Post by ILIRI I MADH on Sept 18, 2012 2:14:37 GMT -5
Excerpt from The History of the Roman State
Chapter V – Rebirth and Interauctoritas (Augustus’ Empire)
Chapter V – Rebirth and Interauctoritas (Augustus’ Empire)
“What had been happening in Germany during this period is as follows. The Romans had a hold on parts of it, not whole regions, but merely those areas which happened to have been subdued, so that this fact has not received historical notice. Meanwhile bodies of troops were in the habit of wintering there, and cities were being founded; the barbarians were gradually re-shaping their habits in conformity with the Roman pattern, were becoming accustomed to hold markets and were meeting in peaceful assemblies. But they had not forgotten their ancestral customs, their native manners, their independent way of life, nor the power they had enjoyed through their strength in arms. So long as they were unlearning their customs little by little, by indirect means, so to speak, and were under careful surveillance, they did not object to the change in their manner of life, and were unconsciously altering their disposition.” -Dio Cassius. The Roman History 56.
Great Illyrian Revolt
The Great Illyrian Revolt of 6 AD had its roots in the Germanic Rebellion of 5 AD, but also most probably in the general treatment and subjugation of its population since the Roman Empire had crushed the Breuci and Dalmatae tribes in 12 BC and incorporated the inhabitants into the new province of Illyricum. Like most subjugated provinces, Roman rule was at times relatively peaceful and at other times harsh. In the summer of 6 AD the inhabitants considered themselves to be subjected to a period of such harshness so as to illicit a violent response.
The Germanic Rebellion of 5 AD placed a considerable strain on the Roman state that the future Emperor Drusus, then in command of Germania, felt himself unable to effectively subdue without additional reinforcements from Rome. The Germanic Rebellion involved not only the theoretical subjects of Rome, but also those tribes across the Elbe which had not yet had occasion to raise their arms against the Empire. Drusus requested of Augustus a further four legions to fully subdue the Germanic incursions from across the Elbe and suppress their violent tendencies against the majesty of Rome. For such an undertaking Augustus was content to acquiesce to his request, although this was not without reservations as to the profitability of further Germanic conquests. Germania had proven to be a difficult territory to administer, but more importantly it was wholly unprofitable in its reluctant submission to Rome. However despite these reservations Augustus ultimately directed that such a force be raised and placed at the disposal of his heir.
For the provision of this army Augustus placed it under the direction of Publius Quinctilius Varus, a patrician of consular rank and husband to the grand-niece of Augustus. The choice would prove to be a poor one. Already Varus was well known for his harsh rule during his governorship of Syria, in which he was reportedly excessively cruel to the Jews of Jerusalem following a revolt in 4 BC. However it was his general military incompetence which would lead him to gain everlasting infamy in the Roman pantheon.
Varus had earlier been in command of four legions when governor of Syria, although heavy handed with the inhabitants of that region, he had not displayed any specific incompetence when dealing with military matters. Consequently it would seem that his new assignment would not be too onerous, and as he would be primarily under the direction of Drusus, his decidedly inferior military skills would be somewhat moderated by the talents of that remarkable general.
However such an eventuality did not occur. During the early principate period, auxiliary regiments raised in frontier provinces were stationed in or close to their home province. This policy was very risky, for there was potential for an auxiliary regiment to join with their own tribe if said tribe rebelled against Rome. The loss would be two fold for Rome - not only would they be deprived of a cohort of troops, but the enemy would gain the experience and expertise of Roman arms. It is in this context that the tribes of Illyricum, an important source for the auxilia, revolted.
When assembling the necessary auxiliary cohorts to augment the legions under Varus, the Illyrian tribesmen gathered for such a task revolted - First under Bato of the Daesitiate, but joined soon after by the Breuci. The Daesitiate defeated a Roman force dispatched to disperse them, but when they joined with the Breuci were defeated at the Battle of Sirmium by a second Roman force from Moesia under Caecina Severus. The defeat was only temporary, but it had inflicted such casualties on Severus’ troops that he was unable to pursue. This setback for the Romans was regrettable, for soon the Daesitiate and Breuci had occasion to join with other tribes of Illyria and the isolated revolts soon threatened to spread throughout all of Dalmatia.
