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Post by Catcher in the Rye on Sept 5, 2010 7:14:02 GMT -5
Later in the 13th century, King Charles I of Hungary attempted to expand his realm and the influence of the Roman Catholic Church eastwards after the fall of Cuman rule, and ordered a campaign under the command of Phynta de Mende (1324). In 1342 and 1345, the Hungarians were victorious in a battle against Tatars; the conflict was resolved by the death of Jani Beg, in 1357. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moldavia#Historical_population So what does that an anti Tatar campaign has to do with those Gypsy like Cumans you mention with every occasion? Like I said at 1241 Cumans were already a memory both in Moldavia and Wallachia. Regarding the Cuman bishopric who was razed to the ground by the Tatars, the Hungarians tried in vain to keep alive mentioning it in documents for a while although it didn't existed anymore and it never existed for real. The Cuman bishopric was founded in 1229 and soon enough a letter was sent by the Pope to the Kings of Hungary complaining that the owls are not what they seem. This is the Pope letter from 1234: In the Cuman bishopric there are a people called Wallachians and although they believe themselves to be Christians they despise the Roman Church and receive the holly sacraments not from our brother the Cuman bishop but from some pseudo bishops who follow the Greek rite. Some people from the kingdom of Hungary both Saxons and Hungarians go to them and pass to their rite and became one with those Wallachians receiving the holly sacraments from those pseudo bishops in spite of the bishop of the Cumans.The Pope advice was to make a Catholic bishop from the Wallachian nation. As it can be seen, not even in the middle of the so called Cuman state, the Cumans were anything of a presence and that even before they moved all their tents to Hungary in fear of the Mongols. That Hungarian expedition against the Tatars was in a great extent manned by Romanians from Transylvania and especially those of Maramureş. This fact is presented in the Moldavian chronicles but the greatest proof is that when the expedition went back they left a march there ruled by Dragoş, a Romanian Voievode from Maramureş. Rantings are the ridiculous words you wrote above. To bad the old forum was deleted I would have loved to show you the documents where the Hungarians in Transylvania, especially in Maramureş were called hospites (guests) in their very own Hungarian documents. As for the increase in population, the figures we have, show the savage magyarization of the indigenous population, from 29% Hungarians in 1787 to 55% in 1910 (I'm talking here about the territory of the entire medieval Hungary). To bad we cannot go even further in time, probably at 1300 you had to search hard to find a real Hungarian in the so called Hungary. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_foreign_recipients_of_the_Knight's_Cross The Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross (German: Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes) and its variants were the highest award in the military of the Third Reich during World War II. You don't need to search too hard. Even here, the figures show a clear picture, in WW2 Germany awarded to it's allies 43 Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. Out of those receivers 18 were Romanians. That's 40% of the awards were given to Romanians. As much as Italians, Hungarians and Japanese put together. It should be considered that during WW2, Romania was significantly smaller than today having much of Transylvania given by Hitler and Mussolini to Hungarians. Also during WW2 Hungary was much larger than today and Romania was allied with Germany for less than three years while Hungarians fought on the German side for the entire 6 or 7 years of war. Yet the brave Hungarians received only 8 awards although they blowed Hitler with every occasion. Not to mention three Romanians received Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, one of the highest awards compared to none of the Hungarians. Some of the recipients did some amazing feats like the most further advance of the Axis forces into Russia: The 6th recipient General de brigada (Brigadier General) Ion Dumitrache: 2nd November 1942
Dumitrache commanded the Romanian 2nd Mountain Division, which captured the Soviet town of Nalchik in the Caucasus, the farthest, or most southern, Axis advance on the Eastern Front; he also received a promotion to the rank of General de divizie or Major General shortly afterwards. wikimapia.org/#lat=43.4848121&lon=43.6157227&z=7&l=0&m=bNalchik seems like quite a large and important city. There is one great photo with the Romanian soldiers on camels in the Caucasus. That's quite far, the Germans didn't seem to have been able to keep up. Cut the bulls**t with the elite Szekely, they could gather no more than a few thousand men and could you tell me any war fought and won by the Szekely alone? They were so weak that anybody cold force them into war they were everybody's w**res. Hungarians used them, Moldavia used them (by force), Wallachia used them, and Turks also used them against Moldavia. Unfortunately a book I've read about John of Hunyadi is no longer available on the net which showed with sources who was in his retinue. What was amazing was the huge number of Romanians that were ennobled by him, and also taking into consideration the huge lands he owned in Hungary it seems like he had some sort of plan, to bad he died so early. A map of his estates is available, he used the money to gather armies on his own. The Hungarian nobility seem to have been a joke. There is a decree by King Sigismund of Luxembourg from 1426 that exempted nobles from Hungary from armed service with one exception: the Wallachian nobles, I wonder why, probably because the Hungarian nobles made a fool of themselves with every occasion.
