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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 20, 2012 22:39:48 GMT -5
Armani, your a hypernationalistic teenager, your too blind and can't comprehend. I said, if your kinezo *Asparuch* was alive today he would be asking you, "why are you embarressed to have my mongolian blood".
Q is the same for Bulgaria as for Serbia? so, therefore serbia has 5% mongol looking people too?
PS Get out of here and munch on a spring roll!
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 20, 2012 22:07:32 GMT -5
World War III will start . I smell a Serbian sniper attempt This time, if there is a WW3, you'll be off to the Adriatic....1999 won't ever be repeating again!
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 20, 2012 22:06:18 GMT -5
This isn't her first time. I think she came in 2010, last time.
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 20, 2012 5:11:07 GMT -5
"U.S. secretary of state to visit Serbia in October"
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will arrive here in early October, writes the Belgrade-based daily, quoting "several diplomatic sources".
(KosovoCompromiseStuff) Wednesday, September 19, 2012 According to the report, she will meet with top Serbian officials to discuss the issues of Kosovo, Serbia's EU integration, and cooperation in fighting terrorism and organized crime. Clinton visited Belgrade previously in October 2010, as part of her Balkan tour. At the time, the U.S. official and her Serbian hosts discussed Serbia's EU integration and the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue.
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 20, 2012 5:06:50 GMT -5
^ What sort of influence will he have?
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 20, 2012 5:02:55 GMT -5
^ Brate, his still got alot to prove just yet!
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 20, 2012 5:00:37 GMT -5
^ Pyrro, any Albs with ove, ova, iqi, ica attached to a surname was an ex-slav.
Yes, Dushka means soul ;D
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 20, 2012 1:47:40 GMT -5
^ Krivo, l was kinda implying it ;D
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 19, 2012 23:37:51 GMT -5
"Albanians would've been so proud."
I know LMAO. Hey, you know the Borat film has help Kazakhstans economy LMAO
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 19, 2012 23:29:26 GMT -5
"Pyrros was never been in Bulgaria, i'm sure about that. He, along with Novi Pazar are just jelly that Bulgarians are more European than Serbs."
More European? Listen, your too hypernationalistic to REALISE your national name BULGARIA does NOT stem from Indo-European peoples, its EAST ASIAN and related to Mongolians/Turks/Koreans and Japanese!
You are blabbering on about the lack of Q gene in Bulgaria, well, Bulgaria does register a Q by up to 2% of its population and racial athropologists claim 5% of Bulgarians have a central asian appearance. This alien *Q* is your founders gene, be proud because its Asparuch's gift to you. If Asparuch were listening to you today he would say, just like Paisy, "why are you ashamed to be called a Bulgar and to have my blood" LMAO
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 19, 2012 23:06:30 GMT -5
"What? Have you seen Mongolian traditional clothing?"
Put some reading glasses on this time and look at pg.3 post 15 in this topic. You trying to be a pin up my backside again?
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 19, 2012 22:58:54 GMT -5
"all you up there a bunch of losers"
Finally its time to work Rex, and you'll be working ;D BLOOD, SWEAT AND TEARS!
You want land, well its time to work for it because everything is RELATIVE, nothing is for FREE. YOU MUST EARN THIS FROM YOUR MASTERS, Rex, they arn't Serbs this time round ;D
PS Albanians will be TRUELY SUFFERING.....its what they were hoping for when Serbs looked after them.....NOW, their dream to be suffering has finally come ;D ;D ;D ;D ;D ;D ;D ;D
The laugh is on you, ITS OVAH!
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 19, 2012 4:17:37 GMT -5
^ ;D PS Emperor Dusan, whom the stupid Bu Lgari say is 3/4 Bu Lgarin (His fathers father is 100% Serb). Bulgaro-Albanian logic?
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 19, 2012 4:09:58 GMT -5
Pyrro brate, the photo's of the BuLgari in their dress, well, look so MONGOLIAN?
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 19, 2012 1:34:07 GMT -5
Human Organ trafficking in Kosovo - EULEX on a Slippery Slope
In 2008, Carla Del Ponte, former ICTY chief prosecutor, published a book titled The Hunt: Me and War Criminals.
