Post by Novus Dis on Jul 28, 2008 23:45:47 GMT -5
The post-Karadzic world.
Lord Ashdown's warning about the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina – which was intended to rouse Europe's capitals from their "comfortable slumber" – certainly dampened the optimism that accompanied last week's arrest of Radovan Karadzic.
However, in attributing the problems facing Bosnia and Herzegovina to the actions of Bosnia's Serbs, Lord Ashdown overlooked – intentionally or not – several broader issues that continue to undermine the state's viability. From the fiscal frailty of one of Bosnia and Herzegovina's two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to persistent discord amongst Bosnia's Croats, the country is beset by a number of other structural vulnerabilties that cannot be blamed on the country's Serbs. The weakness of the international community does not lie in its approach towards the other entity, Republika Srpska, as Lord Ashdown tacitly asserts. Instead, it stems from the failure to tackle the Federation's current instability and the rhetoric calling for the dissolution of Republika Srpska which, like any talk of secession, violates the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
Contrary to Lord Ashdown's claims that Milorad Dodik, the prime minister of Republika Srpska, is "now aggressively reversing a decade of reforms", Republika Srpska has engaged in a plethora of socio-economic reforms designed to improve the entity's business environment by streamlining bureaucracy and cutting tax. As a result, it has benefited from privatisation deals, encouraged substantial foreign direct investment and now maintains a healthy budget surplus.
In comparison, overly generous payments to war veterans have left the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the verge of bankruptcy. Only &€;221 remained in its treasury at the end of May. What the International Monetary Fund describes as a 'liquidity squeeze' has led to lower then expected budget revenues. Financial instability in the Federation has damaging ramifications for the economic prospects of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole, deterring investors from an already challenging environment.
The Federation's fiscal and political problems have further destabilised the status of Bosnia's Croats. The Croatian prime minister, Ivo Sanader, recently described their situation as Bosnia and Herzegovina's main problem. Many of Bosnia's Croats want a 'third entity' as a means to secure equality within Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the debate about constitutional reform set to be reignited in the autumn, the Croat question will resurface.
The arrest of Karadzic has prompted another outpouring of rhetoric that reinforces this sense of fragmentation – a sense that has been particularly apparent since a US-proposed constitutional reform package was rejected by Haris Silajdzic's Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina two years ago. The current chairman of the BiH presidency, Silajdzic has again called into question the existence of Republika Srpska. Sulejman Tihic, president of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), expressed his hope that evidence revealed by the trial of Karadzic would allow Republika Srpska's existence to be reassessed.
Lord Ashdown is also somewhat disingenuous when he insists that Dodik has "used the autonomy granted by the Dayton Agreement to undermine the Bosnia Dayton envisaged". The pillars of the Dayton Agreement are group rights and autonomy, not centralisation and the creation of a unitary system. As Sumantra Bose writes, "the 'multiethnic' and apparently 'civic' vision of integration in post-war BiH is an attention-seeking device for some sectarian Bosniak political elements who want to appear 'liberal' to westerners". While more reforms are needed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in the economic and administrative spheres, Europe's various experiences demonstrate that it is neither necessary nor always viable to centralise decision-making. The principle of subsidiarity, commonplace throughout Europe, should also be applied to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Lord Ashdown is right to say that "it is always more difficult, especially in the Balkans, to defend the preservation of multi-ethnic spaces and resist the creation of mono-ethnic ones". But Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence – and subsequent recognition by a number of EU states – has undermined the idea of preserving multi-ethnic spaces. The international community's view that Kosovo is a unique case without precedent is not shared by critics of the selective and inconsistent application of the right to self-determination throughout the region.
If Bosnia and Herzegovina is to have a sustainable and prosperous future, its structural shortcomings must be prioritised over Lord Ashdown's scaremongering about Republika Srpska. Until RS is accepted – however reluctantly by some – as an integral part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, centrifugal political forces will continue to prevail over compromise, concession and re-integration. Only then, and with the necessary reforms in the Federation, can Bosnia and Herzegovina hope to reach its goal of joining the EU.