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Post by dezboy on Sept 5, 2010 8:54:46 GMT -5
oszkarthehun its interesting you mentioned the allies as referring to Romanians "as women in uniform". In the book Paris 1919, various delegates were quoted as calling Bratianu a bearded woman and that officers in the Romanian Army were quite fond of wearing makeup. Anita, why do you keep thumping your chest about the looting of Budapest in 1919? When your combined czech, serb romanian and french armies outnumbered Kuns communists 4-1, or your victory lap alongside your soviet comrades in 1945 when 11000 romanians were killed in Budapest in 2 days of fighting. Are these your most glorious victories? What source mentions your presence on our land, Gesta? You yourself know gesta is very inaccurate, It tells of Menumorat as Bulgarian, Do you consider yourselves Bulgarian? Origins: Serbs, Albanians and Vlachs; www.promacedonia.org/en/nm/kosovo.html
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Post by Catcher in the Rye on Sept 5, 2010 14:12:53 GMT -5
As a nation of losers, all you can do is to flush your frustrations out of your corrupted minds. You are either that mollusk Unguro or his clone because you repeat just like a parrot all the stupid things he wrote. I think even in the Hungarian maniac community is not easy to find two identical idiots. For the Romanian-Hungarian war of 1919 you have: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungarian–Romanian_War_of_1919As expected the Hungarians were a joke although, despite your whining, you faced only the Romanian army, while Romania was under Russian Soviet attacks from the east and the army was split. The Hungarian forces were at least as numerous as the Romanian ones and well equipped so no excuse for you here, like i said a woman in armor is still a woman. Still you were so easily beaten considering the WW1 was such a slow war and so hard on the advancing force because of the machine guns, trenches and barbed wire, it took like days for the Romanians to take over 41000 prisoners in the final stages of the war and to march through Budapest. This quote is cool: The Romanians occupied all Hungary, with the exception of a piece of land around the Balaton lake. If not for the Allies that took mercy on you and talked us into leaving there would have been no Hungary anymore just like between 1526 and 1867. As for fighting in Budapest during WW2 it seems like it took more than three days. The figures are given by a Hungarian historian: The overall Romanian loss statistics for the 16 days of fierce combat inside Budapest stands at 107 officers, 124 NCOs and 5299 privates, which amounts to approx. 20% of the total number of soldiers who took part in combat.Yet from one day of the battle: By 3 January heavy engagements had reduced the combat strength of the Hungarian 12th Reserve Division to between 10 and 25 men in each battalion, and on that day alone 307 Hungarians were taken prisoner by the Romanians. Despite repeated German and Hungarian attempts to drive them back across the Rakos stream, the Soviet continued to widen their salient. That's pretty good for urban warfare considering the attacking force had to clear in some cases room after room and fortified positions. There is also a Hungarian map which seems to point to more than just three days of battle, you prick: Yet the mujiks acted like the mujiks they are and deprived Romanian from sharing the victory over Budapest, from a Hungarian book: The capture of Pest being only days away, Malinovsky ordered the Romanian 7th Army Corps-which had reached the Great Boulevard to the front in northern Hungary. Although the real reason was that he did not want to share the victory with the Romanians, he claimed that he responding to requests from the Romanian general staff. The Romanian commander, General Nicolae Şova, reluctantly obeyed but nevertheless dismissed on 7 February for "insubordination" and, after the communist takeover of Romania, was sentenced to ten years hard labor in Siberia.