(Nikos Papakostas , Global Politician ) Monday, September 17, 2012
In 2008, Carla Del Ponte, former ICTY chief prosecutor, published a book titled The Hunt: Me and War Criminals. The book, apart from widespread criticism over the prosecutors self-serving presentation of facts and the self-righteous apprehension of her incumbency, revitalized the political and historical debate on the 1998-1999 conflict between the Federal Yugoslav Army and the Kosovo Liberation Army. Leaving aside Del Ponte s accusations of all implicated parties for their lack of cooperativeness and competence, which can be explained by the very nature of memoirs writing; the disclosure of the investigation that ICTY carried out in 2004 and was built on allegations of inhuman behavior and human organs trafficking which are supposed to have taken place after the conflict in 1999 by members of the Kosovo Liberation Army were without a doubt the most interesting insight of the book.
The investigation followed reports made by numerous local and international journalists who claimed that more than 300 people, Serb militants and civilians, Albanians who were considered cooperators with Serbian authorities and therefore traitors as well as a limited number of internationals, were subjected to bodily organs harvesting after being executed by KLA militants in the aftermath of the conflict. According to the prosecutor the harvesting of body parts, aimed for trafficking in the black market, took place in Albanian territory. Another point in Del Ponte s book that puzzled, to say the least, international analysts and policy makers was her disclosure that the evidence that had been painfully collected during the investigation at the so called " Yellow House " , that is at one of the key locations where the alleged harvesting of human organs took place (including heavy sedating medicine and evidence of blood stains), were destroyed without her permission in 2005.
Following the publication, the Council of Europe charged Swiss former senator Dick Marty, with an urgent probe on the case which lasted about a year and a half and resulted in a 27 page long draft report. The main findings of the report can be summed up as follows: a. highly ranked Kosovar politicians, including Prime Minister Hashim Thaci, led organized crime networks, namely the Drenica Group, involved in trafficking of drugs and human beings, other central political figures, close to PM Thaci were involved in a network of human organs trafficking that harvested body parts (primarily kidneys) from Serb and Albanian prisoners and trafficked them to the Black market while they were also present, they supervised or exercised themselves inhuman treatment on prisoners, the bulk of the human organs trafficking operation took place in Albania while the assertion of Tirana that no bodies are to be found in Albanian territory is logically unfounded , d. there are connections of the human organs trafficking networks operating in Albania after the conflict with the infamous Medicus case again involving political figures of the inner circle of Hashim Thaci.
The first and last points of the report are not going to be discussed here; on the one hand, because there is nothing really new about the former. The fact that trafficking activities, involving highly ranked political figures, were carried out by the KLA in order to keep the cash flow running is well-known to anyone who has followed a half decent bibliography regarding the 1998-1999 conflict . Besides, illegal activities, such as trafficking, during a conflict are to a large extent expected and usually go unpunished in the context of post-conflict reconciliation. With regards to the Medicus case, it is rather possible that the two probes have common links or even that they are parts of the same network, however, the point of the present article is to present human organs trafficking in the context of the conflict and the balance of powers it implies and the correlations between the two cases does not add anything in that regard.
Marty s report was enough to revitalize the international attention on the Kosovo conflict and to bring forward, once again, the frictions of the Security Council on issues related to the Western Balkans between US, UK and France, on the one end, and Russia and China, on the other. The official investigation of Marty s findings was taken up by EULEX, European Unions Rule of Law mission in Kosovo, causing Belgrade, but more intensely and vociferously its allies, Russia and China , discontent in the Security Council. Especially the latter, despite Belgrade s commitment for cooperation in the investigation regardless of the leading institution (EULEX or UN), raised serious concerns on the way the allegations are being investigated, accused the Head of EULEX probe, Clint Williamson of being biased and asked for a UN probe that could guarantee neutrality, adding that “the investigation into the involvement of Kosovo leaders is being conducted by the countries that, in the past, have helped these people come to power in Kosovo.