Lord Ashdown's warning about the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina – which was intended to rouse Europe's capitals from their "comfortable slumber" – certainly dampened the optimism that accompanied last week's arrest of Radovan Karadzic.
However, in attributing the problems facing Bosnia and Herzegovina to the actions of Bosnia's Serbs, Lord Ashdown overlooked – intentionally or not – several broader issues that continue to undermine the state's viability. From the fiscal frailty of one of Bosnia and Herzegovina's two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to persistent discord amongst Bosnia's Croats, the country is beset by a number of other structural vulnerabilties that cannot be blamed on the country's Serbs. The weakness of the international community does not lie in its approach towards the other entity, Republika Srpska, as Lord Ashdown tacitly asserts. Instead, it stems from the failure to tackle the Federation's current instability and the rhetoric calling for the dissolution of Republika Srpska which, like any talk of secession, violates the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
Contrary to Lord Ashdown's claims that Milorad Dodik, the prime minister of Republika Srpska, is "now aggressively reversing a decade of reforms", Republika Srpska has engaged in a plethora of socio-economic reforms designed to improve the entity's business environment by streamlining bureaucracy and cutting tax. As a result, it has benefited from privatisation deals, encouraged substantial foreign direct investment and now maintains a healthy budget surplus.
In comparison, overly generous payments to war veterans have left the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the verge of bankruptcy. Only &€;221 remained in its treasury at the end of May. What the International Monetary Fund describes as a 'liquidity squeeze' has led to lower then expected budget revenues. Financial instability in the Federation has damaging ramifications for the economic prospects of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole, deterring investors from an already challenging environment.
The Federation's fiscal and political problems have further destabilised the status of Bosnia's Croats. The Croatian prime minister, Ivo Sanader, recently described their situation as Bosnia and Herzegovina's main problem. Many of Bosnia's Croats want a 'third entity' as a means to secure equality within Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the debate about constitutional reform set to be reignited in the autumn, the Croat question will resurface.
The arrest of Karadzic has prompted another outpouring of rhetoric that reinforces this sense of fragmentation – a sense that has been particularly apparent since a US-proposed constitutional reform package was rejected by Haris Silajdzic's Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina two years ago. The current chairman of the BiH presidency, Silajdzic has again called into question the existence of Republika Srpska. Sulejman Tihic, president of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), expressed his hope that evidence revealed by the trial of Karadzic would allow Republika Srpska's existence to be reassessed.
Lord Ashdown is also somewhat disingenuous when he insists that Dodik has "used the autonomy granted by the Dayton Agreement to undermine the Bosnia Dayton envisaged". The pillars of the Dayton Agreement are group rights and autonomy, not centralisation and the creation of a unitary system. As Sumantra Bose writes, "the 'multiethnic' and apparently 'civic' vision of integration in post-war BiH is an attention-seeking device for some sectarian Bosniak political elements who want to appear 'liberal' to westerners". While more reforms are needed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in the economic and administrative spheres, Europe's various experiences demonstrate that it is neither necessary nor always viable to centralise decision-making. The principle of subsidiarity, commonplace throughout Europe, should also be applied to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Lord Ashdown is right to say that "it is always more difficult, especially in the Balkans, to defend the preservation of multi-ethnic spaces and resist the creation of mono-ethnic ones". But Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence – and subsequent recognition by a number of EU states – has undermined the idea of preserving multi-ethnic spaces. The international community's view that Kosovo is a unique case without precedent is not shared by critics of the selective and inconsistent application of the right to self-determination throughout the region.
If Bosnia and Herzegovina is to have a sustainable and prosperous future, its structural shortcomings must be prioritised over Lord Ashdown's scaremongering about Republika Srpska. Until RS is accepted – however reluctantly by some – as an integral part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, centrifugal political forces will continue to prevail over compromise, concession and re-integration. Only then, and with the necessary reforms in the Federation, can Bosnia and Herzegovina hope to reach its goal of joining the EU.