Post by Teuta1975 on May 31, 2008 14:56:43 GMT -5
TO BE READ WITHIN A WEEK...IF PATIENT...
Great Britain and Greater Greece 1917-1920
Author(s): Erik Goldstein
Source: The Historical Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2, (Jun., 1989), pp. 339-356
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: www.jstor.org/stable/2639605
Accessed: 31/05/2008 15:48
The HistoricaJl ournal,3 2, 2 (i989), pp. 339-356
Printed in Great Britain
GREAT BRITAIN AND GREATER GREECE 1917-1920
ERIK GOLDSTEIN
University of Birmingham
The First World War saw the collapse of the old order in the Eastern Mediterranean with the disintegration of the Ottoman empire, an event which threatened to create a dangerous power vacuum. Great Britain for the past century had attempted to prevent just such a crisis by supporting the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state. Britain had a number of crucial strategic concerns in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular the Suez Canal and the Straits. The former was the more critical interest and Britain was determined to keep this essential link to its Indian empire firmly under its own control. As to the Straits Britain, which was concerned about over-extending its strategic capabilities, was content to see this critical waterway dominated by a friendly state. The question inevitably arose therefore as to what would replace the Ottoman empire. One alternative was Greece, a possibility which became increasingly attractive with the emergence of the supposedly pro-British Eleftherios Venizelos as the Greek leader in early 1917.
Within the Foreign Office there was a significant group who wished to cast Greece in the role of regional power and regional British proxy. With the ending of the war in i 9I8 the actual conduct of the negotiations over Greek related questions fell into the hands of this group of philhellenes, centred on the new Political Intelligence Department. The most important philhellenes were Sir Eyre Crowe, Allen Leeper, Harold Nicolson, and to a lesser extent Arnold Toynbee. From the ending of the war in November I9I8 until Venizelos' fall two years later they pushed for the creation of an Anglo-Greek entente in which a Greater Greece would be Britain's chief ally in this historically sensitive area.
Britain's foreign policy had drifted during the early years of the war, producing a number of short-term solutions to immediate crises. One of the results of this policy was a number of secret treaties agreed by the Entente powers concerning the future division of the Ottoman empire. The most important in relation to Greece were the I9I5 secret treaty of London and the I9I7 agreement of St Jean de Maurienne. The former was signed as an inducement to Italy to enter the war, and promised it among other spoils an equitable share in the division of the Ottoman empire. This was clarified by the St Jean de Maurienne agreement which promised Italy the south western quarter of Anatolia, with the exercise of special rights in the Smyrna district.
These promises conflicted with traditional Greek irredentist aims and continually hampered the post-war negotiations when Italy stood rigidly by its interpretation of its treaty rights. One result of the growing number of such agreements was a concern, particularly in the Foreign Office, for the need for a greater consideration of long-term policy formulation.
When Britain went to war in I9I4 its general war aims were simple - victory. It was only as the war progressed that the British government began to consider more elaborate aims. Finally during the summer of I9I6 in the aftermath of the bloodbath of the battle of the Somme the government took up the question of war aims, when Asquith's war committee gave some desultory consideration to these questions. Very little came of the discussions, and given the general lassitude of Asquith's administration only a few of the ministers invited to submit memoranda even bothered to reply.'
The whole tenor of government changed dramatically in December I9I6 with the appointment of Lloyd George as prime minister. Whether or not the permanent officials liked or disliked Lloyd George a new feeling of vitality ran through Whitehall. At last Britain began seriously to consider what sort of world it wanted when the fighting ceased.
Several government officials were concerned about the lack of focus in British considerations about the post-war settlement. The senior members of the government provided no direction, being far too wrapped up in the day to day conduct of the struggle. The result was that a handful of officials took it upon themselves to establish a network of offices concerned with preparing negotiating material for an eventual peace conference. The most important office was the Political Intelligence Department (P.I.D.) established by the Foreign Office in March 1918.2
The P.I.D. was assigned the task of'collecting, sifting, and coordinating all political intelligence... '3 and it became the nucleus of the British negotiating team at the Paris peace conference. The P.I.D. comprised on average a dozen experts, each with a regional speciality. Most of its staff were civilians doing temporary war work, augmented by some regular Foreign Office officials. In October I9I8 as peace loomed the P.I.D. was reorganized to take on the full weight of preparing Britain's negotiating brief.4
The South Eastern European section was placed under Sir Ralph Paget, who had served as minister in Belgrade during the critical years I9I0-I 3.5 To assist on Balkan matters he was assigned Allen Leeper and Harold Nicolson. The Middle East section which was concerned with questions relating to the Ottoman empire was headed by Sir Louis Mallet who had been ambassador to Turkey, I9I3-I4.6 His most important assistant was Arnold Toynbee.
The great bulk of the work on preparing Britain's policy towards Greece fell on the three P.I.D. staffers, Leeper, Nicolson, and Toynbee. These three experts were quite remarkable individuals, all at this time being about thirty years old and all products of Balliol. Each was destined to play a significant role not only in the preparatory phase but in the negotiations as well. They were very much imbued with the ideas of the New Europe group which envisaged a Europe redrawn along the lines of national self-determination and with future tranquillity assisted by a League of Nations.7
Allen Leeper (I887-I935) was born in Australia and had taken a first in Latin and Greek at Melbourne before taking another first in Greats at Oxford in i 91 . A superb linguist he spoke fifteen languages with ease, among them Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbo-Croat.8 Harold Nicolson later recalled of him that 'being a citizen of the New World, he could approach the Old with the romantic zest of a scholar on his first visit to the Parthenon... ' Leeper frequently contributed to the journal New Europe under the pseudonym 'Belisarius'."o Harold Nicolson (I886-I968) was a 'member of the diplomatic service, who had served previously at Constantinople. Nicolson's philhellenism was matched by notable turcophobia." Arnold Toynbee (I889-I975) had served in various propaganda offices before joining the P.I.D. Besides contributing to the New Europe he produced several wartime patriotic potboilers, including The murderous tyranny of the Turks."2
One other individual involved in the Greek negotiations deserves particular mention, Sir Eyre Crowe. One of the outstanding British diplomats of the era he was the dynamo which dominated the British delegation at Paris. Lloyd George and the politicians may have decided policy at the highest level, but it was Crowe and his proteges from the P.I.D. who influenced the shape and texture of the settlement in the various technical committees in which most of the issues were settled. It was the P.I.D. which formed the backbone of the British negotiating team at Paris. While the British delegation at the conference was vast and mostly decorative, these individuals held most of the key substantive positions.
During the preparatory phase for the negotiations the most important reports bearing on the Greek settlement were produced by Leeper, Nicolson and Toynbee. Nicolson and Leeper's P.I.D. report on British desiderata in South Eastern Europe appeared in mid-December. Their conclusions were based on the assumption that national self-determination would be the underlying principle of any settlement as it not only offered 'the best prospects of a permanent peace in South-Eastern Europe, and as such are the most desirable and advantageous from the point of view of British interests'.14
They recommended that Greece be enlarged by receiving an Anatolian enclave centred in Smyrna, that Greece and Italy reach an agreement as to the Dodecanese, that Greece should obtain all the Aegean islands (including the strategically placed islands of Imbros, Tenedos, Lemnos and Samothrace), that Britain should cede Cyprus to Greece, and that Northern Epirus up to the Voiussa be annexed to Greece. Their recommendations were partly complemented by those proposed by Toynbee.15
Toynbee prepared a series of reports covering the various components of the Ottoman empire. In his most comprehensive memorandum, produced in mid- November, Toynbee recommended that 'since the transference of the Caliphate from the Turks to the Arabs is distinctly desirable from the British point of view ... the expulsion of Turkey from Constantinople may perhaps be regarded as a British desideratum on political grounds'.16 Toynbee recognized that traditional rivalries for control of the city might make retention of the status quo the easier solution.
In a subsequent report Toynbee recommended against ceding Greece any Anatolian territory as posing too many ethnographical, economic, and strategic difficulties.17 Toynbee later recalled that, on the eve of the peace-conference I was given the job (among a number of others) of suggesting - with a map - the bounds of a possible Greek enclave round Smyrna.
I carried out these instructions, and learnt in doing so, that this plan was a geographical absurdity. It was not till I visited, in I92I, the then Greek-occupied area that I realised how small the Greek minority was, even within the area that I had delimited."8 Toynbee remained a supporter of most of Greece's European claims, but consistently warned that allowing Greece a role in Anatolia would generate numerous potentially combustible problems. Toynbee is already revealing at this stage that critical approach to pan-hellenic claims which would later cause such a dramatic breach in his relations with Greece.
Greece undoubtedly benefited from a general philhellenic feeling among the central figures in Britain's negotiating team, incited in part by strident turcophobia. Nicolson commenting on Greek claims in Asia Minor believed that 'we will be morally lacking if we allow this sensitive and progressive civilisation to be again subordinated to the Turks...'.19 Nicolson later wrote that 'for the Turks I had, and have, no sympathy whatsoever. Long residence at Constantinople had convinced me that behind his mask of indolence, the Turk conceals impulses of the most brutal savagery'.20 Nicolson's views were not unrepresentative. His chief, Sir Eyre Crowe, saw the expulsion of the Turks from Europe as a vital aim of British policy, observing that 'the policy of allowing the Turk to remain in Europe is so contrary to our most important interests and so certain to involve the continuance of all the abdomination associated with the rule of the Turks, that we cannot afford to treat this as a matter ofjust humouring Moslem feelings... '.21 Crowe consistently placed the reduction of Turkish power and the consequent increase in Greek power above any concerns as to the reaction of the British empire's substantial moslem population to the displacement of the caliph. This was a view which found favour in the highest reaches of Whitehall. Lord Curzon, as chairman of the Eastern Committee observed 'that the presence of the Turks in Europe has been a source of unmitigated evil to everybody concerned ... Indeed, the record is one of misrule, oppression, intrigue, and massacre, almost unparalleled in the history of the Eastern world'.22
Such views reflected a wide section of public opinion. Among the letters which the foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, received during the early days of the conference was a resolution from the Edinburgh presbytery of the United Free Church of Scotland requesting that 'it shall be made an essential condition of peace that the Turkish Government be removed from Constantinople and the Continent of Europe'.23 Individual efforts of this type were augmented by the sustained campaigns of organized pressure groups such as the St Sophia Redemption Committee set up by the Anglican and Eastern Association.24
While the Ottoman empire attracted the most attention, there was general British support for Greek irredentist claims to other neighbouring districts. The British minister at Athens, Lord Granville, a not uncritical observer of Greece, made an unusually impassioned plea during December I 9 I 8, pointing out that with the collapse of the Central Powers 'the eternal question of the unredeemed Greeks has now at last a chance of solution'.25 The frequent repetition of the concept of redemption indicates the almost religious fervour with which the creation of*greater Greece was seen.