Currently, there are no less than six investigating teams on the human organs trafficking affair: the Serbian prosecutor s, the Pristina authorities , the OSCE s, the Council of Europe , the Russian and the EULEX one. In a region were IGOs over-population and duplication of mandates has been notorious, this is hardly promising. However, the main reason for the limited progress of the investigation so far has to do with Albania s refusal to allow international investigations to be extended on its ground claiming that it was not directly implicated in the conflict. Nevertheless, on May 3rd 2012, Albanian President Sali Berisha decided to finally open the doors to EULEX investigators and offered Albanian authorities unconditional support to their venture. Tirana s decision, depending on its handling by international missions and primarily EULEX, can be rendered a turning point with regards to the process of conflict resolution and the historical appraisal of the 1998-1999 war.
ANALYSIS
There is hardly any reason to assume that the Marty Report had different motives than the ones indicated by its author and that is to correct the misperceptions of the 1999 conflicts and the stereotypes it entailed, on the one hand, and to bring a sense of closure to missing persons families, on the other. Also, there is no reason to doubt that CoE interviews took place as reported and that the allegations made by Del Ponte were confirmed by former KLA militants to Dick Marty and his team. Thus, despite the vagueness of the allegations and the lack of concreteness and hard evidentiary support of Martys report, it appears that acts of inhuman treatment and also human organs theft and trafficking were, to one extent or the other, carried out after the conflictâs end. In that sense, it is only fair to note that the Council of Europe with its largely apolitical role duly published its findings in the way it did and refrained from providing further evidence that would disturb the probe of Pristina and EULEX or would jeopardize the wellbeing of the suspects .
However, the role and mandate of strongly political instruments with wide mandates, such as the EULEX and KFOR, constitutes the current probe a whole different, much more complicated story. First of all, it should be made clear that, since the allegations of inhuman treatment of prisoners and of human organs trafficking have been published it would be rather impossible for EULEX to dismiss them given that it is morally, legally and politically obliged not to. I make this clarification because, as it will be discussed later, the interests of the European Union (or NATO for that matter) do not lie in digging into past atrocities that could potentially raise more doubts over the missions legitimacy and competence within the Security Council, escalate pressure and scrutiny of its effectiveness and rise interethnic tensions.
The challenges EULEX has to face in order to build strong cases and achieve perpetrators indictments are manifold. First, as it has been repeatedly proven throughout international missions presence in Kosovo, cooperation between local and international institutions is limited and dysfunctional . Second, the bad shape of UNMIK records as well as the fragmentary investigation that resulted in 300.ooo pages of disarray handed over to EULEX in 2008, deprived the EU mission from essential data and testimonies that were either not collected or were lost or destroyed. Third, the elapse of thirteen years or so since the end of the conflict renders the collection of incriminating evidence rather unlikely while the destruction of the only reliable evidence in 2005 further undermines the venture. Fourth, the clannish structure of the Albanian society secures an omerta among witnesses and potential suspects and obstructs EULEX at building cases that almost exclusively depend on testimonies. Fifth, some of the primary suspects for the case enjoy diplomatic (as in the case of Hashim Thaci) or parliamentary immunity. Sixth, and arguably most importantly, the terrible records of EULEX as well as ICTY at witness protection, which resulted in suicides, accidents or straightforward killings of potential witnesses , render the prospect of new and reliable testimonies uncomfortably unlikely.
Finally, the international networking of Albanian clans and the constant flow of information of Kosovars whereabouts and activities certainly does not make EULEX job of putting witnesses on the stand any easier.