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Post by dezboy on Sept 5, 2010 20:15:13 GMT -5
By January 14, Hungarian infantry and assault guns were locked in mortal combat for the Eastern Railway Station with most of General Nicholae Sova's Seventh Romanian Rifle Corps. Whereas in most instances Hungarian units had fought halfheartedly during the Battle of Budapest, here — faced with their Romanian arch-nemesis — they fought savagely.
The fighting traveled from track to track, through the rolling stock, and into the station. By January 16, the outnumbered defenders were bludgeoned in close-quarter fighting amid the rubble of the shattered station, and the exhausted attackers stood close to the Elizabeth Ring Road, a short distance from the Danube. Sova's corps, already having suffered eleven thousand casualties out of its thirty-six-thousand-man force, was pulled out by Malinovsky, who was incensed by the Romanian tendency to whip up frenzied resistance among previously demoralized Hungarian troops.
World War II: Siege of Budapest » HistoryNet
Romanians do fight like woman, and surely would've lost any war when both sides were at full strengh
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Post by Anittas on Sept 6, 2010 1:07:07 GMT -5
By January 14, Hungarian infantry and assault guns were locked in mortal combat for the Eastern Railway Station with most of General Nicholae Sova's Seventh Romanian Rifle Corps. Whereas in most instances Hungarian units had fought halfheartedly during the Battle of Budapest, here — faced with their Romanian arch-nemesis — they fought savagely. The fighting traveled from track to track, through the rolling stock, and into the station. By January 16, the outnumbered defenders were bludgeoned in close-quarter fighting amid the rubble of the shattered station, and the exhausted attackers stood close to the Elizabeth Ring Road, a short distance from the Danube. Sova's corps, already having suffered eleven thousand casualties out of its thirty-six-thousand-man force, was pulled out by Malinovsky, who was incensed by the Romanian tendency to whip up frenzied resistance among previously demoralized Hungarian troops. World War II: Siege of Budapest » HistoryNet Romanians do fight like woman, and surely would've lost any war when both sides were at full strengh So we kicked your ass and therefore fought like women? What's the reasoning in that?
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wbb
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Post by wbb on Sept 6, 2010 3:38:17 GMT -5
Romanians kick Hungarians arse because the Freemasons was de-moralizing the Hungarian people and their nation. It's was the Freemasons that created the Romanian nation by very famous Romanian ultra-nationalist who were Freemasons. I can list all Romanians politicians that's including Bratianu, Titulescu, and so on, were all members of freemasons. If u want i can list some more names, since it's in Wiki.