There were, of course, those who did not share the philhellenic ardour of these diplomats. Those, however, who ventured to suggest contrary views had their opinions summarily dismissed. In March I9I9 Colonel H. D. Napier, British military representative in Sofia, suggested that the right people to back in the Balkans were the Bulgars, commenting that 'after all, a Bulgar is something of a man, and when you take Venizelos from Greece, what have you left'.2" Allen Leeper simply minuted on Napier's pro-Bulgar suggestions that 'The proposals seem quite unjustifiable'.27 When in May the British minister at Sophia, Sir Harry Lamb, sent in several reports pointing out some of the difficulties facing Bulgaria, Crowe commented that 'Sir H. Lamb has unfortunately never been able to see anything but the Bulgarian side of the question'." Both Napier and Lamb fared better than the unfortunate Captain Spencer who in a letter to The Times reported that to his knowledge the border district of Koritza, which Britain wished to transfer from Albania to Greece, was entirely Albanian in population. This led Crowe to observe that 'Captain Spencer is notoriously an adventurer of the shadiest character and of the most unsavoury antecedents. He ought to be in the dock'.29
British diplomats were not alone in their sympathies. At the first meeting of the Greek Territorial Committee in February i919 the chairman, Jules Cambon of France, opened with the remark that the peace conference offered ' the best means of satisfying the ancient claims of the Hellenic nation and of at least completing the work of independence begun by the Liberal Nations of Europe a century ago'.30 Certainly there was every indication that Greece could hope for more than impartial justice. This general climate of opinion was not lost on the Greek delegates and Nicholas Politis, the foreign minister, in writing back to Greece just after the opening of the conference commented upon ' a certain phil-hellenic feeling... .'31 It was an emotion which the Greek delegation had every expectation of capitalizing on.
Greece's greatest asset in dealing with Britain, and indeed the peace negotiations, was Eleftherios Venizelos, who emerged as one of the giants of the conference. Venizelos' diplomatic craftsmanship was superb, especially then thrown into relief against the coarse antics of the Roumanian, Bratianu. Venizelos' presentation of Greece's case before the conference on 3 February I9 I9 led Allen Leeper to remark 'we all thought it was the most brilliant thing we've ever heard, such amazing strength and tactfulness combined '.3 The delegates who dealt with Venizelos remained fascinated by him, and the Greek premier maintained frequent contact with the British delegates, often inviting them to dine. When Leeper received such an invitation in May he wrote excitedly to his brother, 'I've at last got Veniselos's autograph '.3" Venizelos was considered a solid ally of Britain, and as the P.I.D. observed in their report on South Eastern Europe, 'M. Venizelos has merited our complete support ... So long, therefore as M. Venizelos remains in power little anxiety need be entertained as to the internal conditions of Greece, or her relations to this country'.3 Indeed an important factor in British considerations was a fear that Venizelos might be toppled if he was forced to return to Greece without tangible gains. Nicolson observed in March, during a crisis over Greek claims in Anatolia, that any failure by Venizelos to secure the liberation of these Greeks would seriously undermine his position. Nicolson went on to note 'I need not elaborate the disastrous effects which any weakening of M. Venizelos' position would have upon Greece itself and general Entente interests in the Eastern Mediterranean'. 36 Venizelos was clearly seen as the key to long-term, friendly Anglo-Greek relations.
Britain feared a return of the regime it had assisted Venizelos to overthrow in I9I6. This led to the curious position that British policy tilted in favour of Greece becoming a republic, and ending the strained situation of King Alexander's unwilling reign in place of his father. The P.I.D. explained that Venizelos considered 'that Greece is not yet ripe for republican institutions', but that 'should the Greek people desire eventually to establish a republic, we need raise no objection'.3 Certainly an interesting view for His Majesty's government to take.
The general nature of Greek claims was no secret. The Megali idea was a well-known Greek aspiration. At the end of December, though, Venizelos presented a skilfully worded memorandum which for the first time specified his country's irredentist claims.38 Clearly at this stage in the negotiations Venizelos' statement has to be seen as a maximum statement, and was recognized as such.39 It reassured the British that the Greek claims would not be extravagant. Venizelos claimed Northern Epirus; Thrace so as to include Adrianople; the region around Smyrna; and the Aegean islands of Imbros, Tenedos, and Castellorizo. He expressed the hope that Italy would take the initiative in handing over the Dodecanese, and while Venizelos did not actually claim Cyprus he obviously hoped that a similar conclusion would be drawn by Britain. Venizelos was careful not to claim Constantinople, potentially a source of Great Power conflict; rather he favoured the city being made an international state under the League of Nations. This would obviously leave open the opportunity for Greece to obtain Constantinople at some future date while eliminating Turkish rule now.
Venizelos' memorandum was widely read and studied by the British negotiators, and Nicolson was ordered to prepare a synopsis of the Greek case with a commentary of its significance for British policy.40 Nicolson reported that the claims to Northern Epirus were justified, except possibly the Koritsa district which would require further consideration. As to Thrace Greek claims were again seen as justified, on the basis of the Greeks being the majority nationality, except that Adrianople ought to go to Bulgaria. They were only the majority nationality however if one ignored the Turks who Nicolson assumed 'ex hypothesis will not be given these districts'.41 On purely political grounds Nicolson supported Greek claims in Thrace on the basis that 'it is a direct British interest that M. Venizelos' personal influence in Greece should be maintained and strengthened '.42 As to the claims in Asia Minor Nicolson considered these too broad and suggested modifications, observing that 'it would be extremely weakening for Greece to absorb so large a Turkish element within a zone conterminous with the future Turkish state'.43 As to the islands there was clear support for Greek aims, though the neutralization of Imbros and Tenedos was recommended. Britain was unable to do anything directly about the Dodecanese because of its I9I5 secret treaty with Italy. The report also opposed the cession of Cyprus, which Nicolson personally supported, but which was opposed by Crowe who revised the text before it was issued.
Given that Venizelos' statement was one of maximum aims, it received a remarkable degree of support from within the Foreign Office. The only serious objections were raised by the general staff.44 While accepting Greek claims in Northern Epirus on strategic grounds, they dissented on Thrace. Rather they proposed including the vilayet in an international Constantinopolitan state to 'dispense with an avoidable cause of friction in the Balkans '.45 On Asia Minor they presciently observed that to give Greece Smyrna and its hinterland 'will give the Turks ajust cause for resentment and will create a source of continual unrest possibly culminating in an organised attempt by the Turks to re-conquer this territory'.46 The general staff therefore concluded that they considered 'the peaceful settlement of Turkey a legitimate military interest...
Nicolson agreed that while the general staff's argument had its merits, it was consigning too large an area to international administration and suggested that the Smyrna problem might be solved by making it a freeport under international control. Clearly Nicolson wished to restrict the Turks as
much as possible.48
On 3-4 February the peace conference's supreme council heard Venizelos' presentation of Greece's case, and decided to refer these claims to a Greek Affairs Committee. The Committee met twelve times between I 2 February and 2I March, with Britain being represented by Sir Eyre Crowe and Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian prime minister, with Nicolson as their technical adviser.49 Throughout the discussions of the Greek Committee there was general Anglo-French agreement, with frequent American concurrence. The Italians were continually difficult. Italian aims clashed sharply with the Megali idea, in so much as Italy hoped to receive control of Albania and a slice of Anatolia, while expecting to retain the Dodecanese. As a result Greek-Italian relations plummeted to new depths during the first months of the peace talks.
The committee turned first to the question of Northern Epirus, on which it was felt that agreement could be achieved most easily. The British, French, and Americans all rapidly concurred that Greece should obtain the areas south of the Voiussa, in particular the Argyrocastro district. The French were the most generous to Greece, with Britain shifting to agreement with them, while the Americans dissented on giving the Koritza district to Greece. The Italians, hoping to receive control of Albania, naturally wanted the pre-war frontier agreed by the Florence protocol of I9I3. Crowe, when pressed in the Committee to justify handing over such a large number of Albanians to Greek rule brushed the matter aside with an observation on '... the great power of assimilation possessed by the Greeks'.50 When the Greek Committee reported on 6 March to the supreme council, it presented the Anglo-French proposal, pointing out the American variant over Koritza and noting Italy's claims for the status quo.51
The supreme council, busy with many other concerns, asked the Greek Committee to make a last effort on reaching a consensus.52 Here Nicolson and his junior P.I.D. colleague, Major J. S. Barnes, took the leading role in attempting to achieve a compromise.53 Nicolson's immediate proposal was to suggest that in as much as the I9I4 Corfu convention, which had never been ratified, made Northern Epirus an autonomous district, the simplest solution would be to make it a League of Nations mandate, with Greece as the mandatory power! Nicolson admitted that this was probably not an ideal solution. 54
In April Major Barnes, who had travelled widely in Albania, proposed another compromise. He assumed that the conference 'seriously desired to constitute an Albania capable of surviving as an independent self-respecting State'.55 His solution was to make the entire country a League mandate, but allowing Italy only an indirect role by appointing the Duke d'Abruzzi as high commissioner with the title of mbret! This would at least remove any immediate Italian threat on Greece's border, and even Nicolson was briefly taken by the scheme.56 Harold Temperley of military intelligence in reviewing the Barnes proposal was concerned about the Koritza district. While recognizing that it was a significant aim of Albanian nationalism he considered that, 'none the less the importance of strategic security to Greece must be insisted upon'.57 As a result he argued for assigning Koritza to Greece.
To the general frustration of the British delegation the main stumbling block to reaching an agreement with the United States was not American inflexibility, but rather, as one American delegate apologetically informed them on 2I April, that 'unfortunately, my people are so much engaged with other matters that they have not time to attend, even for a moment to the problem of Northern Epirus'. 58 Indeed no further movement occurred on the Epirus question until late May.
