open secret that all options are under review.
For example, the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based international conflict resolution think tank, has said that ethnic tensions in the disputed Kirkuk could spark a regional conflict and even prompt Turkish intervention.
”In northern Iraq, largely unnoticed, a conflict is brewing which, if allowed to boil over, could precipitate civil war, break up the country and, in a worst-case scenario, involve Turkish intervention,” the group said in a January 26 report titled “Iraq: Allaying Turkey’s Fears Over Kurdish Ambitions.”
Going back to the million-dollar question, does all this mean a looming war? Assuming that the Iraqi Kurds will not take bold action or a systematic offensive against the Turkmens, or do not provoke tensions with Ankara, a Turkish military incursion into Iraq is unlikely.
No one in Ankara is so senseless as to miss the bitter truth that any unilateral Turkish intervention will almost mean a de facto war with America. Besides, it would effectively kill Turkey’s chances to join the European Union.
But an all-out war against Iraqi Kurds (and America) is possibly not the only option for Ankara. After all, the Americans will not stay in this very volatile part of the world forever. If President George W. Bush’s strategists are wise enough and serious about their plans to democratize the Middle East, they should find common ground between the Turks and Kurds, rather than risking deeper hostilities.
www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/news/content.asp?aid=52704