Post by engers on Aug 7, 2008 9:52:54 GMT -5
The aim of Operation Oluja [Storm} was not to drive out the Serbs
Author: Ozren Žunec - interview
Uploaded: Thursday, 07 August, 2008
Ozren Žunec, author of Goli život [Naked Life], a seminal study of the Serb rebellion in Croatia - two volumes containing nearly 1,000 pages - argues that the ideological and strategic weaknesses from which the revolt suffered from the very start made it inherently unachievable. The rebellion, according to Žunec, carried within itself the seeds of its own ultimate defeat.
Ozren Žunec is a professor of sociology at the University of Zagreb and the author of Goli život [Naked Life], a seminal study of the Serb rebellion in Croatia brought out in Zagreb by the Demetar publishing house. This extensive work - two volumes containing nearly 1,000 pages - details the social and political aspects of the revolt, and examines in some detail the ideological and strategic weaknesses from which the project of the Croatian Serb leaders suffered from the very start, and which made it inherently unachievable. The rebellion, according to Žunec, carried within itself the seeds of its own ultimate defeat. A thorough examination of the available sources, including the archives of the Hague tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, leads him to conclude that the Croatian military action known as Oluja was directed not at driving the Croatian Serbs out of the country, but rather at achieving a quick victory with minimal casualties in a relatively restricted area. The plan did nevertheless anticipate the departure of the population and the concomitant retreat of the Belgrade-controlled Serb army from Croatia. Whereas the Croatian military action had been well prepared and was efficiently executed, moreover, the Croatian authorities did nothing to prevent the killing of several hundred remaining Serb civilians and the torching of thousands of Serb homes. The crimes and devastation committed after Oluja were frightening in their nature and extent; however, Žunec argues, Operation Storm did not actually cause the civilian exodus, which for the most part preceded the arrival of the Croatian army.
***
Glas Istre: It is quite strange that the rebels refused all possibility of living with Croats, even after the likelihood that the Republika Srpska Krajina would collapse became quite evident.
Žunec: That is the most frightening thing. The whole project of the rebellion was concerned exclusively with territory as a value in itself, regardless of what it contained and who lived in it. One may view a territory in various ways, but it is at all times a political space. Yet the territory that the Serb rebels claimed for themselves they never saw as a political space, with inhabitants and institutions. They turned it into a void. The population of the Republika Srpska Krajina found itself in the end trapped by a project based on the idea that it was not possible to live with Croats. This is why they had to leave when the Croats arrived. It was a great tragedy.
A Serious Lapse After Oluja
It is interesting that the Croatian project of reintegrating the Krajina into the Croatian constitutional order was also primarily focussed on territory as opposed to restoration of the legal system in the area.
This was negligence on the part of the Croatian government, which did take some steps but they were insufficient. Thus only Orthodox churches were protected, while everything else was left to chaos. As a result the churches remained untouched, except for one in Karin that was allegedly blown up when a policeman went off to relieve himself . What happened after Oluja was grave negligence. The war had its own logic, however, and no one asked what would happen after the military action was over. Croatia is no exception here. Baghdad too was so badly looted after the arrival of the Americans that a traffic jam was created because of the great number of looters in the streets. There too it was necessary to achieve victory, and little thought was given to what would happen next.
The Hague prosecutors believe, on the other hand, that the intensity of the destruction and killing, the length of time these lasted, their scale, and the fact that they were carried out by soldiers, argue that this could not have been the result simply of chaos, of spontaneous action. So they argue that there must have been a plan, that orders were given.
One should differentiate, in my view, between the fact of the loss of control and the prosecutors’ thesis that this was intended to drive out the Serbs, as a joint criminal conspiracy. I think that the prosecution will be unable to prove the latter. I am no legal expert, but the category of joint criminal conspiracy was taken from a US penal law that is used in the struggle against the mafia. Its use by The Hague displays a misunderstanding of reality, because the way in which the mafia functions is completely different from the way politicians and military commanders do. I also find puzzling the assertion by the prosecution that history is being written at The Hague, although the court is basically applying Anglo-Saxon law, according to which the accused can bargain with the prosecution. What kind of history can we have here, when its outcome can be negotiated? It is more like a manipulation of history.
