Post by insomniac on Aug 20, 2009 22:45:34 GMT -5
I dont have the rest of the article because you have to pay for it. The article is from 2006, so a lot of things have changed. But nonetheless it's interesting.
Article Excerpt
Italy's relationship with Albania is a recurrent theme of Albanian foreign policy debates. While points of view differ, (1) there is no escaping the fact that Italy is of primary importance to Albania because of cultural links, migratory patterns, foreign direct investment and security factors. Hence, bilateral cooperation with Italy has been high on the agenda of consecutive post-communist Albanian governments. But, the Italian perspective towards Albania has been a great deal more ambiguous and fraught with internal tensions that flow from two sources. First, Italy's "Albania policy" has been very active in supplying economic and security aid to Albania and has made Italy's voice an important one in Tirana. However, after the initial optimism abated, Italy has tended to react rather than act on Albanian affairs mainly due to the fact that it perceived Albania as a source of potential security threats rather than a potential partner with whom it could do long-term business. Second, Italy's approach to Albania has been negatively conditioned by its regional policy. For economic and strategic reasons, Italy's regional policy has focused on Serbia as the security Schwerpunkt of the Balkans. While the goal of stabilizing Serbia is a sensible one, Italian actions on the ground have often weighed in favour of untenable solutions (i.e. keeping the Yugoslav Federation together or shoring up the Milosevic regime), thus harming Italian interests in the long-run. The tensions within the Albania policy as well as between it and the regional policy have ultimately harmed Italian interests in the Western Balkans and have reduced its role as an agent of change. There exists a gap between the expectations for intense, dynamic and positive Italian involvement in Albania and the actual low-key levels of bilateral cooperation.
This paper examines Albanian Italian relations in the post communist era in their three dimensions: political, economic and security. Methodologically, this examination occurs within the context of Euro-Atlantic integration. That is to say, the paper takes into account the role of Italy as a front line EU state, and one of the strongest NATO members, whereas Albania and other Western Balkan states have been committed to the EU integration process. From this perspective, developments within the EU, the EU approach towards the region, and the role Italy plays in the process provide the dynamic background within which bilateral relations ought to be analyzed. Tracing the tensions and contradictions in each of these perspectives, it concludes that Italy would benefit if it upgraded its "Albania policy" from threat management to a clearer long-term vision of partnership. However, it argues that the most effective way for achieving a mutually-beneficial partnership is to craft the pursuit of Italian interests in Albania within a larger vision of Italian Ostpolitik. Given that Albania will continue to remain important to Italy not only because of the "strength through weakness" of the Albanian position vis-a-vis its neighbours bur also because of the economic and security benefits of seamless cooperation between the two countries, an Italian Ostpolitik (2) that encompasses the region as a whole rather than its individual parts would be a more effective tool to further Italian, EU and regional interests.
Following the demise of the communist regime, Albanian-Italian relationships have been influenced by three main factors: the historical legacy of bilateral relationships, regional instability and the grave internal crises that accompanied Albania's transition to democracy. Historically, the Otranto Strait between the two countries has served more as a communication bridge than as a barrier to cooperation. (3) Starting with the Ottoman invasion, Albanian migration to Italy created diaspora communities that powerfully influenced the creation of Albanian national consciousness and facilitated Italian cultural penetration in the Albanian worldview. Despite some historical problems such as the Fascist invasion of Albania, this worldview has remained particularly open and welcoming to Italy. From a cultural and human perspective, geographical proximity has favoured and encouraged permanent communication between the two nations. (4) On the other hand, relations between the two sovereign states have been powerfully influenced by the geopolitical setting of both countries: every strong power that has arisen in the Apennine peninsula has had the tendency to expand into the Balkans by using Albania as a bridgehead. On the other hand, whenever a powerful state has emerged in the Balkan Peninsula, it has tended to reach the Adriatic coast and to use Albania as a springboard for expansion to the West. (5) In more recent times, although there is a clear tendency for geo-economics to supersede geo-politics, the geopolitical setting has remained an important factor that helps explain modern relations between the two countries especially when considering the way Italy views Albania.
Secondly, the violent instability that turned the Balkans into a security importing region undermined the capacity to build long-lasting, institutionalized relationships between the two countries and favoured quick, reactive actions on the part of Italy to deal with the regular flare-ups in Balkan violence. Economic cooperation became low priority while crisis management understandably topped the Italian regional policy list. Despite recent improvements, the lack of a clear status for Kosovo, the ambiguity of the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina's institutional fragility have created a perception of insecurity in Farnesina's conceptualization of Western Balkans.