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Post by Catcher in the Rye on Sept 6, 2010 6:40:01 GMT -5
By January 14, Hungarian infantry and assault guns were locked in mortal combat for the Eastern Railway Station with most of General Nicholae Sova's Seventh Romanian Rifle Corps. Whereas in most instances Hungarian units had fought halfheartedly during the Battle of Budapest, here — faced with their Romanian arch-nemesis — they fought savagely. The fighting traveled from track to track, through the rolling stock, and into the station. By January 16, the outnumbered defenders were bludgeoned in close-quarter fighting amid the rubble of the shattered station, and the exhausted attackers stood close to the Elizabeth Ring Road, a short distance from the Danube. Sova's corps, already having suffered eleven thousand casualties out of its thirty-six-thousand-man force, was pulled out by Malinovsky, who was incensed by the Romanian tendency to whip up frenzied resistance among previously demoralized Hungarian troops. World War II: Siege of Budapest » HistoryNet Romanians do fight like woman, and surely would've lost any war when both sides were at full strengh That's pseudo history at it's best. Anyway the number I gave is for the assault of Budapest. It seems like the Romanian troops were making very fast progress facing both German and Hungarian troops. They could keep up with the Soviets despite the Russian tactic had no consideration for their own casualties. The inflated figures of casualties you're giving are for the entire Operation Budapest which started in October 1944 on the river Tisa, far from Budapest. It's about three months of battle in which the Romanian troops took more than 7500 POW only aside from the casualties which probably were huge on the German-Hungarian side. There's no surprise we have no real figures of the Hungarian loses since the Hungarian battalions of the 12th Reserve Division (a battalion is between 300-1300 soldiers while a divison is between 10000 - 30000 men) facing the Romanian sector after only three days of fighting inside Budapest were reduced to 10-25 soldiers each. That's obliteration. The following figure are given by a Hungarian historian specialized in the WW2 about the Romanian losses (C7A means Army Corp 7): The number you are referring to (more precisely 10,708 casualitites, i.e. KIA, WIA, MIA and POW) happened during the entire 'Budapest Operation' C7A was involved in (not only the actual 16-day siege of the capital) and occured in about three months. The overall loss statistics for the 16 days of fierce combat inside Budapest stands at 107 officers, 124 NCOs and 5299 privates, which amounts to approx. 20% of the total number of soldiers who took part in combat. Also i doubt about that frenzied resistance, the map proves that either the German-Hungarian troops were running back on new positions or they were obliterated quite fast both in the Soviet and Romanian sectors, that's considering the constant progress. How did they opposed that frenzied resistance giving such a high number of prisoners? Stalin ordered the conquest of Budapest at all means meaning the Russian again show no respect for the loss of human lives since they anyway had almost an inexhaustible supply on primitive Russo-Tatar mujik cannon fodder. Considering this, what the Romanian troops did is amazing that's because the Romanian troops had no reserves and the troops had to fought to exhaustion. A Romanian general wrote a complain wandering if the Romanian troops were not destined for destruction beeing allowed no rest. That's like the Russians understand to wage war. Inside Budapest, the 7th Corps advanced 11 km, managing to get only 2 km away from the Danube in two weeks of ferocious street fighting. One by one the Hippodrome, the Central Post Office, the Franz Josef Barracks, the Eastern Rail Station and the Kerepes Cemetery fell to the Romanian troops. The presence of gen. Sova in the first line, where the situation demanded, was something usual. On 26 December 1944, for example, his mantel was pierced by two bullets, during a counterattack.But the ungrateful Soviet mujiks wanted the glory all for themselves, well after all the Romanians took Budapest once all by themselves so now the Russians were probably jealous. On 16 January the corps was pulled out of its positions and sent to Slovakia. General Nicolae Sova was very irritated and protested vehemently:
The officers and the soldiers of the 7th Corps, who fought and bled next to the allied troops from the crossing of the Tisa and up to the middle of Budapest, are depressed by the fact that with the pending collapse of Budapest they are sent to another sector. They interpret this as their undeserved removal from the honor to fight until the end of the operations in Budapest, considering that they have been used by the allies only in the difficult moments of the battle when they gave their unconditional assistance marked by the number of graves of their comrades killed in action in these fights and they are removed when the moment of victory, of reward and honour is near.
The corps suffered 10,708 casualties out of 36,348 soldiers in Operation Budapest, but it had captured approximately 7,000 POWs and caused many casualties to the enemy.
He was obviously relieved of command soon after this, on 7 February 1945. He had just received the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class with swords in January. On 24 March he was retired. Thus ended his 38 year long military career.
He was arrested in January 1946, along with other former members of Antonescu’s government, who were still free. However, he was accused only on 24 September, nine months later and put on trial on 15 December 1947, two years later! He was sentenced to ten years of prison, but the two which he had already served were taken into consideration. Thus, in January 1956 he walked out of the infamous Aiud prison. He was in a terrible condition and had the Parkinson syndrome. In 1948 his pension had been suspended and his house was confiscated. After many petitions, he started receiving it again in 1964.