Where the Hague tribunal is Wrong
Do you deny then that the Hague tribunal has played a positive role?
No, not at all. The Hague tribunal has played a very positive role, and the problem is that it is about to close down. But the fact that the Hague tribunal is a positive institution does not mean that it does not make mistakes, sometimes very serious ones. One problem had been the absence of law applicable in such cases.
You are ready to charge the Croatian government with responsibility for the crimes, yet you insist that Croatia did not conduct ethnic cleansing of the Serbs.
For ethnic cleansing there must be intent. I did not discover such intent, not even in the famous transcripts that are taken as the crowning proof that Franjo Tuðman negotiated a criminal undertaking. I see nothing of that nature there. There is no agreement there that the size of the Serb national community should be reduced. In my view, the departure of the Serbs was an anticipated consequence not just of Oluja, but of the rebellion as such - its assumption having been that there could be no co-existence with Croats. We find the same model of behaviour in both Croatia and Bosnia. We are talking about an ideology that insisted on there being a thousand-year-war between us [Croats and Serbs], and that anything was better than to live with them [Croats]. The logical consequence of this was that the day the Croats came - without asking for permission, because they had grown stronger and could not be stopped - the Serbs would leave. That is what they did. It was a logical consequence of their rebellion. It is also the case that, in this kind of conflict, the departure of the population seems to assume also the departure of the army. If you provoke the population into leaving, then it is highly likely that the army will leave too. The same happened on the Croatian side.
Whom then did Tuðman have in mind when he said that the Serbs had to be hit so hard that they would practically disappear - soldiers or civilians?
Tuðman was talking to his military commanders about where to hit the Serbs, in which directions, after which Gotovina said that the Serbs were already leaving, which later proved to be true. The Croatian side failed to consider, however, how to resolve politically the situation that the military action would create. Asked whether he feared unnecessary destruction after the liberation, General Ivan Tolj replied in the negative, insisting that the area was part of Croatia.
A Tale of Dishonour
The Croats, on the contrary, by torching and destruction treated Krajina as part of Serbia.
That’s a complete paradox. Everything was looted and destroyed, as if by destroying Serbia one could take revenge for the Serb crimes in Croatia. It only goes to show what war does to people.
Does this mean that Tuðman was not responsible for the departure of the Serbs?
He was responsible in that at one point he launched a military action. But the operation would have had to happen sooner or later, because the Serb rebels showed no desire for a political settlement.
Tuðman did not bother to hide that he was glad that the Serbs had gone, their departure made him happy.
It was quite odious. Croatia is a country with a demographic problem, and the departure of a couple of hundred thousand people was very bad for it. It is a great demographic loss.
Thirteen years have passed since Oluja, and Croatia has not as yet succeeded in revitalising this area.
So far as I know, Lika has about 50,000 inhabitants. This is the same number of people who are planned to live in the new Zagreb suburb of Vrbani 2.
The crimes committed after Oluja have called into question the legitimacy of the whole action, which was based on the idea that Croatia would make secure an area that had been in a state of anarchy for four years.
Croatia had always tried to keep to international law, international conventions and Security Council resolutions, while the Serb rebellion was more based on naked force. It is a fact that what happened after Oluja represented an ugly regression, but in my view this problem should be viewed in the context of the whole war. The focus is now on 1995, thanks to the Hague tribunal, so that attention is on the end of the war, while the character of the previous five years of war is forgotten. Some things were caused by the behaviour of the actors in the previous period, and should be treated in that way. Oluja did not take place in a simulator, but involved real people and real relations, following many years of dishonour, of a history of mutual violence.
War does not of itself solve problems
The intensity of fighting in Oluja was exceptionally low. You explain this by a desire on the Croatian side to avoid contact with civilians and to prevent greater hardship, but some believe it to be proof of a prior agreement between Tuðman and Miloševiæ.