Last, but not least the political, social and economic crises of post communist Albania, which have been followed by massive migration waves of Albanians towards Italian coasts have played a decisive role in bilateral relations. Not only have they prompted Italy to respond quickly to the dynamic changes in Albanian security, but they have also had a powerful impact on the way Italy perceived Albania. The latter has proved a powerful conditioner on Italian policies towards Albania. The Italian view of Albania as a source of instability and security threat has created expectations of unpredictability for bilateral relations and, has kept Italian policy-making in "emergency gear" even when Albanian realities were conducive of more long-term cooperative approaches.
1.1 The Political Dimension
The first non-communist Albanian Government formed after the elections of March 31, 1992 actively sought to put an end to the long and extreme isolation of the country, through establishing and strengthening relations with the West. For historical and cultural reasons as well as bilateral interest, the establishment of a mutually beneficial partnership with Italy became one of the primary objectives of Albanian diplomacy. This openness in foreign policy was not only intended to address security issues: the Albanian Government laid its hopes for the country's economic recovery and transformation on Western assistance and Italy responded promptly and generously. (6) At the same time, Italy represented the symbol of the West in popular Albanian culture--no surprise given that Italian state television RAI had virtually been Albanians' only window to the west. The Albanian people as well as the Albanian elite nurtured high expectations towards the role of the neighbouring country for Albania's revitalization. Such high expectations also derived from the belief that Italy had maintained a long silence during the Cold War, and the time had come to somehow restore "the debt of long silence and inattention." (7)
That is not to say that bilateral relations have been poor. On the contrary, the determination of both parties to strengthen relations as well as the fact that no political problems existed between the two countries, have brought about a constant increase of political dialogue. In 1995, the two countries signed the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, the first to be signed with a Western country since the regime change in Tirana. In 1996, Italian President Scalfaro visited Albania, and gave assurances of Italian support for the transformation and economic revival of Albania. The Socialist administration maintained the good tempo in political contacts with Premier Berlusconi and Prime Minister Nano developing a close personal relationship as well. It seems that this will continue after the rotation of power in Tirana following the elections of July 2005--the first visit abroad of Prime Minister Berisha was in Italy at the invitation of Mr. Berlusconi. During more than one and a hall decade, the parties have maintained a good political understanding on their role and contribution in the context of regional initiatives. Thus, for instance, in the context of the Stability Pact, Italy has insisted for more attention towards the so-called Western Balkans.
Nevertheless, Albanian-Italian relations followed the broader pattern of West-East developments, where the initial wave of enthusiasm was soon after overshadowed by uncertainty, since more time was needed to accommodate to the new situation in order to better understand the challenges and opportunities arising from the collapse of communism. Within this climate of general uncertainty between East and West, Albanian-Italian relations fell below expectations despite remarkable achievements. There were four specific reasons for this: (a) despite initial hopes, Albania did not prove to be the promised land for Italian investments; (b) Albanian instability produced massive out-migration towards Italy thus de-facto downgrading Albania from a potential partner to a source of threats and destabilization in Italy's perceptions; (c) the tension between friendship with Albania and a regional policy that oscillated between Serbia-centred and Serbia-friendly made Italian intentions seem more ambiguous and Albania more cautious; (d) Italian perceptions that Albania had to choose between Rome or Athens as opposed to Rome and Athens. Despite a powerful reservoir of good will on the part of both nations, these differences in perceptions had a negative impact on the state of political relationships.
From the very beginning, Italian enthusiasm was dampened by the poverty, economic decline and social unrest that was the Albanian reality in the early nineties. The initial assumption that Albania would become the "promised land for investments" was associated with hesitancy: the ways to exploit such opportunity were rather vague, at least in the perspective of political discourse. On 11 November 1992, these fears were well-articulated in Italy's leading newspaper Corriere della Sera, which published an article entitled "Is Albania Italy's DDR ...?" (8) Not only did the massive waves of refugees and, later, illegal immigrants Italy show that Italy lacked a clear vision on how to deal with its long-lost neighbour but they also caused an internal identity crisis in Italy. The noted Italian columnist, Enzo Biagi, commented thus on the chaos of 8-15 August 1991 caused by the first dramatic wave of refugees herded in a stadium and ultimately expelled back to Albania:
The dream of the Albanians has dissolved, but so too has that of the Italians. The fifth industrial power in the world has not been capable, in three days, of distributing ten thousand cups of coffee ... Those plastic sacks of water thrown from above to the dehydrated immigrants, those sandwiches scattered by the soldiers into the scrambling mob--it was like being in a zoo. (9)
This age of uncertainty was reflected in Italy's erratic behaviour: during the 1992 election campaign, the Italians publicly supported the Socialists because of the close links between the Democratic Party and the United States. Yet, given the extent of the country's bankruptcy and the depth of popular resentment towards the ex-Communists, the fact that Italy backed a losing horse is more indicative of the failure of Italian diplomacy to recognize Albanian reality than the unpredictability of the latter.