So far, most of the former KLA suspects of human organs trafficking and inhuman treatment have been released from custody months or years after their apprehension. The case of Fatmir Limaj and three other ex-KLA fighters (Nexhmi Krasniqi, Naser Krasniqi and Naser Shala), released on the 2nd of May 2012 after accusation against them were dropped due to lack of evidence or of Rasmush Haradinaj released a few months earlier, after the key witness of ICTY refused to repeat his statement before court, are characteristic. They are also indicative of all the aforementioned impediments as well as a further one: it is rather different for a witness to speak freely, save anonymously, for a Council of Europe investigation carrying no legal obligations for them and it is a whole different story to put the same men on the stand before an international court. But, for arguments sake, lets assume that putting convincing witnesses on the stand was possible; Charging key political figures with a decade old accusations, does not really suit neither the European Union nor the United States given that they have found in the face of Prime Minister Hashim Thaci and the current political elite, predictable and dependent partners whose implication in the conflict secures a mutually beneficiary silence. Besides, the United States and president Obama especially in the context of the upcoming elections wants American soldiers out of Kosovo. That would be unlikely, at least in the short term, should human organs trafficking perpetrators are brought to justice, given the possibility of a new round of violence. Here, it is important to note that ones war criminal is anothers war hero. Therefore, and based on previous experience and prosecutions, it would be highly improbable that the Albanian constituency will leave potential indictments of former KLA fighters unchallenged.
With regards to EULEX, there is need for the EU mission to reinforce its credibility both before the conflicting sides (primarily the Serb side) and the international community. With regards to the former, EU mission needs to diminish skepticism of both sides and to address the feeling of discrimination that is widespread among the Serb constituency. Regarding the later, criticism over the legitimacy, competence and impartiality of EULEX needs to deescalate in order for the mission to avoid destructions and political pressures and move forward with its demanding mandate. Besides, as it has been analyzed elsewhere the European Union is looking for its first success as an effective political player and its implication in the Western Balkans is viewed as an opportunity it cannot afford to miss.
However, the probe on human organs trafficking and inhuman treatment does not really depict the vision of EU leaders who, in 2008, exhausted their political leverage for acquiring the leading role for resolving the Kosovo conflict and reinstating the Rule of Law. Rather it is an uncomfortable externality of the job or to put it differently, an aspect of the job description that the applicant hopes she will not have to deal with. This is because, first, from the four year of experience since the EULEX mission was deployed in Kosovo, its primary aspiration was to reform the judicial system and its competences on day by day basis rather than to correct the wrong doings of the war and get involved in lengthy and politically uncomfortable probes. Second, it is rather questionable that both KFOR and EULEX, should they have a change to avoid it, would go into this investigation given the threats it implies for the maintenance of peace and their image as effective players in the conflict. It is possible that even in cases of indictments the image of EULEX will not be thoroughly improved in the eyes of Serbs; given the impossibility of the task of prosecuting the bulk of war criminals it is likely that any fragmentary indictments will occur to the Serb side as an effort of sweetening the pill. Finally, it is rather questionable to what extent the process of peace building has preceded adequately and how far we are from a fresh outbreak of violence (such as the one in 2004 or in July 2011). In other words, it is questionable whether the probe and any possible indictments will result in the much promoted in Martys report closure or in a fresh opening of interethnic tension. The events that took place in July 2011 , together with the recent occurrence of violence and mutual provocations ahead of the Serb elections, indicates that nationalistic tensions from both sides have not fully subsided. Moreover, it is highly probable that any potential outcome of the probe will be used on political grounds by both sides in order to rise instead of diminishing tension. The victory of the nationalist and pro-Russian SNS party leader Tomislav Nikolic on the 20th of May elections has further complicated the situation. Russia already exerts escalating pressure for an UN-led probe while the rise of a nationalist leader constitutes any outcome of the EULEX probe largely unpredictable. Should there be no results, the Serbian government will accuse EULEX for being biased, should there be results the tension will come out of indignation and grievance.
The process of conflict resolution between Serbia and Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244) after many years has recently been put on track with the EU fostered technical dialogue since March 2011 which has, so far, resulted in tangible progress and mutual concessions stemming from Belgrade s commitment and aspiration to EU integration. The latter, should Serbia continue on the European path, is expected to finally stumble on a mutually accepted solution on the Kosovo issue. Should a relapse to violence is averted in the pre-accession period and the bilateral debate continues it is rather likely that such a solution could be reached in the medium term. Therefore, the venture of setting things straight for past wrongdoings can be costly and can have a devastating impact on the process of conflict resolution and, therefore, should be handled cautiously and effectively.