Augustus ordered Varus to break off his relief to Drusus and move his army to Illyricum. It is understood he also gave serious consideration to recalling Drusus from Germania, but the danger in Germania was also severe. The Caridi under King Adalhard had crossed the Elbe and were ravaging the province of Bohemia. His positioning was of great concern to Augustus, for he was well placed to intervene in the Illyrian Revolt and consequently exacerbate that crisis. Furthermore other tribes of Germania, presently under control, were precariously placed to add their own struggles to Adalhard and threaten the entire north provinces if they so desired. Removing Drusus could be disastrous to these efforts, and consequently the decision was made to retain his presence for the moment.
Varus sent his legates Lucius Nonius Asprenas and Lucius Arruntius ahead of his main troops in an attempt to head off the danger promptly. The legates were competent commanders who handled their duties admirably, but were nonetheless unable to control the crisis. Varus himself proved a poor general, and would often intervene in the decisions of his subordinates to the great frustration of his commanders. This flaw would ultimately prove disastrous when Varus, supremely overconfident and against the explicit advice of his generals, allowed himself to be trapped by the enemy near the river Kupa. Varus and the entirety of the Legions XXI Rapax and XVI Gallica were slaughtered to a man. The loss was a total military disaster and was only mitigated by the actions of Lucius Asprenas in preventing the loss of further legions. However the damage was done and the loss of the legions as well as that of the legionary eagles provoked a crisis in the capital. The Battle of Kupa River has since become an infamous example of ill preparation and rash decisions. A tragedy that was entirely preventable and unnecessary. Varus’ longstanding reputation was prevented further harm by the taking of his own life when he saw the battle lost, and thereby not adding cowardice to incompetence.
The defeat and suicide of Varus
With the defeat of Varus and the spreading of the revolt through the entirety of Dalmatia, panic broke out in Rome. The Illyrian tribes, originally consisting of just the Daesitiate and Breuci, but now also the Amantini, Azali, Colpiani, Daesiates and Pirustaem, had by now secured the Adriatic coast and threatened Italia itself. Augustus raised a second force in Rome where he resorted to the compulsory purchase and emancipation of thousands of slaves in order to amass enough troops. This extraordinary decision, not undertaken since the aftermath of the Battle of Cannae two centuries earlier, demonstrates the great fear that Augustus and very likely all of Rome possessed at the time. Remarkably, Augustus constituted at least 50 auxiliary cohorts composed of Roman citizens. These were men Augustus considered as unsuitable for recruitment into the legions (which consisted entirely of citizens). For the most part these were either convicted criminals or freed slaves of Roman citizens. These units were accorded the title civium Romanorum (“of Roman citizens”) and maintained this distinction after the crisis.
The delegation of this army could potentially prove to be a momentous decision, and Augustus chose carefully. This task, which possessed great honour but also great responsibility, was delegated to none other than Tiberius. Although it is likely that Augustus’ wife Livia had some influence on his decision, primarily the necessities of the situation demanded it. Drusus could not be recalled from the frontier, and no other general had the experience and knowledge of the region as well as Tiberius. Furthermore it was Tiberius who had, in 12 BC, originally pacified the tribes of Illyria. Such was the context in which Augustus set aside his personal dislike and Tiberius found himself rehabilitated to public life. He was summoned to the Imperial Palace where he was presented with his commission and given a private audience with Augustus. He wasted no time in departing to the front, taking with him his son Drusus and a retinue of personal staff.