The ambiguity of political discourse in the early 90s was not only due to the question "how to manage the big change" but it was also linked to the political character of such relations. Whereas pro Italian sentiments were popular in Albania at the time, and no hard feelings persisted from the Second World War, a significant degree of prudence was necessary lest this new era of relations resembled a client-patron relationship. It is likely that the Albanian government interpreted the request of the Italian Government to extend the mission of the Pelikan Operation (l0) in Albania in light of this concern when it decided to turn it down. (11)
Another factor impacting bilateral relations is a contradiction inherent in Italy's regional policy--and "the Albanian national question" that is a key piece of the regional puzzle--and Italian policies towards the Albanian state. Italy's economic penetration in Serbia (12) during the Milosevic regime, symbolized by the signing of several large contracts in the field of telecommunications between Italy and Serbia, (13) strongly influenced Italy's stance towards Kosovo. Fear of undue German influence in Italy's "backyard" and the perception of Serbia as the strategic pivot of the Balkans have been reflected (14) in a more "pro-Serbian" attitude on the part of Italy when compared to other Western nations. While this has not impacted Albanian-Italian relations directly, it has made it easier for successive Tirana governments to strategically prioritize relations with Washington and has contributed to an atmosphere of "silent suspicion" in Tirana's political circles of Italy's intentions towards Albania.
However, the affinity Italy has usually reflected towards Serbia does not automatically translate into hostility towards Albanians in the Balkans and Kosovo in particular. Traditional Italian-German rivalry has been put forward to explain Italy's stance
Italy has a vital interest in preventing the Balkans from becoming subject to the German Sphere of influence. That result would damage Italy's economic and commercial relations with the region and with all of Eastern Europe, as well as run contrary to Italy's status and its foreign relations policy. (15)
This reasoning is however questionable. First, because it derives from the old understanding of geopolitics where rivalry and conflict of interests determined mutual perceptions and relationships. Second, because Italy has strategic interests in the whole region, and exclusivity with one member of the region at the expense of the rest of the region could seriously damage this strategic goal. On the brink of Yugoslavia's dissolution, Serbia was considered by Italy as well as by other European countries as a key player for the region's stability. By supporting the continuity of the Yugoslav Federation and then the stability of the Milosevic regime, Italy aimed to preserve the status quo even though that implied support of autocratic regimes in a setting where this was not only unethical but also untenable. While this problem was not specific to Italy--the USA also supported a "negative stability" at the beginning--Italy proved to be more resistant to adapting its policies to the internal dynamics of the region. Yet, it is difficult to measure to what extent Albanian perceptions towards Italy have been influenced, by her "pro-Serbian" attitude, at least until the Kosovo conflict of 1999. In a 2004 opinion poll, Albanians evaluate with almost the maximum score the importance the Government should pay to strengthening relations with Kosovo, (16) and indicate Italy as the most important European partner (with 8.61 points out of ten). (17) Obviously, Albanians in proper Albania nurture special feelings towards Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia or Montenegro. Nevertheless, domestic crises and serious economic problems that have characterized post-communist Albania have prevented her from looking beyond her borders. Yet, from the point of view of bilateral relations, the Italian stand in the Contact Group has been a sensitive issue for successive Albanian governments. (18) Now that the final talks on Kosovo's status have begun, there is a new chance for an assertive, inclusive regional approach that views the region as a whole as opposed to centred on one particular state. This is facilitated by the fact that all countries in the region have now embarked on the process of Euro-Atlantic integration which has provided them with a common language and powerful incentives for cooperation.