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 19, 2012 1:31:29 GMT -5
Kosovo : after independence, autonomy
Although the supervised independence of Kosovo is completed, it is difficult to speak of a functioning state and a democracy, writes the French "Le Monde". Independent Kosovo remains practically divided into two parts, the Serbian parallel structures are ubiquitous, and the dialogue with the Serbian government has stalled, says the author.
(Christophe Solioz, Le Monde.fr) Friday, September 14, 2012
Closure of the International Civilian Office in Kosovo on 10 September 2012. marks the end of international supervision. Well, almost. NATO forces will remain as the European civil mission EULEX, which has since 2008. The charge to promote the rule of law. The transition to full sovereignty will be gradual. Let's look closely.
Even if it is wrong to interpret the meaning of the word, it is difficult to speak of a functioning state and democracy in Kosovo. As before, the last elections were marked by fraud and corruption is proven that extends to the highest levels of government. De facto independent Kosovo remains divided into two parts, Serbian parallel structures are ubiquitous, and the dialogue with the Serbian government is stalling .
Of course, given the situation in the summer of 1999. years, this is no longer the same country. For satisfactory balance in Kosovo may have a greater responsibility of the international community, but the Kosovo Albanian authorities.
Relative growth is explained by the process of reconstruction after the 1999 conflict. , the Kosovar diaspora money and official development assistance. However, the economic situation is worrying to say the least - while revenues decline, the deficit continued to grow. However, the provincial authorities have increased public spending, "forgetting" the need to consolidate public finances.
How to explain the impasse in which Kosovo is today? The lesson that is too often forgotten is that "no one likes armed missionaries" (Robespierre) and that democracy can not be exported or at least not to a great extent. There is also a sad fact that the strategy of the international community seems consistently one-sided, one-dimensional, Greek crisis gives us a new image.
While the intervention program applied stricter criteria, with the sole result of "dependency syndrome", the concept of partnership and ownership autonomous not dependent on fantasy. Mirror effect, "local players" have a good opportunity to shift the responsibility to "external players" to create consensus and economy of a policy which is based on real reform. In addition to Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina confirms this view.
This systemic problem is certainly virtue of difficulty interpreting reality that a society is perceived as "different" and "strange." However, more important is that it is a wrong conception of the historic district, "hide the institutional dimensions of society and the attribution of origin and a meaning institutions that she wears in a particular social source", as Cornelius Castoriadis well spotted.
Like any society, like every state, Kosovo can not run away from your responsibilities. In this sense, society itself institutions autokreacija. In fact, "autonomy is possible only if society recognizes itself as the source of its own principles," he says Castoriadis. Kosovo still needs to meet the challenge of autonomy.
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 19, 2012 1:27:00 GMT -5
Kosovo – the end of supervision?
Whilst the departing International Civilian Office (ICO) oversaw the writing of many good rules, according to which Kosovo’s institutions were erected or reshaped, it completely neglected to ensure their full implementation.
(Andrea Lorenzo Capussela, TransConflict ) Monday, September 17, 2012
Should you care to ask, it would be hard for me to say whether my reaction to hearing about today's events - a conference, speeches, dinner parties, music and perhaps some fireworks - was one of surprise or displeasure. Because the only thing that happens today is that the ICO closes down, and such celebrations - as if to say: "good riddance!" - are quite discourteous to us (I worked there for three years).
To put it more clearly: whatever you may have read or heard, the supervision of Kosovo does not end today, for two reasons: the ICO did many things, good or bad, but it certainly did not supervise Kosovo; and Kosovo was, and will continue to be, supervised or managed or influenced or whatever you will, by foreign powers: the US primarily, and in lesser degree also the EU and some of its member states.