At the end of May Nicolson in a last desperate attempt to secure a solution on Northern Epirus proposed one of the most curious schemes of the peace conference.59 It was aimed to meet American objections, while being in line with British commitments to Italy under the I9I5 treaty of London. Nicolson proposed dividing up Albania into a number of states. There would be an autonomous Albanian province in the Albanian highlands of Yugoslavia, roughly encompassing the Kossovo region. Central Albania would be an autonomous moslem state under an Italian mandate. Northern Epirus would be ceded outright to Greece, but with the intention that Greece would then trade the moslem portions of Epirus to Italy in return for the Dodecanese.
Finally the much debated district of Koritza would not be given to either Greece or Italy but would be 'rendered the seat of a Central Albanian university under United States protection, in which the idea of eventual Albanian unity would be preserved and stimulated'.60 This would at least neutralize the district, while removing any strategic threat to Greece.
Nicolson had certainly hit upon a unique method of creating an unofficial demilitarized zone - by placing a university in it. Nicolson suggested that this solution be agreed to run for twenty years. It is difficult to know whether Nicolson was completely serious, or that having seen all serious solutions fail he decided to try a silly one. He was however authorized by Balfour to discuss the scheme with the Americans, who seem to have remained uninterested.
On the future of Thrace the Greek Committee had at first seemed likely to reach a consensus. All the powers started with the assumption that Turkish rule in Europe was at an end.6" By the beginning of March all agreed a Thracian frontier based on an Anglo-French proposal and adjusted by minor erudite refinements suggested by the Americans." It was impossible to set an eastern frontier, as the extent of the presumed Constantinopolitan state was not known, but a notional line of Enos to Midia was assumed. This would have provided Greece with a small Black Sea coastline. The ease with which agreement was reached seemed quite remarkable.
As so often happened at Paris, though, the clearest agreements could easily come unstuck. To the honest fury of the British delegation, when the Central Territorial Committee was reviewing the various territorial decisions in July, the Americans suddenly repudiated the Greek Committee's agreement on Thracian frontiers - which was based on their own proposal.63 The United States was now suggesting that the frontier should follow the I9I5 borders.
Nicolson attempted to point out that the complex negotiations at Paris had involved continual give and take, and that by radically altering its position the United States threatened the entire fabric of the settlement.64 The British were even more irritated by American interference when it was recalled that the United States had never declared war on either Bulgaria or the Ottoman empire. Crowe put down the American volte face to W. H. Buckler, the American delegate, whom he dismissed with the comment that Buckler was 'a notorious out-and-out pro-Turk and hates everything Greek'.65 The result, though, was that the entire matter had to be reconsidered. Britain was anxious to provide Greece with the greatest possible gains in Thrace, and certainly saw no reason why Bulgaria should gain out of the war.
Venizelos implored Crowe to mobilize British support for the original agreement. He was planning to return shortly to Athens, and as yet no decision had been reached on any of Greece's claims. Venizelos feared the worst if he was forced to return to Athens empty-handed.66 As the British interest in Greece centred on the continuation of the Venizelist regime such a possibility would be disastrous. The British, though, were to suffer severe frustrations in attempting to bring the Americans round. As Nicolson commented in one memorandum that as the Americans had 'no sense of policy, our political arguments leave them cold'.67 There followed a period of negotiations when ever more tenuous schemes were attempted.68
Greek claims in Asia Minor were clearly the most emotive issue to be considered by the Great Powers. Venizelos had originally claimed a rather large district encompassing much of the western Anatolia littoral.69 As with other Greek claims there was close Anglo-French agreement, which in this instance gave Greece the core of its claim around Smyrna.70 When the Greek Committee met to discuss the issue the Americans strongly opposed any districts being detached from Anatolian Turkey.71 In something of a diplomatic huff the Italians standing by their rights under the I9I5 treaty of London adopted a policy of not speaking when Asia Minor was discussed, a policy which the minutes reveal the Italian representative, de Martino, had difficulty maintaining.72
In these discussions Britain took a clear stand that the Greek colonies in Asia Minor should be annexed to Greece, and that there was no need for a League mandate arrangement.73 Such a solution would of course not only forward he Megali idea, but would see a British ally firmly astride the Aegean Sea.
When agreement proved difficult to reach Nicolson resorted to the usual formula, which would hopefully leave the substance - if not the visible form, of Greek control. He recommended in the first instance that Greece be given outright the Sandjak of Smyrna, with a mandate over the remainder of the region claimed by Venizelos. This would in fact have increased the area under Greek control over that proposed by Britain and France in the committee. Nicolson made his own view clear when he commented in his proposal that he felt strongly 'that the Greek claims in Asia Minor are justified '. This was not the universal view in the delegation.
There were those who believed that to allow the Greeks any role in Asia Minor would be a serious mistake. Sir Louis Mallet, one of the few senior diplomats at Paris with direct experience of the region, while not unsympathetic to Greece, believed that there should be no Greek annexations 'unless political necessity made it inevitable'.7 Mallet's view was supported by the views of General Milne, the General Officer commanding at Constantinople, and by General Thwaites of military intelligence.76 Crowe naturally dismissed these contrary views, observing on a despatch from Milne 'I should attach more importance to this paper if it did not betray in every line of it the traditional prejudice against everything Greek which is the stock-intrade of our pro-Turks in the East'.77 Crowe saw Greek rule as the most likely guarantee of future stability and he considered that the military assessment was based on political and not strategical factors, and as such were the concern of the diplomats. Thwaites retorted however that 'policy, unless leavened with understanding, is apt to make an early call on strategy. Do we desire such a call at present and could we respond to it?'78 A sympathy which could have been profitably remembered during the subsequent Chanak crisis.
It should be noted, however, that military views were no more united than diplomatic opinion, as the day after Thwaites' comment military intelligence issued a memorandum which advocated placing Smyrna under Greek rule for reasons justifiable 'both politically and morally, while economically it is defensible on the grounds that the Turks have never shown any aptitude or inclination to control their own commerce'.79 This was entirely consistent with the view expressed by military intelligence as far back as December which had concluded that the Turks were 'totally incapable of commerce, or of economic development of the rich western coastland of Asia Minor. If this region is to be developed at all it must be developed by Europeans'.80 The Europeans they had in mind were the Greeks. The entire question of Greek claims in Asia Minor remained very much in flux, both within the British delegation and in the conference as a whole.
Nicolson and Toynbee, supported by Crowe, proposed a scheme in mid- April in the hope of breaking through the impasse, which would still secure Greece's strategic position, and thereby Britain's. Perhaps having been influenced by the military's concerns they proposed that Greece should receive Constantinople and European Turkey, while the sultan would rule over an Anatolian Turkey. They accepted that defending its position in western Anatolia might weaken Greece, while this solution would be easier to enforce.
Crowe suggested that Italy should be pensioned off not with its Anatolian claims but by being given the honour of becoming the League of Nations mandatory in the Caucasus. The idea of disposing of the Italians in that mountainous district might have appealed to many diplomats during the height of the Adriatic crisis which threatened to disrupt the conference in April, but Balfour had to admit that it was unlikely the Italians would accept.
The proposals of the British diplomats were overtaken in May by events in the council of four, now reduced to three by an Italian walkout. It has been observed that 'In the absence of the Italians, the hostility of the three to them multiplied at a geometric rate'. 82 It can certainly be argued that the Italians were the most disruptive force at Paris. Their walkout however was a serious tactical error, as it allowed the remaining Great Powers to move rapidly on a number of issues. One of these was the need for an Allied presence at Smyrna to block an expected pre-emptive Italian landing.83 None of the Great Powers was particularly anxious to deploy its own forces and it was Lloyd George who suggested on 6 May 'that M. Venizelos should be allowed to land two or three Divisions at Smyrna to protect his fellow countrymen in Turkey'.84 Clemenceau and Wilson agreed and on I3 May a Greek flotilla sailed for Smyrna accompanied by four British warships. The landing on I5 May was supervised by Admiral Sir Somerset Calthorpe. Simultaneously American objections to Greek claims subsided with the direct intervention of Woodrow Wilson who was more philhellenic than many of his advisers.85 It now seemed as if Venizelos was on the verge of success. With a Greek army in place in Asia Minor his negotiating position was now vastly strengthened.
The tragedy for Venizelos and those like Crowe and Nicolson who supported a Greater Greece were the atrocities committed by the Greek troops on arrival in Smyrna. The effect of the reports arriving in Paris was to alter the climate of opinion against a Greek role. In early June S. A. Armitage- Smith of the financial section observed that 'It is impossible to sanction any territorial arrangement under which Greeks would be permitted to rule over Turks'. 86 Some members of the British delegation wished to distance Britain from the debacle of the landings. Eric Forbes-Adam of the delegation's political section wrote on I July that 'We do not want to increase the already prevalent, though erroneous, opinion that we alone are responsible for the Greek occupation of the Smyrna zone'. 87 The peace conference dealt with the problem, as it dealt with so many problems it had faced, and postponed discussion of the Turkish question.88
One of the most important decisions to be faced by the conference was the fate 'of Constantinople.89 There was widespread support for ousting Turkish rule from the city, and there was little inclination to justify a move which contravened all the principles on which supposedly the peace was to be based.
As Toynbee argued in The murderoust yrannyo f the Turks, Constantinople 'is the Turk's at present by right of conquest, but that right justified his expulsion by war if it justifies his original intrusion ... '.90 Venizelos, however, had not laid claim to Constantinople knowing that it was likely to be a focus of Great Power rivalry. What emerged as the likely solution from a very early stage was the plan that the city would become an international state under the League of Nations.9" There was even some hope that Constantinople would become the seat of the League. Britain's aim was to avoid the city falling into the grasp of any other European power.92
Linked to the future of Constantinople were British concerns about the reaction of the large moslem population within their empire, particularly in India, to the displacement of the Turks and the sultan-caliph from the city. Britain's overwhelming concern about the security and stability of the Indian empire acted as a particular constraint to its policies on Turkey. Prominent Indian moslems, including the Aga Khan, petitioned the British government to leave the Turks of Constantinople and Asia Minor under Turkish and therefore moslem rule. Crowe dismissed such petitions with the observation that, ' when they suited our policy we have made use of them, when inconvenient and unpractical, they have been courteously neglected'.93 The India Office however took such views seriously, being concerned about the possibilities of widespread civil unrest.