Despite the strength of the post Cold War cooperation regimes in European state relations, in regional affairs the traditions of realist competition for spheres of influence continue to be relevant. This may be illustrated by looking at the Italian-Albanian-Greek menage a trois--a relationship that contains all of these trends however contradictory they may be. While Greek-Albanian relations do not concern us directly, it is important to point out that an atmosphere of mutual jealousy has often characterized the Albanian commitments of these two EU countries. (19)
The jealousy is not unjustified--in Albania, debates over the role Italy and Greece may play in supporting Albania's EU integration process tend to pose the dilemma "Rome or Athens?" (20) However, this dilemma originates primarily from the internal political struggle between democrats and socialists, (21) rather than from the country's foreign policy. This dilemma is built on the doubtful assumption that integration is an external process, while it is clear that the preparation of Albania to become a EU member is first and foremost dependant on the success of internal reforms. While the creation of internal EU coalitions to support one's membership will be key once a country has complied with the Copenhagen criteria, these coalitions are less helpful in the early stages of transition. Moreover, the tactic of playing one potential partner against another is counter-productive. Hence, Albania has attempted to escape this dilemma and operate through another approach: "Both Rome and Athens," instead of "Rome or Athens." (22)
Italy and Greece sometimes have been protagonists in this old-fashioned realpolitik. For instance, the persistence of both Italian and Greek governments to allocate their military contingents in the framework of Operation Alba respectively in areas such as Vlora and Korca was officially justified with the necessity to undertake responsibilities for the management of security issues in the respective borders. Nevertheless, agreement over the map of distribution of the multinational European force (Operation Alba) was difficult, and the tendency to allocate troops in former strategic zones became evident. Historical legacies have an unfortunate way of becoming relevant in the most unfortunate moments.
1.2 The Economic Dimension
Looking at Albanian-Italian relations from the economic perspective it is not difficult to distinguish the Italian style of foreign policy towards the Balkans: Italy is not a military power, its geopolicy must be integrative, not expansive, and based on cultural and commercial relations (small and midsized Italian enterprises). (23) Within this strategy, the economic presence of Italy in Albania has been subject to growth without marking significant peaks, but rather through a horizontal expansion with small and medium enterprises, signed by a steady and noteworthy cultural component that gives it solidity.
Italy contributed to and was in charge of international assistance during a critical moment for Albania in 1991-1992. Italy is the main donor of Albania in bilateral arrangements. (24) Italian assistance is mainly concentrated in infrastructure development, human resources development and institution-building, which match the current needs of Albanian economy. (25)
Statistics indicate that Italy is the main economic partner of Albania. Italy is ranked first in the field of investments. (26) Furthermore, Italy is ranked first in the list of Albania's trade partners, and it makes up 40 percent of Albanian trade transactions with foreign countries. From a promising start in 1992-1993 economic relations dropped steadily due to the 1997 crisis. (27) However, in the regional context Italy has supported infrastructure projects, as for instance Corridor 8, the realization of which could bring Albania considerable economic benefits. Overall, the economic dimension of bilateral relations has been the least problematic of the three dimensions.
1.3 The Security Dimension
Nowhere are the three factors that we identified at the beginning of this paper--historical legacy, regional violence and instability and Albania's chronic security crises--as structural determinants of Albanian-Italian relations better illustrated than in the security dimension of this relationship. In a region plagued with historical animosities, violent instability and security vacuum, the dynamics of security sector cooperation play a central part in the perceptions of different actors towards each other and the subsequent political moves that determine the state of bilateral relations. While the political dimension of these relations remains primary because that is where actor agency determines the outcome of the process, the security dimension provides the structural background that constrains or enables particular behavioural patterns on the part of the actors.
From a security perspective, strengthening relations with Italy has been of primary importance to Albania. A weak state, with an almost bankrupt economy, and scarce defence capacity, in an unstable region where historical animosities were awakened almost overnight, needed support in addressing security issues through the formation of alliances or close bilateral security cooperation. Thus, Albania was the first of the former Warsaw Treaty members to apply for NATO membership (December 1992), while it simultaneously sought to strengthen bilateral relations with the Euro-Atlantic alliance members, including Italy. Strengthening relations with Italy was not only imperative because Italy is a NATO member but also since the geographic setting of the two countries and their mutually compatible value systems allow for complimentarity in security goals. Besides seeking alliance-seeking, the first non-communist administration also focused on the reformation of defence forces, in order to adapt them to the new political system as well as enhance their reliability in case of conflict. Italy, along with USA, Germany and Turkey......