He passed away on 12 March 1966 and was buried with all the military honors in the Ghencea-Militar Cemetery in Bucharest, next to general Constantin Argeseanu.Well there is a book with a nice title that summarize well the Romanian war effort: www.amazon.com/Third-Axis-Fourth-Ally-1941-1945/dp/1854092677Some pictures with the Romanian troops on the Eastern Campaign. In Basarabia: Crosing a river under machine gun cover: Marchall Ion Antonescu and King Michael on the front: Russian prisoners: In Crimeea: Others in the Kuban, Donetk, Don, Caucasus, Sea of Azov: In the winter camouflage: In Kuban: Deep in the beast lair. Only if the Germans weren't so incompetent and weak.
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Post by oszkarthehun on Sept 6, 2010 21:07:07 GMT -5
Hungarians in general felt demoralised and in a state of dissaray during that time, as most people did not support a communist Government. Many people and ex officers joined the fight not in support of Bela Kun's regime but only in defense of Hungarian territories. Nevertheless Hungary was outnumbered all together as it was fighting on 3 fronts. Therefore, Romanian troops invaded Hungary on April 16. The army of the Czech-Slovak Republic joined up and launched an attack from the North. Within days the Romanians had occupied Nagyvarad, and in a week they had reached Debrecen. while Czech troops occupied Miskolc. The Allied forces were outnumbering the Hungarian troops three to one. On the south, the Yugoslav troops numbered 20-30,000 men; in the east, the Romanians had 20-30,000 men (not mentioning the 20-30,000 French back-up army); in the north the Czechs had around 20-25,000 soldiers.
During this period, when the patriotism of the Hungarian officers and soldiers produced military victories, the communist dictatorship of the proletariat created more and more dissatisfaction in the different segments of the Hungarian population./15/ In many p1aces, civilians and soldiers in the countryside and in the army began to organize an uprising to overthrow the repressive governmentwww.hungarian-history.hu/lib/thou/thou11.htmAs for Hungarians History in Warfare and Battle, we dont need to listen to AofG's hateful rants. Magyars dominated and held the Carpathian basin for several hundred years when they arrived, no one could take it from them, on top of that they simultaneously attacked western europe for 100 years. In the revolt against Hapsburgs they gave the Austrians a hard time and simultaneously defeated the Croats who waged war against them. Many Hungarian Hussar regiments were brought into the Great Prussian Army and were renowned for their abilities. Hussars and famous Hungarian Hussar Generals also fought in American War of Independance and were celebrated for their abilities. And as for our friend AofG branding Hungary a loser nation, well well well, lets see what is Romania known for prostitutes and criminals in Italy(there Roman Italian brothers hehe want to kick them out of Italy) and criminals and prostitutes all over Europe, and Britain not to mention major internal corruption, and I could go on but I wont bother.
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wbb
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Post by wbb on Sept 7, 2010 5:02:04 GMT -5
When the Czecho-Slovak army, the Romanian army and the Yugo-Slavs army invaded Hungary, it was done by the support of the West, while Hungary itself was isolated during the war. This war planned very much the same with during Turkey's collapse of the Ottomans. French, British, Greeks, Armenians, Italians, Americans, Russians and Arabs together against the Turks. The Turks was also isolated during the foreign occupation of Anatolia. It took only 1 man to drive out those savages and that was Kemal Ataturk. Hungarian-Romanian wars of 1919 was nothing other than Hungary's victory over the Romanians, since Horthy regimes had driven the Romanians out from Hungary. Romanians did nothing but withdrew their troops from Hungary similar to that of the US withdrawal of Vietnam, therefore Romanian army had lost the war in 1919, Romanians recieved Transylvania but failed to receive Pannonia. VIVA LA RESISTANCE!!!!