Tiberius conducted the Illyrian campaign for three years at the head of thirteen regular legions and a correspondingly large force of auxiliaries. He carried out his task with diligence and a great degree of caution. It is possible he was aware this was his last great chance for honours, but more likely he was influenced by the great military disaster at Kupa. His conduct in this war is described by Suetonius:
“Tiberius arrived in Illyria and, finding that the disaster there had been due to Varus’ rashness and neglect of precautions against surprise, refrained from taking any strategic decisions without the assent of his general staff. This was a notable departure from habit; hitherto he had always complete confidence in his own judgement, but he was now relying on a large military council.” -Suetonius. The Twelve Caesars. Tiberius. 18. [1]
His precautions proved fruitful. For although supplies were short and conditions arduous, Tiberius never allowed the enemy forces to assume the offensive. After a period of three years the stubbornness of Tiberius reduced the whole of Illyricum to complete submission. This feat, for which the Roman people were grateful, inspired the Senate to vote him a triumph and award him the cognomen Pannonicus. [2] Tiberius postponed his triumph because of the public mourning of Varus and the continuing campaign of his brother Drusus in Germania. However, he did accept the cognomen Pannonicus but in this he followed his brother’s precedence by accepting it only on behalf of his son.
Meanwhile the heir Drusus had also won great honours for Rome during his own campaign further north. Although it is not strictly true that he spent the entirety of his four year campaign in the field, his various recalls to Rome were of such a brief nature that he could be said to have literally lived in camp almost the whole time. Drusus spent the majority of his campaign containing the various Germanic tribes which rebelled against Roman rule. The most dangerous of these were those beyond the Elbe who were not strictly within the Roman realm, but who feared Roman expansion so much they felt a pre-emptive strike would prevent such a fate.
We have already seen how the Caridic King Adalhard threatened to join his forces to those of Illyria and thus exacerbate both the Germanic Rebellions and the Great Illyrian Revolt. Such an occurrence would have been devastating to Rome and potentially forced a Roman withdrawal into Italia – a disastrous setback for Roman policy. Drusus' efforts, along with his brother's further south, prevented this from occurring. Drusus was ultimately denied the extra legions he requested to fully destroy the Germanic tribes beyond the Elbe. This was not by choice, but as we have already seen the circumstances of events.
Despite not possessing the strength he desired, Drusus nonetheless used his considerable talents to contain the rebellion. After a period of two years he was able to force the Caridi to retreat back across the Elbe, but was unable to pursue them and complete the victory. He had several engagements with the Senones, Saxones and Virudi, and was fortunate to prevent their coordination under a confederation. For this he pursued both a military and diplomatic strategy, at one point even convincing the Virudi to switch sides, albeit only temporarily.
For those tribes within the Roman borders itself Drusus proved remarkably successful. His diplomatic skills kept the tribes mostly loyal, and he was careful to rescind the collecting of taxes and recruitment of auxilia during the crisis from those tribes whose loyalty was suspect. His dealings with the chiefs were also respectful but firm. Whilst he was capable of kindness he was also ruthless in dealing with rebellion. The failed Cherusci chieftain Arminius, at one time a hostage of Rome, was executed promptly after attempting unsuccessfully to foment a rebellion amongst his people. Drusus shored up the chief Segestas in his place, and raised the Cherusci to a higher status amongst the province to ensure their obedience. [3]
Finally, when the Illyrian Revolt was dealt with there remained the possibility of those legions being sent north to Germania to finish the job. Although it was an outcome that Drusus had desired, the great exhaustion of their experience, and also of his own, convinced him to not pursue it. He returned to Rome in 9 AD and celebrated a joint triumph with his brother Tiberius, taking with him his son Germanicus and other generals who had campaigned with him. Soon afterwards the consuls introduced a measure which gave Drusus joint control of the provinces with Augustus and the task of assisting him to carry out the next five-year census.
The honour and stability brought to Rome was immense, but it was soon to be overshadowed by another crisis – that of Augustus and his declining health.
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[1] A slight changing of OTL quotation from Suetonius, except in this case Illyria has been changed in place of Germania.
[2] In OTL the Senate proposed to award Tiberius either Pannonicus, Invictus or Pius, but Augustus vetoed these on the grounds that Tiberius would be adequately awarded when he [Augustus] died. Obviously in TTL Tiberius is not destined to succeed Augustus and consequently the impediment does not remain.
[3] In OTL there was great division amongst the Cherusci of pro-Roman disposition and anti-Roman. This existed even with the cruelties and harshness of Varus’ administration. With the more benign administration of Drusus in TTL, there would be significantly less anti-Roman feeling and Arminius’ efforts would be fruitless.