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Kush mendon se eshte nje aleat i mire per Shqiperine. Deri tani vende te tjera qe mund te mendoj , SHBA, Austri, Turqi?
Article Excerpt
Italy's relationship with Albania is a recurrent theme of Albanian foreign policy debates. While points of view differ, (1) there is no escaping the fact that Italy is of primary importance to Albania because of cultural links, migratory patterns, foreign direct investment and security factors. Hence, bilateral cooperation with Italy has been high on the agenda of consecutive post-communist Albanian governments. But, the Italian perspective towards Albania has been a great deal more ambiguous and fraught with internal tensions that flow from two sources. First, Italy's "Albania policy" has been very active in supplying economic and security aid to Albania and has made Italy's voice an important one in Tirana. However, after the initial optimism abated, Italy has tended to react rather than act on Albanian affairs mainly due to the fact that it perceived Albania as a source of potential security threats rather than a potential partner with whom it could do long-term business. Second, Italy's approach to Albania has been negatively conditioned by its regional policy. For economic and strategic reasons, Italy's regional policy has focused on Serbia as the security Schwerpunkt of the Balkans. While the goal of stabilizing Serbia is a sensible one, Italian actions on the ground have often weighed in favour of untenable solutions (i.e. keeping the Yugoslav Federation together or shoring up the Milosevic regime), thus harming Italian interests in the long-run. The tensions within the Albania policy as well as between it and the regional policy have ultimately harmed Italian interests in the Western Balkans and have reduced its role as an agent of change. There exists a gap between the expectations for intense, dynamic and positive Italian involvement in Albania and the actual low-key levels of bilateral cooperation.
This paper examines Albanian Italian relations in the post communist era in their three dimensions: political, economic and security. Methodologically, this examination occurs within the context of Euro-Atlantic integration. That is to say, the paper takes into account the role of Italy as a front line EU state, and one of the strongest NATO members, whereas Albania and other Western Balkan states have been committed to the EU integration process. From this perspective, developments within the EU, the EU approach towards the region, and the role Italy plays in the process provide the dynamic background within which bilateral relations ought to be analyzed. Tracing the tensions and contradictions in each of these perspectives, it concludes that Italy would benefit if it upgraded its "Albania policy" from threat management to a clearer long-term vision of partnership. However, it argues that the most effective way for achieving a mutually-beneficial partnership is to craft the pursuit of Italian interests in Albania within a larger vision of Italian Ostpolitik. Given that Albania will continue to remain important to Italy not only because of the "strength through weakness" of the Albanian position vis-a-vis its neighbours bur also because of the economic and security benefits of seamless cooperation between the two countries, an Italian Ostpolitik (2) that encompasses the region as a whole rather than its individual parts would be a more effective tool to further Italian, EU and regional interests.
Following the demise of the communist regime, Albanian-Italian relationships have been influenced by three main factors: the historical legacy of bilateral relationships, regional instability and the grave internal crises that accompanied Albania's transition to democracy. Historically, the Otranto Strait between the two countries has served more as a communication bridge than as a barrier to cooperation. (3) Starting with the Ottoman invasion, Albanian migration to Italy created diaspora communities that powerfully influenced the creation of Albanian national consciousness and facilitated Italian cultural penetration in the Albanian worldview. Despite some historical problems such as the Fascist invasion of Albania, this worldview has remained particularly open and welcoming to Italy. From a cultural and human perspective, geographical proximity has favoured and encouraged permanent communication between the two nations. (4) On the other hand, relations between the two sovereign states have been powerfully influenced by the geopolitical setting of both countries: every strong power that has arisen in the Apennine peninsula has had the tendency to expand into the Balkans by using Albania as a bridgehead. On the other hand, whenever a powerful state has emerged in the Balkan Peninsula, it has tended to reach the Adriatic coast and to use Albania as a springboard for expansion to the West. (5) In more recent times, although there is a clear tendency for geo-economics to supersede geo-politics, the geopolitical setting has remained an important factor that helps explain modern relations between the two countries especially when considering the way Italy views Albania.
Secondly, the violent instability that turned the Balkans into a security importing region undermined the capacity to build long-lasting, institutionalized relationships between the two countries and favoured quick, reactive actions on the part of Italy to deal with the regular flare-ups in Balkan violence. Economic cooperation became low priority while crisis management understandably topped the Italian regional policy list. Despite recent improvements, the lack of a clear status for Kosovo, the ambiguity of the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina's institutional fragility have created a perception of insecurity in Farnesina's conceptualization of Western Balkans.