But what was the ICO meant to do? A growing body of literature holds that the quality of a country's institutions is a first-order cause of its long-term economic growth, and that open, pluralistic political institutions favour the emergence of efficient economic ones, namely institutions that maximise aggregate growth and social welfare; whereas a closed and authoritarian political system is likely to produce inefficient economic institutions, ones that allow the governing élite and the social groups it represents to extract a disproportionate share of wealth and resources, but do not maximise growth. Thus, building good institutions in Kosovo is desirable for its citizens as well as for the stability of the region and of Europe. This view is implicit in the Ahtisaari plan and indeed represents its deeper rationale, at least in an objective sense: if you set the paraphernalia of multi-ethnicity aside - which is of largely symbolic value, because few countries in Europe are more ethnically homogenous than Kosovo - its sixty-one pages are all about erecting good institutions, political and economic. Guiding and assisting this process was ICO's job (in parallel, Eulex's job was to strengthen the rule of law, which is the bedrock of all institutions).
But institutions, in essence, are rules. And rules shape reality according to how they are enforced. The ICO oversaw the writing of many good rules, according to which Kosovo's institutions were erected or reshaped, but it neglected their implementation: it did not make any serious effort to reduce the gap between the manner in which those institutions actually function and the manner in which they should function. Laws, however, are of little use if they are not implemented or are routinely ignored. This is what happens in Kosovo, where the formal institutions are the façade behind which the élite pursues its own interests: even the constitutional court is used as a partisan instrument. The ICO pretended not to notice, and increasingly concentrated itself on embellishing its preferred façade, that of multi-ethnicity (which, I repeat, is not Kosovo's problem). ICO's silence allowed the élite to extend its control over the institutions and contradicted the very rationale of its existence: what took place under its watch was a not-too-disguised form of state capture.
Why did the ICO act thus? The political consequences of the unilateral, controversial character of Kosovo's independence are not a sufficient explanation. The ICO failed also because implementing laws is a more difficult job than writing them, and ICO's management and staff were not all top-notch. Because implementing those laws would have required confronting Kosovo's élite, which still commands people with weapons. And because the US did not allow the ICO to act independently, in accordance with its mandate, but preferred using it as a multilateral mantle to clothe its predominance in Kosovo (also the Quint sometimes serves this function). Entirely legitimately, however, the US pursues its own interests and not the implementation of the Ahtisaari plan or the establishment of good institutions in Kosovo. And as the welfare of its citizens or the stability of the Balkans do not rank very high among them, its approach generally was to allow Kosovo's élite to conduct its affairs rather freely, requesting only outward respect for Ahtisaari's principles and docility to US demands. Unsurprisingly, all available indicators say that since 2008 the quality of governance in Kosovo has not improved and might even have worsened: Freedom House, for instance, still qualifies it as a "semi-consolidated authoritarian state", the only one in Europe. So, I see little reason to celebrate today: except, of course, for the fact that it is my birthday.
ICO gone, the spotlight turns on the citizens. It is rather clear than between democracy and political stability under a docile élite, or between long-term development and some lucrative highway contracts the US will usually prefer the latter. The Europeans have interests that are closer to Kosovo's, but they were, are and will be divided (not to mention the fact that Europe itself still risks reverting to being just a geographical expression). And although Eulex seems to be trying to improve its performance, it is almost on the way out and will certainly not clean up Kosovo's politics. Hence, only Kosovo's citizens can improve their own future. The élite that is mismanaging their country today lost a reliable supporter and a useful screen from the public eye, and its deformities stand now naked in front of the citizens: sooner or later they will find the sight intolerable and will vote for a better government. It is good that ICO closes down, therefore, but it probably goes two or three years too late.
If, after the euphoric independence-making phase, the ICO and the supervision of Kosovo have gradually become a form of theatre, today's celebrations are best seen as the gran finale, in which all main characters sing together on the stage: but unlike in Don Giovanni the villain does not sink in hell, enveloped by flames, and has the greedy features of a minister contentedly grabbing a fat envelope rather than the noble ones of a free thinker. Despite its distinguished panel, therefore, I presume that today's conference might produce less analysis than propaganda. Which would be a pity, because the supervision of Kosovo is an interesting subject. How, for instance, could the Europeans allow all that to happen, in their own backyard and in a place where they invested so much political and financial capital? Why did they allow Eulex to drift away from its mandate, following ICO's footsteps? Or why did ICO not even try to stimulate the agency of Kosovo's citizens, its natural allies, and help them to hold their government to account?