The India Office was split internally on the question of Constantinople. The secretary of state for India, Edwin Montagu, supported the status quo, while Arthur Hirtzel, assistant under-secretary in the India Office's political department, believed that 'if once it is admitted that Indian moslems can influence the policy of His Majesty's Government in Europe a very awkward precedent will be created'.94 Certainly the inter-departmental Eastern Committee had been unable to reach a conclusion on Constantinople, but Lord Curzon in his summing up of their discussions concluded that 'The world is looking for great solutions. Let not this occasion ... be missed of purging the east of one of its most pestilent roots of evil'.95 Linked to the Constantinopolitan question, regardless of who was in control, was the fate of the strategically located islands of Imbros and Tenedos which hold a commanding position at the entrance to the Straits. Occupied by Britain at the end of the war, it was clearly London's intention that they should pass to Greece, regardless of what happened to Constantinople.96 The Greek Committee agreed in March that the islands should go to Greece but that they should be neutralized.97 There the matter rested, awaiting the outcome of the entire settlement. In September the Admiralty did make a plaintive request to evacuate the islands before winter set in, but this was refused. 98
British plans for Greece included specific tactical aims. There was a growing awareness of the importance of airpower, and Britain cast covetous eyes on the Cretan airfield at Suda Bay. This had been used since I9I8 as a stop-over on flights to Egypt and the air ministry wished to retain use of the base as a link in its Far Eastern route. In return for landing rights the air ministry proposed giving Greece a substantial boost in air power with the gift of ioo airplanes surplus to requirement, and Nicolson was deputed to approach Venizelos on the subject in June.99 There was some concern that the British acquisition and development of an airbase so near Italy's Dodecanese possessions would cause difficulties with Rome. Nicolson therefore hit upon a somewhat covert solution. The Greeks would announce plans for an aerodrome at Suda Bay and request British technical assistance. By the time the base was completed it was hoped that the question of the Dodecanese and conflicting Greco- Italian claims elsewhere would have been resolved.100 The aerodrome in any case would be available for British use, presuming of course that Greece remained friendly. The aerodrome project was placed under the ministry of the marine, for reasons which help illustrate an aspect of British influence in Greece. General P. R. C. Groves of the British delegation's Air section informed General Trenchard that the reason for this according to Nicolson was that 'the Greek Ministry of Marine is very much under our control'."' The Suda Bay aerodrome was intended as one aspect of an Anglo-Greek entente.
By July it seemed that a serious impasse had been reached in the various components of the Greek negotiations, mostly due to Italian intransigence, combined with an element of erratic American inflexibility. In the general diplomatic fluidity of I9I9, however, anything was possible, and on 29 July the Italians and Greeks dramatically resolved their difficulties. Italy agreed to support Greek claims in Northern Epirus, Thrace, Smyrna, and the Dodecanese Islands. Italy, however, would retain Rhodes until and if Britain ceded Cyprus to Greece. All this was dependent on Italy achieving its remaining Anatolian aspirations. Although this agreement had inherent difficulties, it did represent a significant diplomatic breakthrough.102
The final settlement was delayed through the autumn of 1919 with the Paris conference reduced to a rump session while the European allies awaited America's decision on the Versailles Treaty. By December, however, it was clear that the United States would opt out of European affairs and Anglo- French talks began in an attempt to resolve the outstanding questions of the peace settlement. Most of the details were worked out at the London conference, I2 February-io April I920, and finalized at San Remo, I8-26 April 1920, although the Turks did not formally sign the treaty of Sevres until August 1920.
The future of Northern Epirus was debated sporadically from the end of August 1919. The conference agreed to recommend that Albania should become an Italian mandate, leaving the southern frontier open to further negotiation. An international commission was indeed established in 1920 to delimit the new frontier, but was plagued with difficulties. When it actually attempted to visit the border area it was troubled by the unsettled nature of the region and the assassination of General Tellini, the Italian commissioner.
The character of the Italian government had also changed since the days of Paris, with Mussolini's seizure of power in I922. The death of Tellini resulted in the Corfu incident of I923, and when the commission reported shortly thereafter it ruled in favour of the Italian view. This left the frontier effectively the same as in I913I103
Greek claims in Thrace were more fortunate. Western Thrace was taken from Bulgaria by the treaty of Neuilly on 27 November I919. It was not handed over directly to Greece, but rather to an inter-allied commission. At the San Remo conference in February I920 Western Thrace together with Eastern Thrace up to the Chatalja line was awarded to Greece, but in I923 at the Lausanne conference Greece lost Eastern Thrace, which reverted to Turkey. Greece was victorious in its aims in the treaty of Sevres in obtaining the Smyrna region, but it was only a hollow victory for the cost of the Greek involvement in Asia Minor was high. The Greek presence had sparked the Turkish nationalist movement which eventually defeated the Greek armies, liquidated Greece's role in Asia Minor, and overturned the Sevres settlement.
As the Greco-Turkish crisis worsened what had happened to British support for a Greater Greece? A number of factors combined to disrupt the Anglo- Greek entente. The ending of the Paris peace conference dispersed the team of philhellenic diplomats who had been generally successful in pushing through key elements of a pro-Greek settlement. Although there were still many uncertainties in I 920, the correlation of forces seemed strongly to favour the emergence of*greater Greece. What unquestionably altered British support for Greece was the event they had most feared, but could hardly have expected in I920 - the fall of the Venizelos government and the return of King Constantine. In October I920 King Alexander died, and the parliamentary elections held on I4 November became a referendum on the return of Constantine. The result was a heavy defeat for Venizelos who resigned and sailed into exile escorted by a British warship. On I9 December Constantine entered Athens.
The removal of Venizelos acted as a spur to the anti-Greek elements in London, who could now identify Greece with the supposedly pro-German Constantine. As Winston Churchill later wrote 'the return of Constantine dissolved all Allied loyalties to Greece and cancelled all but legal obligations'."04 Even Crowe and Nicolson had little faith that Constantine could be counted on to act as a British proxy. Certainly British treatment of the king during the war and his exile was unlikely to form the basis of good relations. 105
Nevertheless Greece continued to enj-oy some support in London. Lloyd George maintained an instinctive philhellenism, eventually to his cost during the Chanak crisis. Crowe and Nicolson while admitting their distaste for Constantine still saw Greece as the country for Britain to favour.106 Perhaps they hoped for an eventual Venizelist revival. Even Lord Curzon, now foreign secretary, and not notably philhellenic, supported the Sevres settlement until the Greek military disasters in Asia Minor. The War office, however, continued to be dubious of Greek abilities.
Britain though, along with France, believed that Greece should be made aware of Allied displeasure at the change of government. On 5 December I920 they cancelled financial credits to Greece. The resultant economic difficulties reduced Greece's ability effectively to conduct its military operations.
Nicolson had warned that any such move would 'permanently destroy the fabric of the peace treaties and reduce Greece to the proportions of a third-class power. The disadvantage of this will be apparent when, as is inevitable, M. Venizelos eventually returns with dictatorial powers'.107 Nicolson was correct.
Venizelos did return to power briefly in I924 and again in I928, but by then the entire strategic situation had been permanently altered by the military victories of Mustapha Kemal. British policy to Greece became increasingly ambivalent after December I920. Britain preferred Greece to Turkey, but support for Greater Greece had been closely tied to Venizelos. The fall of Venizelos meant the collapse of Britain's regional plans and left British policy in the Eastern Mediterranean seriously adrift for several years to come.
References:
104 Winston Churchill, The Great War (London, I934), III, I559.
105 Documentosn Britishf oreignp olicy, 1gig-1g3g (London, I962), first series, XII, 439.
106 Ibid. pp. 439, 488.
107 Ibid. p. 439.
Details are given in James Barros, The Corfui ncident( Princeton, I966).
97 P.R.O., FO 608/37/92/I/4/393I-
98 P.R.O., FO 608/30/76/4/I/I8645; P.R.O., FO 608/30/76/4/I/I9I59.
99 P.R.O., FO 608/34/85/3/I/I3290. A useful file of correspondence on this matter is in the
P. R. C. Groves papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London.
100 P.R.O., FO 608/34/85/3/I/I4667 and P.R.O., FO 608/34/85/3/I/I6977-
101 Groves to Trenchard, 30 July I 9 I 9. Groves papers.
102 P;R.O., FO 6o8/54/I20/3/I2/I70Io. Memorandum by Crowe, 3I July I919. The
agreement is discussed in Petsalis-Diomidis, pp. 25I-6.
90 Arnold J. Toynbee, The murderous tyranny of the Turks (London, I9 I 7), p. 22.
91 A. W. A. Leeper to R. W. A. Leeper, 9 March I9g9, in the unlisted A. W. A. Leeper papers.
92 P.R.O., CAB 27/24/EC46. Minutes of the Eastern Committee, 23 Dec. I9I8.
P.R.O., FO 608/52/I20/I/3/3I6. Minute by Crowe, I Jan. 1919.
9 P.R.O., CAB 27/39/EC284I. Note by Hirtzel, 20 Dec. I9I8.
9 P.R.O., CAB 27/39/EC3027. Curzon, 'The future of Constantinople', 2 Jan. IgIg. Also in
CAB 29/2/P.-85.
96 P.R.O., FO 6o8/37/92/I/T/775.
82 Michael L. Dockrill and J. Douglas Gould, Peace without promise: Britain and the peace
conferences, IgIg-23 (London, I98I), pp. l90-I.
83 Minuses of the Council of Four, 6 May I 9 I 9. Foreignr elationos f the UnitedS tates:t heP arisp eace
conferenceI,g Ig, Volume v.
84 Ibid.
85 Erik Goldstein, 'Adrift on the Bosporus: Woodrow Wilson, philhellenism and the partition
of Turkey I9I8-1920', M.A. Thesis, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University,
I 980.
86 P.R.O., FO 608/I04/383/I/6/II984. Minute by Armitage-Smith, 9 June I9I9.
87 P.R.O., FO 6o8/104/383/I/6/I4003. Minute by Forbes-Adam, I July I9I8.
88 Documentosn Britishf oreignp olicy, 1919-1939 (London, I962), first series, IV, 430.
89 The question of Constantinople has been extensively dealt with, the best short account being
A. L. MacFie, 'The British decision regarding the future of Constantinople, November
i9i8-january I920', Historical Journal, i8, 2 (I975), 39I-400.