Last, but not least the political, social and economic crises of post communist Albania, which have been followed by massive migration waves of Albanians towards Italian coasts have played a decisive role in bilateral relations. Not only have they prompted Italy to respond quickly to the dynamic changes in Albanian security, but they have also had a powerful impact on the way Italy perceived Albania. The latter has proved a powerful conditioner on Italian policies towards Albania. The Italian view of Albania as a source of instability and security threat has created expectations of unpredictability for bilateral relations and, has kept Italian policy-making in "emergency gear" even when Albanian realities were conducive of more long-term cooperative approaches.
1.1 The Political Dimension
The first non-communist Albanian Government formed after the elections of March 31, 1992 actively sought to put an end to the long and extreme isolation of the country, through establishing and strengthening relations with the West. For historical and cultural reasons as well as bilateral interest, the establishment of a mutually beneficial partnership with Italy became one of the primary objectives of Albanian diplomacy. This openness in foreign policy was not only intended to address security issues: the Albanian Government laid its hopes for the country's economic recovery and transformation on Western assistance and Italy responded promptly and generously. (6) At the same time, Italy represented the symbol of the West in popular Albanian culture--no surprise given that Italian state television RAI had virtually been Albanians' only window to the west. The Albanian people as well as the Albanian elite nurtured high expectations towards the role of the neighbouring country for Albania's revitalization. Such high expectations also derived from the belief that Italy had maintained a long silence during the Cold War, and the time had come to somehow restore "the debt of long silence and inattention." (7)
That is not to say that bilateral relations have been poor. On the contrary, the determination of both parties to strengthen relations as well as the fact that no political problems existed between the two countries, have brought about a constant increase of political dialogue. In 1995, the two countries signed the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, the first to be signed with a Western country since the regime change in Tirana. In 1996, Italian President Scalfaro visited Albania, and gave assurances of Italian support for the transformation and economic revival of Albania. The Socialist administration maintained the good tempo in political contacts with Premier Berlusconi and Prime Minister Nano developing a close personal relationship as well. It seems that this will continue after the rotation of power in Tirana following the elections of July 2005--the first visit abroad of Prime Minister Berisha was in Italy at the invitation of Mr. Berlusconi. During more than one and a hall decade, the parties have maintained a good political understanding on their role and contribution in the context of regional initiatives. Thus, for instance, in the context of the Stability Pact, Italy has insisted for more attention towards the so-called Western Balkans.
Nevertheless, Albanian-Italian relations followed the broader pattern of West-East developments, where the initial wave of enthusiasm was soon after overshadowed by uncertainty, since more time was needed to accommodate to the new situation in order to better understand the challenges and opportunities arising from the collapse of communism. Within this climate of general uncertainty between East and West, Albanian-Italian relations fell below expectations despite remarkable achievements. There were four specific reasons for this: (a) despite initial hopes, Albania did not prove to be the promised land for Italian investments; (b) Albanian instability produced massive out-migration towards Italy thus de-facto downgrading Albania from a potential partner to a source of threats and destabilization in Italy's perceptions; (c) the tension between friendship with Albania and a regional policy that oscillated between Serbia-centred and Serbia-friendly made Italian intentions seem more ambiguous and Albania more cautious; (d) Italian perceptions that Albania had to choose between Rome or Athens as opposed to Rome and Athens. Despite a powerful reservoir of good will on the part of both nations, these differences in perceptions had a negative impact on the state of political relationships.
From the very beginning, Italian enthusiasm was dampened by the poverty, economic decline and social unrest that was the Albanian reality in the early nineties. The initial assumption that Albania would become the "promised land for investments" was associated with hesitancy: the ways to exploit such opportunity were rather vague, at least in the perspective of political discourse. On 11 November 1992, these fears were well-articulated in Italy's leading newspaper Corriere della Sera, which published an article entitled "Is Albania Italy's DDR ...?" (8) Not only did the massive waves of refugees and, later, illegal immigrants Italy show that Italy lacked a clear vision on how to deal with its long-lost neighbour but they also caused an internal identity crisis in Italy. The noted Italian columnist, Enzo Biagi, commented thus on the chaos of 8-15 August 1991 caused by the first dramatic wave of refugees herded in a stadium and ultimately expelled back to Albania:
The dream of the Albanians has dissolved, but so too has that of the Italians. The fifth industrial power in the world has not been capable, in three days, of distributing ten thousand cups of coffee ... Those plastic sacks of water thrown from above to the dehydrated immigrants, those sandwiches scattered by the soldiers into the scrambling mob--it was like being in a zoo. (9)
This age of uncertainty was reflected in Italy's erratic behaviour: during the 1992 election campaign, the Italians publicly supported the Socialists because of the close links between the Democratic Party and the United States. Yet, given the extent of the country's bankruptcy and the depth of popular resentment towards the ex-Communists, the fact that Italy backed a losing horse is more indicative of the failure of Italian diplomacy to recognize Albanian reality than the unpredictability of the latter.