I do not believe there were such agreements, because they would be hard to implement. Such agreements are unrealisable on the ground. Nonetheless, the belief in there having been an agreement is very strongly present, especially among the Serbs. The fact that Miloševiæ did nothing, and that the news about Oluja was broadcast in the 20th minute of the main news programme, is taken as the crowning proof that such an agreement existed. I think it was not like that, however, but that matters proceeded in parallel. Miloševiæ gave up on the Croatian Serbs, while Tuðman seized the opportunity.
How should we in Croatia view Oluja? Should we celebrate this action, which led to mass suffering and hardship, as a victory?
The homeland war is often presented as a pillar underpinning Croatia. I know that I am in a minority when I say that war is the worst possible solution. This war was a Croatian victory, of course, a victory of David against Goliath. But I always think of war as a sad event, regardless of who suffered as a result of it or of how they suffered. While Croatia celebrates Oluja, it would be advisable for the Serb side to ask itself how it came to pass that Croatia won. The war happened because someone made use of the JNA, in the belief that they could achieve something. In the same way, I think that celebration of the war and military victories on the Croatian side is questionable, if it leads to a belief that problems are solved through war.
Serbia Remains Obsessed by Territories
How do you judge Serbia’s attitude to Kosovo?
It is interesting that the same policy that led to the war [in 1991] is visible also in regard to Kosovo, which is treated as a metaphysical, ethnic and exclusively Serb area. During the last referendum on the Serbian constitution, which was held precisely in order to confirm that Kosovo was part of Serbia, the Albanians were not allowed to vote, even though they were constitutionally Serbian citizens. In other words, the people are not part of Serbia but only the territory. But what then is to be done with the Albanians? Here I see the unique continuity of Serbian policy.
In your book you deal also with the future of the Croatian Serb community. You argue there that Krajina and Oluja could become a new Serb myth.
It is likely that the Croatian Serb community will in future seek additional rights. If the existing state policy continues, then there is little likelihood that this would lead to violence. But if Krajina and the 1995 events were to become a myth, then this could change and the power of the myth might lead to the choice of violent strategies again in the future. That would be very dangerous.
www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2459
Author: Ozren Žunec - interview
Uploaded: Thursday, 07 August, 2008
Ozren Žunec, author of Goli život [Naked Life], a seminal study of the Serb rebellion in Croatia - two volumes containing nearly 1,000 pages - argues that the ideological and strategic weaknesses from which the revolt suffered from the very start made it inherently unachievable. The rebellion, according to Žunec, carried within itself the seeds of its own ultimate defeat.
Ozren Žunec is a professor of sociology at the University of Zagreb and the author of Goli život [Naked Life], a seminal study of the Serb rebellion in Croatia brought out in Zagreb by the Demetar publishing house. This extensive work - two volumes containing nearly 1,000 pages - details the social and political aspects of the revolt, and examines in some detail the ideological and strategic weaknesses from which the project of the Croatian Serb leaders suffered from the very start, and which made it inherently unachievable. The rebellion, according to Žunec, carried within itself the seeds of its own ultimate defeat. A thorough examination of the available sources, including the archives of the Hague tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, leads him to conclude that the Croatian military action known as Oluja was directed not at driving the Croatian Serbs out of the country, but rather at achieving a quick victory with minimal casualties in a relatively restricted area. The plan did nevertheless anticipate the departure of the population and the concomitant retreat of the Belgrade-controlled Serb army from Croatia. Whereas the Croatian military action had been well prepared and was efficiently executed, moreover, the Croatian authorities did nothing to prevent the killing of several hundred remaining Serb civilians and the torching of thousands of Serb homes. The crimes and devastation committed after Oluja were frightening in their nature and extent; however, Žunec argues, Operation Storm did not actually cause the civilian exodus, which for the most part preceded the arrival of the Croatian army.
***
Glas Istre: It is quite strange that the rebels refused all possibility of living with Croats, even after the likelihood that the Republika Srpska Krajina would collapse became quite evident.