[/i]Author(s): Erik Goldstein
Source: The Historical Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2, (Jun., 1989), pp. 339-356
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: www.jstor.org/stable/2639605
Accessed: 31/05/2008 15:48
The HistoricaJl ournal,3 2, 2 (i989), pp. 339-356
Printed in Great Britain
GREAT BRITAIN AND GREATER GREECE 1917-1920
ERIK GOLDSTEIN
University of Birmingham
The First World War saw the collapse of the old order in the Eastern Mediterranean with the disintegration of the Ottoman empire, an event which threatened to create a dangerous power vacuum. Great Britain for the past century had attempted to prevent just such a crisis by supporting the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state. Britain had a number of crucial strategic concerns in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular the Suez Canal and the Straits. The former was the more critical interest and Britain was determined to keep this essential link to its Indian empire firmly under its own control. As to the Straits Britain, which was concerned about over-extending its strategic capabilities, was content to see this critical waterway dominated by a friendly state. The question inevitably arose therefore as to what would replace the Ottoman empire. One alternative was Greece, a possibility which became increasingly attractive with the emergence of the supposedly pro-British Eleftherios Venizelos as the Greek leader in early 1917.
Within the Foreign Office there was a significant group who wished to cast Greece in the role of regional power and regional British proxy. With the ending of the war in i 9I8 the actual conduct of the negotiations over Greek related questions fell into the hands of this group of philhellenes, centred on the new Political Intelligence Department. The most important philhellenes were Sir Eyre Crowe, Allen Leeper, Harold Nicolson, and to a lesser extent Arnold Toynbee. From the ending of the war in November I9I8 until Venizelos' fall two years later they pushed for the creation of an Anglo-Greek entente in which a Greater Greece would be Britain's chief ally in this historically sensitive area.
Britain's foreign policy had drifted during the early years of the war, producing a number of short-term solutions to immediate crises. One of the results of this policy was a number of secret treaties agreed by the Entente powers concerning the future division of the Ottoman empire. The most important in relation to Greece were the I9I5 secret treaty of London and the I9I7 agreement of St Jean de Maurienne. The former was signed as an inducement to Italy to enter the war, and promised it among other spoils an equitable share in the division of the Ottoman empire. This was clarified by the St Jean de Maurienne agreement which promised Italy the south western quarter of Anatolia, with the exercise of special rights in the Smyrna district.
These promises conflicted with traditional Greek irredentist aims and continually hampered the post-war negotiations when Italy stood rigidly by its interpretation of its treaty rights. One result of the growing number of such agreements was a concern, particularly in the Foreign Office, for the need for a greater consideration of long-term policy formulation.
When Britain went to war in I9I4 its general war aims were simple - victory. It was only as the war progressed that the British government began to consider more elaborate aims. Finally during the summer of I9I6 in the aftermath of the bloodbath of the battle of the Somme the government took up the question of war aims, when Asquith's war committee gave some desultory consideration to these questions. Very little came of the discussions, and given the general lassitude of Asquith's administration only a few of the ministers invited to submit memoranda even bothered to reply.'
The whole tenor of government changed dramatically in December I9I6 with the appointment of Lloyd George as prime minister. Whether or not the permanent officials liked or disliked Lloyd George a new feeling of vitality ran through Whitehall. At last Britain began seriously to consider what sort of world it wanted when the fighting ceased.
Several government officials were concerned about the lack of focus in British considerations about the post-war settlement. The senior members of the government provided no direction, being far too wrapped up in the day to day conduct of the struggle. The result was that a handful of officials took it upon themselves to establish a network of offices concerned with preparing negotiating material for an eventual peace conference. The most important office was the Political Intelligence Department (P.I.D.) established by the Foreign Office in March 1918.2
The P.I.D. was assigned the task of'collecting, sifting, and coordinating all political intelligence... '3 and it became the nucleus of the British negotiating team at the Paris peace conference. The P.I.D. comprised on average a dozen experts, each with a regional speciality. Most of its staff were civilians doing temporary war work, augmented by some regular Foreign Office officials. In October I9I8 as peace loomed the P.I.D. was reorganized to take on the full weight of preparing Britain's negotiating brief.4
The South Eastern European section was placed under Sir Ralph Paget, who had served as minister in Belgrade during the critical years I9I0-I 3.5 To assist on Balkan matters he was assigned Allen Leeper and Harold Nicolson. The Middle East section which was concerned with questions relating to the Ottoman empire was headed by Sir Louis Mallet who had been ambassador to Turkey, I9I3-I4.6 His most important assistant was Arnold Toynbee.
The great bulk of the work on preparing Britain's policy towards Greece fell on the three P.I.D. staffers, Leeper, Nicolson, and Toynbee. These three experts were quite remarkable individuals, all at this time being about thirty years old and all products of Balliol. Each was destined to play a significant role not only in the preparatory phase but in the negotiations as well. They were very much imbued with the ideas of the New Europe group which envisaged a Europe redrawn along the lines of national self-determination and with future tranquillity assisted by a League of Nations.7
Allen Leeper (I887-I935) was born in Australia and had taken a first in Latin and Greek at Melbourne before taking another first in Greats at Oxford in i 91 . A superb linguist he spoke fifteen languages with ease, among them Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbo-Croat.8 Harold Nicolson later recalled of him that 'being a citizen of the New World, he could approach the Old with the romantic zest of a scholar on his first visit to the Parthenon... ' Leeper frequently contributed to the journal New Europe under the pseudonym 'Belisarius'."o Harold Nicolson (I886-I968) was a 'member of the diplomatic service, who had served previously at Constantinople. Nicolson's philhellenism was matched by notable turcophobia." Arnold Toynbee (I889-I975) had served in various propaganda offices before joining the P.I.D. Besides contributing to the New Europe he produced several wartime patriotic potboilers, including The murderous tyranny of the Turks."2
One other individual involved in the Greek negotiations deserves particular mention, Sir Eyre Crowe. One of the outstanding British diplomats of the era he was the dynamo which dominated the British delegation at Paris. Lloyd George and the politicians may have decided policy at the highest level, but it was Crowe and his proteges from the P.I.D. who influenced the shape and texture of the settlement in the various technical committees in which most of the issues were settled. It was the P.I.D. which formed the backbone of the British negotiating team at Paris. While the British delegation at the conference was vast and mostly decorative, these individuals held most of the key substantive positions.
During the preparatory phase for the negotiations the most important reports bearing on the Greek settlement were produced by Leeper, Nicolson and Toynbee. Nicolson and Leeper's P.I.D. report on British desiderata in South Eastern Europe appeared in mid-December. Their conclusions were based on the assumption that national self-determination would be the underlying principle of any settlement as it not only offered 'the best prospects of a permanent peace in South-Eastern Europe, and as such are the most desirable and advantageous from the point of view of British interests'.14
They recommended that Greece be enlarged by receiving an Anatolian enclave centred in Smyrna, that Greece and Italy reach an agreement as to the Dodecanese, that Greece should obtain all the Aegean islands (including the strategically placed islands of Imbros, Tenedos, Lemnos and Samothrace), that Britain should cede Cyprus to Greece, and that Northern Epirus up to the Voiussa be annexed to Greece. Their recommendations were partly complemented by those proposed by Toynbee.15
Toynbee prepared a series of reports covering the various components of the Ottoman empire. In his most comprehensive memorandum, produced in mid- November, Toynbee recommended that 'since the transference of the Caliphate from the Turks to the Arabs is distinctly desirable from the British point of view ... the expulsion of Turkey from Constantinople may perhaps be regarded as a British desideratum on political grounds'.16 Toynbee recognized that traditional rivalries for control of the city might make retention of the status quo the easier solution.
In a subsequent report Toynbee recommended against ceding Greece any Anatolian territory as posing too many ethnographical, economic, and strategic difficulties.17 Toynbee later recalled that, on the eve of the peace-conference I was given the job (among a number of others) of suggesting - with a map - the bounds of a possible Greek enclave round Smyrna.
I carried out these instructions, and learnt in doing so, that this plan was a geographical absurdity. It was not till I visited, in I92I, the then Greek-occupied area that I realised how small the Greek minority was, even within the area that I had delimited."8 Toynbee remained a supporter of most of Greece's European claims, but consistently warned that allowing Greece a role in Anatolia would generate numerous potentially combustible problems. Toynbee is already revealing at this stage that critical approach to pan-hellenic claims which would later cause such a dramatic breach in his relations with Greece.
Greece undoubtedly benefited from a general philhellenic feeling among the central figures in Britain's negotiating team, incited in part by strident turcophobia. Nicolson commenting on Greek claims in Asia Minor believed that 'we will be morally lacking if we allow this sensitive and progressive civilisation to be again subordinated to the Turks...'.19 Nicolson later wrote that 'for the Turks I had, and have, no sympathy whatsoever. Long residence at Constantinople had convinced me that behind his mask of indolence, the Turk conceals impulses of the most brutal savagery'.20 Nicolson's views were not unrepresentative. His chief, Sir Eyre Crowe, saw the expulsion of the Turks from Europe as a vital aim of British policy, observing that 'the policy of allowing the Turk to remain in Europe is so contrary to our most important interests and so certain to involve the continuance of all the abdomination associated with the rule of the Turks, that we cannot afford to treat this as a matter ofjust humouring Moslem feelings... '.21 Crowe consistently placed the reduction of Turkish power and the consequent increase in Greek power above any concerns as to the reaction of the British empire's substantial moslem population to the displacement of the caliph. This was a view which found favour in the highest reaches of Whitehall. Lord Curzon, as chairman of the Eastern Committee observed 'that the presence of the Turks in Europe has been a source of unmitigated evil to everybody concerned ... Indeed, the record is one of misrule, oppression, intrigue, and massacre, almost unparalleled in the history of the Eastern world'.22
Such views reflected a wide section of public opinion. Among the letters which the foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, received during the early days of the conference was a resolution from the Edinburgh presbytery of the United Free Church of Scotland requesting that 'it shall be made an essential condition of peace that the Turkish Government be removed from Constantinople and the Continent of Europe'.23 Individual efforts of this type were augmented by the sustained campaigns of organized pressure groups such as the St Sophia Redemption Committee set up by the Anglican and Eastern Association.24
While the Ottoman empire attracted the most attention, there was general British support for Greek irredentist claims to other neighbouring districts. The British minister at Athens, Lord Granville, a not uncritical observer of Greece, made an unusually impassioned plea during December I 9 I 8, pointing out that with the collapse of the Central Powers 'the eternal question of the unredeemed Greeks has now at last a chance of solution'.25 The frequent repetition of the concept of redemption indicates the almost religious fervour with which the creation of*greater Greece was seen.