The ambiguity of political discourse in the early 90s was not only due to the question "how to manage the big change" but it was also linked to the political character of such relations. Whereas pro Italian sentiments were popular in Albania at the time, and no hard feelings persisted from the Second World War, a significant degree of prudence was necessary lest this new era of relations resembled a client-patron relationship. It is likely that the Albanian government interpreted the request of the Italian Government to extend the mission of the Pelikan Operation (l0) in Albania in light of this concern when it decided to turn it down. (11)
Another factor impacting bilateral relations is a contradiction inherent in Italy's regional policy--and "the Albanian national question" that is a key piece of the regional puzzle--and Italian policies towards the Albanian state. Italy's economic penetration in Serbia (12) during the Milosevic regime, symbolized by the signing of several large contracts in the field of telecommunications between Italy and Serbia, (13) strongly influenced Italy's stance towards Kosovo. Fear of undue German influence in Italy's "backyard" and the perception of Serbia as the strategic pivot of the Balkans have been reflected (14) in a more "pro-Serbian" attitude on the part of Italy when compared to other Western nations. While this has not impacted Albanian-Italian relations directly, it has made it easier for successive Tirana governments to strategically prioritize relations with Washington and has contributed to an atmosphere of "silent suspicion" in Tirana's political circles of Italy's intentions towards Albania.
However, the affinity Italy has usually reflected towards Serbia does not automatically translate into hostility towards Albanians in the Balkans and Kosovo in particular. Traditional Italian-German rivalry has been put forward to explain Italy's stance
Italy has a vital interest in preventing the Balkans from becoming subject to the German Sphere of influence. That result would damage Italy's economic and commercial relations with the region and with all of Eastern Europe, as well as run contrary to Italy's status and its foreign relations policy. (15)
This reasoning is however questionable. First, because it derives from the old understanding of geopolitics where rivalry and conflict of interests determined mutual perceptions and relationships. Second, because Italy has strategic interests in the whole region, and exclusivity with one member of the region at the expense of the rest of the region could seriously damage this strategic goal. On the brink of Yugoslavia's dissolution, Serbia was considered by Italy as well as by other European countries as a key player for the region's stability. By supporting the continuity of the Yugoslav Federation and then the stability of the Milosevic regime, Italy aimed to preserve the status quo even though that implied support of autocratic regimes in a setting where this was not only unethical but also untenable. While this problem was not specific to Italy--the USA also supported a "negative stability" at the beginning--Italy proved to be more resistant to adapting its policies to the internal dynamics of the region. Yet, it is difficult to measure to what extent Albanian perceptions towards Italy have been influenced, by her "pro-Serbian" attitude, at least until the Kosovo conflict of 1999. In a 2004 opinion poll, Albanians evaluate with almost the maximum score the importance the Government should pay to strengthening relations with Kosovo, (16) and indicate Italy as the most important European partner (with 8.61 points out of ten). (17) Obviously, Albanians in proper Albania nurture special feelings towards Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia or Montenegro. Nevertheless, domestic crises and serious economic problems that have characterized post-communist Albania have prevented her from looking beyond her borders. Yet, from the point of view of bilateral relations, the Italian stand in the Contact Group has been a sensitive issue for successive Albanian governments. (18) Now that the final talks on Kosovo's status have begun, there is a new chance for an assertive, inclusive regional approach that views the region as a whole as opposed to centred on one particular state. This is facilitated by the fact that all countries in the region have now embarked on the process of Euro-Atlantic integration which has provided them with a common language and powerful incentives for cooperation.