According to the summary I read, in a recent interview with this newspaper Pieter Feith - the head of ICO - said that 11 September will be his happiest day in Kosovo. This can't be true. His happiest day was a few weeks ago, when the former US ambassador left Kosovo: inebriated, or perhaps intoxicated by the power he had, that man treated my former boss in ways that were intolerable to watch. Kosovo is a small place, far away from the Western capitals, and the character of the persons who represent them matters more than one would hope: the harsh treatment of the weak European diplomat by the ambitious American one is thus a metaphor of what went wrong in the supervision of Kosovo. In retrospect, it will probably emerge that a more important day in the history of Kosovo was the day on which Washington realised that that ambassador had not made good use of the freedom he enjoyed, and had perhaps become too close to Kosovo's predatory élite, and replaced him with a different diplomat.
Andrea Lorenzo Capussela previously served as the head of the economics unit of the International Civilian Office (ICO).
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 19, 2012 1:21:20 GMT -5
^ Unfortunately, the government of Kosova doesn't have enough money or even facilities to hold onto these companies....without privatization, these companies will die!
For idiots who don't see the bigger picture:
Kosova's mining companies don't have the facilities to build MEGA MACHINERIES nor do they have the money and brains, so it is wise from the government of Kosova to sell their companies off to NENE AMERIKA or VELLA TURKIYE! Not doing so will see the slow death of them....l cannot even imagine them having the skills to MAINTAIN hard machinery, l'm sure the republic of kosova says thankyou when a German Engineer from Bosch fixes a blown light globe.
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 19, 2012 1:10:57 GMT -5
Kosovo’s Unions Threaten Strike Over Privatization
Kosovo’s opposition parties told the Alliance of Trade Unions on Monday that they would support a motion to stop the privatization of nationalized industries.
(kosovoCompromisStuff) Tuesday, September 18, 2012
Several opposition parties have pledged to support the cause of the Alliance of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo, BSPK, to prevent the sale of the three biggest public enterprises - the post office and telecommunications company, Post-Telecom, the Power Company and the Trepca mine.
BSPK's Chairman Haxhi Arifi, said on Sunday that in the last ten days over 61,000 citizens have signed the petition to stop the privatization of the three companies.
The petition will be presented as a motion at the Parliament of Kosovo, which will discuss it during Monday's session during the debate on privatization.
Last week twenty-seven organizations united under the chairmanship of the BSPK to oppose the sale of government shares in the three largest remaining public companies in Kosovo.
The call went out on the same day as the Procurement Overview body gave a green light for the government to proceed with its privatization plans.Five companies have qualified for the next round of the competition to buy the government's 75 per cent share in PTK.
The BPSK called on all the lawmakers to support its motion to prevent the sell-off, and respect the wishes of the 61,539 citizens and employees of the three companies.
The BSPK said on Sunday that if the parliament and the government of Kosovo did not back its motion and stop the sale process, then its members would take to the streets to protest on September 20.The privatization process has been marred by a number of scandals, following the mysterious death of the Director of Kosovo's Privatization Agency, Dino Asanaj, in June this year.
Last week Kosovo's police started interrogating the shareholders of Pristina's Grand Hotel, as part of their investigation into Asanaj's the death.
The police have already questioned the Deputy Prime Minister Behgjet Pacolli, the Deputy Minister of Finance, Astrit Haraqija, and the son of the former President of Kosovo Ibrahim Rugova, Uke.
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Post by Novi Pazar on Sept 18, 2012 23:11:24 GMT -5
"Somebody like Novi who can't speak the fcukin language but yet pounds his chest as if he is accomplishing something in these forums. That doesn't benefit your Serbdom one bit."
Shqipni, your relying on using stupid Bulgarian logic and its getting boring, haven't l written here heaps of times in Serbian. I CAN FREAKEN HOLD A CONVO with all Serbs.
You know Krivo is spot on, even half castes act much bigger Serbs than full blooded ones!
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