There were, of course, those who did not share the philhellenic ardour of these diplomats. Those, however, who ventured to suggest contrary views had their opinions summarily dismissed. In March I9I9 Colonel H. D. Napier, British military representative in Sofia, suggested that the right people to back in the Balkans were the Bulgars, commenting that 'after all, a Bulgar is something of a man, and when you take Venizelos from Greece, what have you left'.2" Allen Leeper simply minuted on Napier's pro-Bulgar suggestions that 'The proposals seem quite unjustifiable'.27 When in May the British minister at Sophia, Sir Harry Lamb, sent in several reports pointing out some of the difficulties facing Bulgaria, Crowe commented that 'Sir H. Lamb has unfortunately never been able to see anything but the Bulgarian side of the question'." Both Napier and Lamb fared better than the unfortunate Captain Spencer who in a letter to The Times reported that to his knowledge the border district of Koritza, which Britain wished to transfer from Albania to Greece, was entirely Albanian in population. This led Crowe to observe that 'Captain Spencer is notoriously an adventurer of the shadiest character and of the most unsavoury antecedents. He ought to be in the dock'.29
British diplomats were not alone in their sympathies. At the first meeting of the Greek Territorial Committee in February i919 the chairman, Jules Cambon of France, opened with the remark that the peace conference offered ' the best means of satisfying the ancient claims of the Hellenic nation and of at least completing the work of independence begun by the Liberal Nations of Europe a century ago'.30 Certainly there was every indication that Greece could hope for more than impartial justice. This general climate of opinion was not lost on the Greek delegates and Nicholas Politis, the foreign minister, in writing back to Greece just after the opening of the conference commented upon ' a certain phil-hellenic feeling... .'31 It was an emotion which the Greek delegation had every expectation of capitalizing on.
Greece's greatest asset in dealing with Britain, and indeed the peace negotiations, was Eleftherios Venizelos, who emerged as one of the giants of the conference. Venizelos' diplomatic craftsmanship was superb, especially then thrown into relief against the coarse antics of the Roumanian, Bratianu. Venizelos' presentation of Greece's case before the conference on 3 February I9 I9 led Allen Leeper to remark 'we all thought it was the most brilliant thing we've ever heard, such amazing strength and tactfulness combined '.3 The delegates who dealt with Venizelos remained fascinated by him, and the Greek premier maintained frequent contact with the British delegates, often inviting them to dine. When Leeper received such an invitation in May he wrote excitedly to his brother, 'I've at last got Veniselos's autograph '.3" Venizelos was considered a solid ally of Britain, and as the P.I.D. observed in their report on South Eastern Europe, 'M. Venizelos has merited our complete support ... So long, therefore as M. Venizelos remains in power little anxiety need be entertained as to the internal conditions of Greece, or her relations to this country'.3 Indeed an important factor in British considerations was a fear that Venizelos might be toppled if he was forced to return to Greece without tangible gains. Nicolson observed in March, during a crisis over Greek claims in Anatolia, that any failure by Venizelos to secure the liberation of these Greeks would seriously undermine his position. Nicolson went on to note 'I need not elaborate the disastrous effects which any weakening of M. Venizelos' position would have upon Greece itself and general Entente interests in the Eastern Mediterranean'. 36 Venizelos was clearly seen as the key to long-term, friendly Anglo-Greek relations.
Britain feared a return of the regime it had assisted Venizelos to overthrow in I9I6. This led to the curious position that British policy tilted in favour of Greece becoming a republic, and ending the strained situation of King Alexander's unwilling reign in place of his father. The P.I.D. explained that Venizelos considered 'that Greece is not yet ripe for republican institutions', but that 'should the Greek people desire eventually to establish a republic, we need raise no objection'.3 Certainly an interesting view for His Majesty's government to take.
The general nature of Greek claims was no secret. The Megali idea was a well-known Greek aspiration. At the end of December, though, Venizelos presented a skilfully worded memorandum which for the first time specified his country's irredentist claims.38 Clearly at this stage in the negotiations Venizelos' statement has to be seen as a maximum statement, and was recognized as such.39 It reassured the British that the Greek claims would not be extravagant. Venizelos claimed Northern Epirus; Thrace so as to include Adrianople; the region around Smyrna; and the Aegean islands of Imbros, Tenedos, and Castellorizo. He expressed the hope that Italy would take the initiative in handing over the Dodecanese, and while Venizelos did not actually claim Cyprus he obviously hoped that a similar conclusion would be drawn by Britain. Venizelos was careful not to claim Constantinople, potentially a source of Great Power conflict; rather he favoured the city being made an international state under the League of Nations. This would obviously leave open the opportunity for Greece to obtain Constantinople at some future date while eliminating Turkish rule now.
Venizelos' memorandum was widely read and studied by the British negotiators, and Nicolson was ordered to prepare a synopsis of the Greek case with a commentary of its significance for British policy.40 Nicolson reported that the claims to Northern Epirus were justified, except possibly the Koritsa district which would require further consideration. As to Thrace Greek claims were again seen as justified, on the basis of the Greeks being the majority nationality, except that Adrianople ought to go to Bulgaria. They were only the majority nationality however if one ignored the Turks who Nicolson assumed 'ex hypothesis will not be given these districts'.41 On purely political grounds Nicolson supported Greek claims in Thrace on the basis that 'it is a direct British interest that M. Venizelos' personal influence in Greece should be maintained and strengthened '.42 As to the claims in Asia Minor Nicolson considered these too broad and suggested modifications, observing that 'it would be extremely weakening for Greece to absorb so large a Turkish element within a zone conterminous with the future Turkish state'.43 As to the islands there was clear support for Greek aims, though the neutralization of Imbros and Tenedos was recommended. Britain was unable to do anything directly about the Dodecanese because of its I9I5 secret treaty with Italy. The report also opposed the cession of Cyprus, which Nicolson personally supported, but which was opposed by Crowe who revised the text before it was issued.
Given that Venizelos' statement was one of maximum aims, it received a remarkable degree of support from within the Foreign Office. The only serious objections were raised by the general staff.44 While accepting Greek claims in Northern Epirus on strategic grounds, they dissented on Thrace. Rather they proposed including the vilayet in an international Constantinopolitan state to 'dispense with an avoidable cause of friction in the Balkans '.45 On Asia Minor they presciently observed that to give Greece Smyrna and its hinterland 'will give the Turks ajust cause for resentment and will create a source of continual unrest possibly culminating in an organised attempt by the Turks to re-conquer this territory'.46 The general staff therefore concluded that they considered 'the peaceful settlement of Turkey a legitimate military interest...
Nicolson agreed that while the general staff's argument had its merits, it was consigning too large an area to international administration and suggested that the Smyrna problem might be solved by making it a freeport under international control. Clearly Nicolson wished to restrict the Turks as
much as possible.48
On 3-4 February the peace conference's supreme council heard Venizelos' presentation of Greece's case, and decided to refer these claims to a Greek Affairs Committee. The Committee met twelve times between I 2 February and 2I March, with Britain being represented by Sir Eyre Crowe and Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian prime minister, with Nicolson as their technical adviser.49 Throughout the discussions of the Greek Committee there was general Anglo-French agreement, with frequent American concurrence. The Italians were continually difficult. Italian aims clashed sharply with the Megali idea, in so much as Italy hoped to receive control of Albania and a slice of Anatolia, while expecting to retain the Dodecanese. As a result Greek-Italian relations plummeted to new depths during the first months of the peace talks.
The committee turned first to the question of Northern Epirus, on which it was felt that agreement could be achieved most easily. The British, French, and Americans all rapidly concurred that Greece should obtain the areas south of the Voiussa, in particular the Argyrocastro district. The French were the most generous to Greece, with Britain shifting to agreement with them, while the Americans dissented on giving the Koritza district to Greece. The Italians, hoping to receive control of Albania, naturally wanted the pre-war frontier agreed by the Florence protocol of I9I3. Crowe, when pressed in the Committee to justify handing over such a large number of Albanians to Greek rule brushed the matter aside with an observation on '... the great power of assimilation possessed by the Greeks'.50 When the Greek Committee reported on 6 March to the supreme council, it presented the Anglo-French proposal, pointing out the American variant over Koritza and noting Italy's claims for the status quo.51
The supreme council, busy with many other concerns, asked the Greek Committee to make a last effort on reaching a consensus.52 Here Nicolson and his junior P.I.D. colleague, Major J. S. Barnes, took the leading role in attempting to achieve a compromise.53 Nicolson's immediate proposal was to suggest that in as much as the I9I4 Corfu convention, which had never been ratified, made Northern Epirus an autonomous district, the simplest solution would be to make it a League of Nations mandate, with Greece as the mandatory power! Nicolson admitted that this was probably not an ideal solution. 54
In April Major Barnes, who had travelled widely in Albania, proposed another compromise. He assumed that the conference 'seriously desired to constitute an Albania capable of surviving as an independent self-respecting State'.55 His solution was to make the entire country a League mandate, but allowing Italy only an indirect role by appointing the Duke d'Abruzzi as high commissioner with the title of mbret! This would at least remove any immediate Italian threat on Greece's border, and even Nicolson was briefly taken by the scheme.56 Harold Temperley of military intelligence in reviewing the Barnes proposal was concerned about the Koritza district. While recognizing that it was a significant aim of Albanian nationalism he considered that, 'none the less the importance of strategic security to Greece must be insisted upon'.57 As a result he argued for assigning Koritza to Greece.
To the general frustration of the British delegation the main stumbling block to reaching an agreement with the United States was not American inflexibility, but rather, as one American delegate apologetically informed them on 2I April, that 'unfortunately, my people are so much engaged with other matters that they have not time to attend, even for a moment to the problem of Northern Epirus'. 58 Indeed no further movement occurred on the Epirus question until late May.