Despite the strength of the post Cold War cooperation regimes in European state relations, in regional affairs the traditions of realist competition for spheres of influence continue to be relevant. This may be illustrated by looking at the Italian-Albanian-Greek menage a trois--a relationship that contains all of these trends however contradictory they may be. While Greek-Albanian relations do not concern us directly, it is important to point out that an atmosphere of mutual jealousy has often characterized the Albanian commitments of these two EU countries. (19)
The jealousy is not unjustified--in Albania, debates over the role Italy and Greece may play in supporting Albania's EU integration process tend to pose the dilemma "Rome or Athens?" (20) However, this dilemma originates primarily from the internal political struggle between democrats and socialists, (21) rather than from the country's foreign policy. This dilemma is built on the doubtful assumption that integration is an external process, while it is clear that the preparation of Albania to become a EU member is first and foremost dependant on the success of internal reforms. While the creation of internal EU coalitions to support one's membership will be key once a country has complied with the Copenhagen criteria, these coalitions are less helpful in the early stages of transition. Moreover, the tactic of playing one potential partner against another is counter-productive. Hence, Albania has attempted to escape this dilemma and operate through another approach: "Both Rome and Athens," instead of "Rome or Athens." (22)
Italy and Greece sometimes have been protagonists in this old-fashioned realpolitik. For instance, the persistence of both Italian and Greek governments to allocate their military contingents in the framework of Operation Alba respectively in areas such as Vlora and Korca was officially justified with the necessity to undertake responsibilities for the management of security issues in the respective borders. Nevertheless, agreement over the map of distribution of the multinational European force (Operation Alba) was difficult, and the tendency to allocate troops in former strategic zones became evident. Historical legacies have an unfortunate way of becoming relevant in the most unfortunate moments.
1.2 The Economic Dimension
Looking at Albanian-Italian relations from the economic perspective it is not difficult to distinguish the Italian style of foreign policy towards the Balkans: Italy is not a military power, its geopolicy must be integrative, not expansive, and based on cultural and commercial relations (small and midsized Italian enterprises). (23) Within this strategy, the economic presence of Italy in Albania has been subject to growth without marking significant peaks, but rather through a horizontal expansion with small and medium enterprises, signed by a steady and noteworthy cultural component that gives it solidity.
Italy contributed to and was in charge of international assistance during a critical moment for Albania in 1991-1992. Italy is the main donor of Albania in bilateral arrangements. (24) Italian assistance is mainly concentrated in infrastructure development, human resources development and institution-building, which match the current needs of Albanian economy. (25)
Statistics indicate that Italy is the main economic partner of Albania. Italy is ranked first in the field of investments. (26) Furthermore, Italy is ranked first in the list of Albania's trade partners, and it makes up 40 percent of Albanian trade transactions with foreign countries. From a promising start in 1992-1993 economic relations dropped steadily due to the 1997 crisis. (27) However, in the regional context Italy has supported infrastructure projects, as for instance Corridor 8, the realization of which could bring Albania considerable economic benefits. Overall, the economic dimension of bilateral relations has been the least problematic of the three dimensions.
1.3 The Security Dimension
Nowhere are the three factors that we identified at the beginning of this paper--historical legacy, regional violence and instability and Albania's chronic security crises--as structural determinants of Albanian-Italian relations better illustrated than in the security dimension of this relationship. In a region plagued with historical animosities, violent instability and security vacuum, the dynamics of security sector cooperation play a central part in the perceptions of different actors towards each other and the subsequent political moves that determine the state of bilateral relations. While the political dimension of these relations remains primary because that is where actor agency determines the outcome of the process, the security dimension provides the structural background that constrains or enables particular behavioural patterns on the part of the actors.
From a security perspective, strengthening relations with Italy has been of primary importance to Albania. A weak state, with an almost bankrupt economy, and scarce defence capacity, in an unstable region where historical animosities were awakened almost overnight, needed support in addressing security issues through the formation of alliances or close bilateral security cooperation. Thus, Albania was the first of the former Warsaw Treaty members to apply for NATO membership (December 1992), while it simultaneously sought to strengthen bilateral relations with the Euro-Atlantic alliance members, including Italy. Strengthening relations with Italy was not only imperative because Italy is a NATO member but also since the geographic setting of the two countries and their mutually compatible value systems allow for complimentarity in security goals. Besides seeking alliance-seeking, the first non-communist administration also focused on the reformation of defence forces, in order to adapt them to the new political system as well as enhance their reliability in case of conflict. Italy, along with USA, Germany and Turkey......
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Kush mendon se eshte nje aleat i mire per Shqiperine. Deri tani vende te tjera qe mund te mendoj , SHBA, Austri, Turqi?