Žunec: That is the most frightening thing. The whole project of the rebellion was concerned exclusively with territory as a value in itself, regardless of what it contained and who lived in it. One may view a territory in various ways, but it is at all times a political space. Yet the territory that the Serb rebels claimed for themselves they never saw as a political space, with inhabitants and institutions. They turned it into a void. The population of the Republika Srpska Krajina found itself in the end trapped by a project based on the idea that it was not possible to live with Croats. This is why they had to leave when the Croats arrived. It was a great tragedy.
A Serious Lapse After Oluja
It is interesting that the Croatian project of reintegrating the Krajina into the Croatian constitutional order was also primarily focussed on territory as opposed to restoration of the legal system in the area.
This was negligence on the part of the Croatian government, which did take some steps but they were insufficient. Thus only Orthodox churches were protected, while everything else was left to chaos. As a result the churches remained untouched, except for one in Karin that was allegedly blown up when a policeman went off to relieve himself . What happened after Oluja was grave negligence. The war had its own logic, however, and no one asked what would happen after the military action was over. Croatia is no exception here. Baghdad too was so badly looted after the arrival of the Americans that a traffic jam was created because of the great number of looters in the streets. There too it was necessary to achieve victory, and little thought was given to what would happen next.
The Hague prosecutors believe, on the other hand, that the intensity of the destruction and killing, the length of time these lasted, their scale, and the fact that they were carried out by soldiers, argue that this could not have been the result simply of chaos, of spontaneous action. So they argue that there must have been a plan, that orders were given.
One should differentiate, in my view, between the fact of the loss of control and the prosecutors’ thesis that this was intended to drive out the Serbs, as a joint criminal conspiracy. I think that the prosecution will be unable to prove the latter. I am no legal expert, but the category of joint criminal conspiracy was taken from a US penal law that is used in the struggle against the mafia. Its use by The Hague displays a misunderstanding of reality, because the way in which the mafia functions is completely different from the way politicians and military commanders do. I also find puzzling the assertion by the prosecution that history is being written at The Hague, although the court is basically applying Anglo-Saxon law, according to which the accused can bargain with the prosecution. What kind of history can we have here, when its outcome can be negotiated? It is more like a manipulation of history.
Where the Hague tribunal is Wrong
Do you deny then that the Hague tribunal has played a positive role?
No, not at all. The Hague tribunal has played a very positive role, and the problem is that it is about to close down. But the fact that the Hague tribunal is a positive institution does not mean that it does not make mistakes, sometimes very serious ones. One problem had been the absence of law applicable in such cases.
You are ready to charge the Croatian government with responsibility for the crimes, yet you insist that Croatia did not conduct ethnic cleansing of the Serbs.
For ethnic cleansing there must be intent. I did not discover such intent, not even in the famous transcripts that are taken as the crowning proof that Franjo Tuðman negotiated a criminal undertaking. I see nothing of that nature there. There is no agreement there that the size of the Serb national community should be reduced. In my view, the departure of the Serbs was an anticipated consequence not just of Oluja, but of the rebellion as such - its assumption having been that there could be no co-existence with Croats. We find the same model of behaviour in both Croatia and Bosnia. We are talking about an ideology that insisted on there being a thousand-year-war between us [Croats and Serbs], and that anything was better than to live with them [Croats]. The logical consequence of this was that the day the Croats came - without asking for permission, because they had grown stronger and could not be stopped - the Serbs would leave. That is what they did. It was a logical consequence of their rebellion. It is also the case that, in this kind of conflict, the departure of the population seems to assume also the departure of the army. If you provoke the population into leaving, then it is highly likely that the army will leave too. The same happened on the Croatian side.
Whom then did Tuðman have in mind when he said that the Serbs had to be hit so hard that they would practically disappear - soldiers or civilians?
Tuðman was talking to his military commanders about where to hit the Serbs, in which directions, after which Gotovina said that the Serbs were already leaving, which later proved to be true. The Croatian side failed to consider, however, how to resolve politically the situation that the military action would create. Asked whether he feared unnecessary destruction after the liberation, General Ivan Tolj replied in the negative, insisting that the area was part of Croatia.