At the end of May Nicolson in a last desperate attempt to secure a solution on Northern Epirus proposed one of the most curious schemes of the peace conference.59 It was aimed to meet American objections, while being in line with British commitments to Italy under the I9I5 treaty of London. Nicolson proposed dividing up Albania into a number of states. There would be an autonomous Albanian province in the Albanian highlands of Yugoslavia, roughly encompassing the Kossovo region. Central Albania would be an autonomous moslem state under an Italian mandate. Northern Epirus would be ceded outright to Greece, but with the intention that Greece would then trade the moslem portions of Epirus to Italy in return for the Dodecanese.
Finally the much debated district of Koritza would not be given to either Greece or Italy but would be 'rendered the seat of a Central Albanian university under United States protection, in which the idea of eventual Albanian unity would be preserved and stimulated'.60 This would at least neutralize the district, while removing any strategic threat to Greece.
Nicolson had certainly hit upon a unique method of creating an unofficial demilitarized zone - by placing a university in it. Nicolson suggested that this solution be agreed to run for twenty years. It is difficult to know whether Nicolson was completely serious, or that having seen all serious solutions fail he decided to try a silly one. He was however authorized by Balfour to discuss the scheme with the Americans, who seem to have remained uninterested.
On the future of Thrace the Greek Committee had at first seemed likely to reach a consensus. All the powers started with the assumption that Turkish rule in Europe was at an end.6" By the beginning of March all agreed a Thracian frontier based on an Anglo-French proposal and adjusted by minor erudite refinements suggested by the Americans." It was impossible to set an eastern frontier, as the extent of the presumed Constantinopolitan state was not known, but a notional line of Enos to Midia was assumed. This would have provided Greece with a small Black Sea coastline. The ease with which agreement was reached seemed quite remarkable.
As so often happened at Paris, though, the clearest agreements could easily come unstuck. To the honest fury of the British delegation, when the Central Territorial Committee was reviewing the various territorial decisions in July, the Americans suddenly repudiated the Greek Committee's agreement on Thracian frontiers - which was based on their own proposal.63 The United States was now suggesting that the frontier should follow the I9I5 borders.
Nicolson attempted to point out that the complex negotiations at Paris had involved continual give and take, and that by radically altering its position the United States threatened the entire fabric of the settlement.64 The British were even more irritated by American interference when it was recalled that the United States had never declared war on either Bulgaria or the Ottoman empire. Crowe put down the American volte face to W. H. Buckler, the American delegate, whom he dismissed with the comment that Buckler was 'a notorious out-and-out pro-Turk and hates everything Greek'.65 The result, though, was that the entire matter had to be reconsidered. Britain was anxious to provide Greece with the greatest possible gains in Thrace, and certainly saw no reason why Bulgaria should gain out of the war.
Venizelos implored Crowe to mobilize British support for the original agreement. He was planning to return shortly to Athens, and as yet no decision had been reached on any of Greece's claims. Venizelos feared the worst if he was forced to return to Athens empty-handed.66 As the British interest in Greece centred on the continuation of the Venizelist regime such a possibility would be disastrous. The British, though, were to suffer severe frustrations in attempting to bring the Americans round. As Nicolson commented in one memorandum that as the Americans had 'no sense of policy, our political arguments leave them cold'.67 There followed a period of negotiations when ever more tenuous schemes were attempted.68
Greek claims in Asia Minor were clearly the most emotive issue to be considered by the Great Powers. Venizelos had originally claimed a rather large district encompassing much of the western Anatolia littoral.69 As with other Greek claims there was close Anglo-French agreement, which in this instance gave Greece the core of its claim around Smyrna.70 When the Greek Committee met to discuss the issue the Americans strongly opposed any districts being detached from Anatolian Turkey.71 In something of a diplomatic huff the Italians standing by their rights under the I9I5 treaty of London adopted a policy of not speaking when Asia Minor was discussed, a policy which the minutes reveal the Italian representative, de Martino, had difficulty maintaining.72
In these discussions Britain took a clear stand that the Greek colonies in Asia Minor should be annexed to Greece, and that there was no need for a League mandate arrangement.73 Such a solution would of course not only forward he Megali idea, but would see a British ally firmly astride the Aegean Sea.
When agreement proved difficult to reach Nicolson resorted to the usual formula, which would hopefully leave the substance - if not the visible form, of Greek control. He recommended in the first instance that Greece be given outright the Sandjak of Smyrna, with a mandate over the remainder of the region claimed by Venizelos. This would in fact have increased the area under Greek control over that proposed by Britain and France in the committee. Nicolson made his own view clear when he commented in his proposal that he felt strongly 'that the Greek claims in Asia Minor are justified '. This was not the universal view in the delegation.
There were those who believed that to allow the Greeks any role in Asia Minor would be a serious mistake. Sir Louis Mallet, one of the few senior diplomats at Paris with direct experience of the region, while not unsympathetic to Greece, believed that there should be no Greek annexations 'unless political necessity made it inevitable'.7 Mallet's view was supported by the views of General Milne, the General Officer commanding at Constantinople, and by General Thwaites of military intelligence.76 Crowe naturally dismissed these contrary views, observing on a despatch from Milne 'I should attach more importance to this paper if it did not betray in every line of it the traditional prejudice against everything Greek which is the stock-intrade of our pro-Turks in the East'.77 Crowe saw Greek rule as the most likely guarantee of future stability and he considered that the military assessment was based on political and not strategical factors, and as such were the concern of the diplomats. Thwaites retorted however that 'policy, unless leavened with understanding, is apt to make an early call on strategy. Do we desire such a call at present and could we respond to it?'78 A sympathy which could have been profitably remembered during the subsequent Chanak crisis.
It should be noted, however, that military views were no more united than diplomatic opinion, as the day after Thwaites' comment military intelligence issued a memorandum which advocated placing Smyrna under Greek rule for reasons justifiable 'both politically and morally, while economically it is defensible on the grounds that the Turks have never shown any aptitude or inclination to control their own commerce'.79 This was entirely consistent with the view expressed by military intelligence as far back as December which had concluded that the Turks were 'totally incapable of commerce, or of economic development of the rich western coastland of Asia Minor. If this region is to be developed at all it must be developed by Europeans'.80 The Europeans they had in mind were the Greeks. The entire question of Greek claims in Asia Minor remained very much in flux, both within the British delegation and in the conference as a whole.
Nicolson and Toynbee, supported by Crowe, proposed a scheme in mid- April in the hope of breaking through the impasse, which would still secure Greece's strategic position, and thereby Britain's. Perhaps having been influenced by the military's concerns they proposed that Greece should receive Constantinople and European Turkey, while the sultan would rule over an Anatolian Turkey. They accepted that defending its position in western Anatolia might weaken Greece, while this solution would be easier to enforce.
Crowe suggested that Italy should be pensioned off not with its Anatolian claims but by being given the honour of becoming the League of Nations mandatory in the Caucasus. The idea of disposing of the Italians in that mountainous district might have appealed to many diplomats during the height of the Adriatic crisis which threatened to disrupt the conference in April, but Balfour had to admit that it was unlikely the Italians would accept.
The proposals of the British diplomats were overtaken in May by events in the council of four, now reduced to three by an Italian walkout. It has been observed that 'In the absence of the Italians, the hostility of the three to them multiplied at a geometric rate'. 82 It can certainly be argued that the Italians were the most disruptive force at Paris. Their walkout however was a serious tactical error, as it allowed the remaining Great Powers to move rapidly on a number of issues. One of these was the need for an Allied presence at Smyrna to block an expected pre-emptive Italian landing.83 None of the Great Powers was particularly anxious to deploy its own forces and it was Lloyd George who suggested on 6 May 'that M. Venizelos should be allowed to land two or three Divisions at Smyrna to protect his fellow countrymen in Turkey'.84 Clemenceau and Wilson agreed and on I3 May a Greek flotilla sailed for Smyrna accompanied by four British warships. The landing on I5 May was supervised by Admiral Sir Somerset Calthorpe. Simultaneously American objections to Greek claims subsided with the direct intervention of Woodrow Wilson who was more philhellenic than many of his advisers.85 It now seemed as if Venizelos was on the verge of success. With a Greek army in place in Asia Minor his negotiating position was now vastly strengthened.
The tragedy for Venizelos and those like Crowe and Nicolson who supported a Greater Greece were the atrocities committed by the Greek troops on arrival in Smyrna. The effect of the reports arriving in Paris was to alter the climate of opinion against a Greek role. In early June S. A. Armitage- Smith of the financial section observed that 'It is impossible to sanction any territorial arrangement under which Greeks would be permitted to rule over Turks'. 86 Some members of the British delegation wished to distance Britain from the debacle of the landings. Eric Forbes-Adam of the delegation's political section wrote on I July that 'We do not want to increase the already prevalent, though erroneous, opinion that we alone are responsible for the Greek occupation of the Smyrna zone'. 87 The peace conference dealt with the problem, as it dealt with so many problems it had faced, and postponed discussion of the Turkish question.88
One of the most important decisions to be faced by the conference was the fate 'of Constantinople.89 There was widespread support for ousting Turkish rule from the city, and there was little inclination to justify a move which contravened all the principles on which supposedly the peace was to be based.
As Toynbee argued in The murderoust yrannyo f the Turks, Constantinople 'is the Turk's at present by right of conquest, but that right justified his expulsion by war if it justifies his original intrusion ... '.90 Venizelos, however, had not laid claim to Constantinople knowing that it was likely to be a focus of Great Power rivalry. What emerged as the likely solution from a very early stage was the plan that the city would become an international state under the League of Nations.9" There was even some hope that Constantinople would become the seat of the League. Britain's aim was to avoid the city falling into the grasp of any other European power.92
Linked to the future of Constantinople were British concerns about the reaction of the large moslem population within their empire, particularly in India, to the displacement of the Turks and the sultan-caliph from the city. Britain's overwhelming concern about the security and stability of the Indian empire acted as a particular constraint to its policies on Turkey. Prominent Indian moslems, including the Aga Khan, petitioned the British government to leave the Turks of Constantinople and Asia Minor under Turkish and therefore moslem rule. Crowe dismissed such petitions with the observation that, ' when they suited our policy we have made use of them, when inconvenient and unpractical, they have been courteously neglected'.93 The India Office however took such views seriously, being concerned about the possibilities of widespread civil unrest.
The India Office was split internally on the question of Constantinople. The secretary of state for India, Edwin Montagu, supported the status quo, while Arthur Hirtzel, assistant under-secretary in the India Office's political department, believed that 'if once it is admitted that Indian moslems can influence the policy of His Majesty's Government in Europe a very awkward precedent will be created'.94 Certainly the inter-departmental Eastern Committee had been unable to reach a conclusion on Constantinople, but Lord Curzon in his summing up of their discussions concluded that 'The world is looking for great solutions. Let not this occasion ... be missed of purging the east of one of its most pestilent roots of evil'.95 Linked to the Constantinopolitan question, regardless of who was in control, was the fate of the strategically located islands of Imbros and Tenedos which hold a commanding position at the entrance to the Straits. Occupied by Britain at the end of the war, it was clearly London's intention that they should pass to Greece, regardless of what happened to Constantinople.96 The Greek Committee agreed in March that the islands should go to Greece but that they should be neutralized.97 There the matter rested, awaiting the outcome of the entire settlement. In September the Admiralty did make a plaintive request to evacuate the islands before winter set in, but this was refused. 98
British plans for Greece included specific tactical aims. There was a growing awareness of the importance of airpower, and Britain cast covetous eyes on the Cretan airfield at Suda Bay. This had been used since I9I8 as a stop-over on flights to Egypt and the air ministry wished to retain use of the base as a link in its Far Eastern route. In return for landing rights the air ministry proposed giving Greece a substantial boost in air power with the gift of ioo airplanes surplus to requirement, and Nicolson was deputed to approach Venizelos on the subject in June.99 There was some concern that the British acquisition and development of an airbase so near Italy's Dodecanese possessions would cause difficulties with Rome. Nicolson therefore hit upon a somewhat covert solution. The Greeks would announce plans for an aerodrome at Suda Bay and request British technical assistance. By the time the base was completed it was hoped that the question of the Dodecanese and conflicting Greco- Italian claims elsewhere would have been resolved.100 The aerodrome in any case would be available for British use, presuming of course that Greece remained friendly. The aerodrome project was placed under the ministry of the marine, for reasons which help illustrate an aspect of British influence in Greece. General P. R. C. Groves of the British delegation's Air section informed General Trenchard that the reason for this according to Nicolson was that 'the Greek Ministry of Marine is very much under our control'."' The Suda Bay aerodrome was intended as one aspect of an Anglo-Greek entente.
By July it seemed that a serious impasse had been reached in the various components of the Greek negotiations, mostly due to Italian intransigence, combined with an element of erratic American inflexibility. In the general diplomatic fluidity of I9I9, however, anything was possible, and on 29 July the Italians and Greeks dramatically resolved their difficulties. Italy agreed to support Greek claims in Northern Epirus, Thrace, Smyrna, and the Dodecanese Islands. Italy, however, would retain Rhodes until and if Britain ceded Cyprus to Greece. All this was dependent on Italy achieving its remaining Anatolian aspirations. Although this agreement had inherent difficulties, it did represent a significant diplomatic breakthrough.102
The final settlement was delayed through the autumn of 1919 with the Paris conference reduced to a rump session while the European allies awaited America's decision on the Versailles Treaty. By December, however, it was clear that the United States would opt out of European affairs and Anglo- French talks began in an attempt to resolve the outstanding questions of the peace settlement. Most of the details were worked out at the London conference, I2 February-io April I920, and finalized at San Remo, I8-26 April 1920, although the Turks did not formally sign the treaty of Sevres until August 1920.
The future of Northern Epirus was debated sporadically from the end of August 1919. The conference agreed to recommend that Albania should become an Italian mandate, leaving the southern frontier open to further negotiation. An international commission was indeed established in 1920 to delimit the new frontier, but was plagued with difficulties. When it actually attempted to visit the border area it was troubled by the unsettled nature of the region and the assassination of General Tellini, the Italian commissioner.
The character of the Italian government had also changed since the days of Paris, with Mussolini's seizure of power in I922. The death of Tellini resulted in the Corfu incident of I923, and when the commission reported shortly thereafter it ruled in favour of the Italian view. This left the frontier effectively the same as in I913I103
Greek claims in Thrace were more fortunate. Western Thrace was taken from Bulgaria by the treaty of Neuilly on 27 November I919. It was not handed over directly to Greece, but rather to an inter-allied commission. At the San Remo conference in February I920 Western Thrace together with Eastern Thrace up to the Chatalja line was awarded to Greece, but in I923 at the Lausanne conference Greece lost Eastern Thrace, which reverted to Turkey. Greece was victorious in its aims in the treaty of Sevres in obtaining the Smyrna region, but it was only a hollow victory for the cost of the Greek involvement in Asia Minor was high. The Greek presence had sparked the Turkish nationalist movement which eventually defeated the Greek armies, liquidated Greece's role in Asia Minor, and overturned the Sevres settlement.
As the Greco-Turkish crisis worsened what had happened to British support for a Greater Greece? A number of factors combined to disrupt the Anglo- Greek entente. The ending of the Paris peace conference dispersed the team of philhellenic diplomats who had been generally successful in pushing through key elements of a pro-Greek settlement. Although there were still many uncertainties in I 920, the correlation of forces seemed strongly to favour the emergence of*greater Greece. What unquestionably altered British support for Greece was the event they had most feared, but could hardly have expected in I920 - the fall of the Venizelos government and the return of King Constantine. In October I920 King Alexander died, and the parliamentary elections held on I4 November became a referendum on the return of Constantine. The result was a heavy defeat for Venizelos who resigned and sailed into exile escorted by a British warship. On I9 December Constantine entered Athens.
The removal of Venizelos acted as a spur to the anti-Greek elements in London, who could now identify Greece with the supposedly pro-German Constantine. As Winston Churchill later wrote 'the return of Constantine dissolved all Allied loyalties to Greece and cancelled all but legal obligations'."04 Even Crowe and Nicolson had little faith that Constantine could be counted on to act as a British proxy. Certainly British treatment of the king during the war and his exile was unlikely to form the basis of good relations. 105
Nevertheless Greece continued to enj-oy some support in London. Lloyd George maintained an instinctive philhellenism, eventually to his cost during the Chanak crisis. Crowe and Nicolson while admitting their distaste for Constantine still saw Greece as the country for Britain to favour.106 Perhaps they hoped for an eventual Venizelist revival. Even Lord Curzon, now foreign secretary, and not notably philhellenic, supported the Sevres settlement until the Greek military disasters in Asia Minor. The War office, however, continued to be dubious of Greek abilities.
Britain though, along with France, believed that Greece should be made aware of Allied displeasure at the change of government. On 5 December I920 they cancelled financial credits to Greece. The resultant economic difficulties reduced Greece's ability effectively to conduct its military operations.
Nicolson had warned that any such move would 'permanently destroy the fabric of the peace treaties and reduce Greece to the proportions of a third-class power. The disadvantage of this will be apparent when, as is inevitable, M. Venizelos eventually returns with dictatorial powers'.107 Nicolson was correct.
Venizelos did return to power briefly in I924 and again in I928, but by then the entire strategic situation had been permanently altered by the military victories of Mustapha Kemal. British policy to Greece became increasingly ambivalent after December I920. Britain preferred Greece to Turkey, but support for Greater Greece had been closely tied to Venizelos. The fall of Venizelos meant the collapse of Britain's regional plans and left British policy in the Eastern Mediterranean seriously adrift for several years to come.
References:
104 Winston Churchill, The Great War (London, I934), III, I559.
105 Documentosn Britishf oreignp olicy, 1gig-1g3g (London, I962), first series, XII, 439.
106 Ibid. pp. 439, 488.
107 Ibid. p. 439.
Details are given in James Barros, The Corfui ncident( Princeton, I966).
97 P.R.O., FO 608/37/92/I/4/393I-
98 P.R.O., FO 608/30/76/4/I/I8645; P.R.O., FO 608/30/76/4/I/I9I59.
99 P.R.O., FO 608/34/85/3/I/I3290. A useful file of correspondence on this matter is in the
P. R. C. Groves papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London.
100 P.R.O., FO 608/34/85/3/I/I4667 and P.R.O., FO 608/34/85/3/I/I6977-
101 Groves to Trenchard, 30 July I 9 I 9. Groves papers.
102 P;R.O., FO 6o8/54/I20/3/I2/I70Io. Memorandum by Crowe, 3I July I919. The
agreement is discussed in Petsalis-Diomidis, pp. 25I-6.
90 Arnold J. Toynbee, The murderous tyranny of the Turks (London, I9 I 7), p. 22.
91 A. W. A. Leeper to R. W. A. Leeper, 9 March I9g9, in the unlisted A. W. A. Leeper papers.
92 P.R.O., CAB 27/24/EC46. Minutes of the Eastern Committee, 23 Dec. I9I8.
P.R.O., FO 608/52/I20/I/3/3I6. Minute by Crowe, I Jan. 1919.
9 P.R.O., CAB 27/39/EC284I. Note by Hirtzel, 20 Dec. I9I8.
9 P.R.O., CAB 27/39/EC3027. Curzon, 'The future of Constantinople', 2 Jan. IgIg. Also in
CAB 29/2/P.-85.
96 P.R.O., FO 6o8/37/92/I/T/775.
82 Michael L. Dockrill and J. Douglas Gould, Peace without promise: Britain and the peace
conferences, IgIg-23 (London, I98I), pp. l90-I.
83 Minuses of the Council of Four, 6 May I 9 I 9. Foreignr elationos f the UnitedS tates:t heP arisp eace
conferenceI,g Ig, Volume v.
84 Ibid.
85 Erik Goldstein, 'Adrift on the Bosporus: Woodrow Wilson, philhellenism and the partition
of Turkey I9I8-1920', M.A. Thesis, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University,
I 980.
86 P.R.O., FO 608/I04/383/I/6/II984. Minute by Armitage-Smith, 9 June I9I9.
87 P.R.O., FO 6o8/104/383/I/6/I4003. Minute by Forbes-Adam, I July I9I8.
88 Documentosn Britishf oreignp olicy, 1919-1939 (London, I962), first series, IV, 430.
89 The question of Constantinople has been extensively dealt with, the best short account being
A. L. MacFie, 'The British decision regarding the future of Constantinople, November
i9i8-january I920', Historical Journal, i8, 2 (I975), 39I-400.