A Tale of Dishonour
The Croats, on the contrary, by torching and destruction treated Krajina as part of Serbia.
That’s a complete paradox. Everything was looted and destroyed, as if by destroying Serbia one could take revenge for the Serb crimes in Croatia. It only goes to show what war does to people.
Does this mean that Tuðman was not responsible for the departure of the Serbs?
He was responsible in that at one point he launched a military action. But the operation would have had to happen sooner or later, because the Serb rebels showed no desire for a political settlement.
Tuðman did not bother to hide that he was glad that the Serbs had gone, their departure made him happy.
It was quite odious. Croatia is a country with a demographic problem, and the departure of a couple of hundred thousand people was very bad for it. It is a great demographic loss.
Thirteen years have passed since Oluja, and Croatia has not as yet succeeded in revitalising this area.
So far as I know, Lika has about 50,000 inhabitants. This is the same number of people who are planned to live in the new Zagreb suburb of Vrbani 2.
The crimes committed after Oluja have called into question the legitimacy of the whole action, which was based on the idea that Croatia would make secure an area that had been in a state of anarchy for four years.
Croatia had always tried to keep to international law, international conventions and Security Council resolutions, while the Serb rebellion was more based on naked force. It is a fact that what happened after Oluja represented an ugly regression, but in my view this problem should be viewed in the context of the whole war. The focus is now on 1995, thanks to the Hague tribunal, so that attention is on the end of the war, while the character of the previous five years of war is forgotten. Some things were caused by the behaviour of the actors in the previous period, and should be treated in that way. Oluja did not take place in a simulator, but involved real people and real relations, following many years of dishonour, of a history of mutual violence.
War does not of itself solve problems
The intensity of fighting in Oluja was exceptionally low. You explain this by a desire on the Croatian side to avoid contact with civilians and to prevent greater hardship, but some believe it to be proof of a prior agreement between Tuðman and Miloševiæ.
I do not believe there were such agreements, because they would be hard to implement. Such agreements are unrealisable on the ground. Nonetheless, the belief in there having been an agreement is very strongly present, especially among the Serbs. The fact that Miloševiæ did nothing, and that the news about Oluja was broadcast in the 20th minute of the main news programme, is taken as the crowning proof that such an agreement existed. I think it was not like that, however, but that matters proceeded in parallel. Miloševiæ gave up on the Croatian Serbs, while Tuðman seized the opportunity.
How should we in Croatia view Oluja? Should we celebrate this action, which led to mass suffering and hardship, as a victory?
The homeland war is often presented as a pillar underpinning Croatia. I know that I am in a minority when I say that war is the worst possible solution. This war was a Croatian victory, of course, a victory of David against Goliath. But I always think of war as a sad event, regardless of who suffered as a result of it or of how they suffered. While Croatia celebrates Oluja, it would be advisable for the Serb side to ask itself how it came to pass that Croatia won. The war happened because someone made use of the JNA, in the belief that they could achieve something. In the same way, I think that celebration of the war and military victories on the Croatian side is questionable, if it leads to a belief that problems are solved through war.
Serbia Remains Obsessed by Territories
How do you judge Serbia’s attitude to Kosovo?
It is interesting that the same policy that led to the war [in 1991] is visible also in regard to Kosovo, which is treated as a metaphysical, ethnic and exclusively Serb area. During the last referendum on the Serbian constitution, which was held precisely in order to confirm that Kosovo was part of Serbia, the Albanians were not allowed to vote, even though they were constitutionally Serbian citizens. In other words, the people are not part of Serbia but only the territory. But what then is to be done with the Albanians? Here I see the unique continuity of Serbian policy.
In your book you deal also with the future of the Croatian Serb community. You argue there that Krajina and Oluja could become a new Serb myth.
It is likely that the Croatian Serb community will in future seek additional rights. If the existing state policy continues, then there is little likelihood that this would lead to violence. But if Krajina and the 1995 events were to become a myth, then this could change and the power of the myth might lead to the choice of violent strategies again in the future. That would be very dangerous.
www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2459