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Post by Catcher in the Rye on Sept 7, 2010 7:08:41 GMT -5
oskarthehun, that's not history, it's fantasy, it's what your Hungarians love to read.
hungarian-history.hu
rolf
Since you don't want to read the true story of that war on the link i provided, i need to paste it here from Wikipedia. I'm sure the Hungarians contributors did all their best to verify it bit by bit, and of course more important it has official sources.
First I want to add that the Romanian troops were alone, no Frenchman, no Yugoslav, no Frenchmen and no Czechoslovakians or Martians were involved on the Romanian side or attacked the Hungarians. It were the Hungarians who attacked first the Romanians. Although the Romanians defeated them were forced by the Allies not to cross Tisa and finish the Hungarian army, the Hungarians took advantage of this and attacked the Czechoslovakians although the Czechoslovakians had no intention of attacking Hungary.
The seeds of the Hungarian–Romanian war of 1919[1] were planted when Transylvania proclaimed union with Romania on December 1, 1918. In April 1919, the Bolsheviks came to power in Hungary, at which point its army attempted to retake Transylvania, commencing the war. By its final stage, more than 120 000 troops on both sides were involved. The destruction of the Hungarian Soviet Republic and the Romanian occupation of parts of Hungary proper, including its capital Budapest in August 1919, ended the war. Romanian troops withdrew from Hungary in March 1920.
The sides involved: Hungarians 65000 troops, Hungarian commanders Aurél Stromfeld, Ferenc Julier, Vilmos Böhm, Béla Kun.
Romanian troops 65000 Romanian commanders: Traian Moşoiu, George Mărdărescu, Constantin Prezan, Crown Prince Ferdinand.
No French involved (soldiers or officers or any other kind of Frenchman), no Serbs, Croats etc involved.
Second - the war had two stages, the Hungarians attacked the Czechoslovakians after Romanians stopped on the Tisa (because the Allies were against the Romanian advancing even to the Tisa). At the time Romanians fought the Hungarians, the Hungarian army was under no other threat. In the meanwhile the Romanian army had to keep troops in the east preparing against attacks from the red Russian mujiks who tried among others to help the Soviet Hungarians.
Phase I: November 1918 – March 1919
Main article: Union of Transylvania with Romania
Following the Treaty of Bucharest, the bulk of the Romanian Army was demobilized. Only the 9th and the 10th infantry divisions and the 1st and the 2nd cavalry divisions were available at war-time strength, but they were used at the time to protect Bessarabia from the attacks of the Russian Reds. The 1st, 7th and 8th Vânători divisions, stationed in Moldavia, were the first units mobilized under these circumstances. The 8th was sent to Bukovina and the other two divisions were sent to Transylvania.
On December 1st, 1918, the Romanians of Transylvania proclaimed the union with Romania, being followed by the Transylvanian Saxons on January 8, 1919.
First, the units of the 1st and 7th divisions advanced in December 1918 up to the line of the Mureş river which was the demarcation line agreed upon by the representatives of the Entente and of Hungary in Belgrade on November 13, 1918. At the same time, units of the German Army, under the command of Marshal von Mackensen, retreated westward.
Following a Romanian request, the Allied Command in the East under the leadership of the French general Franchet d'Espèrey allowed the Romanian Army to advance up to the line of the Western Carpathians. The 7th Vânători division advanced in the direction of Cluj, and the 1st in the direction of Alba-Iulia. On December 24, units of the Romanian Army entered Cluj. By January 22, 1919, the Romanian Army controlled the entire territory up to this demarcation line.
At this point the Romanian Army in Transylvania was stretched thin, having to simultaneously deter the Hungarian Army and maintain order in the territories under its control. Hence, the Romanian High Command decided to send two more divisions into Transylvania: the 2nd Vânători division to Sibiu, and the 6th infantry division to Braşov. A unified command of the Romanian Army in Transylvania was also established, with the headquarters at Sibiu; General Traian Moşoiu was put in charge of this command.
Romania started organizing the territory it had taken, which at this point was far from encompassing the ethnic Romanian population in the region. Two new infantry divisions, the 16th and the 18th, were organized from Romanian soldiers previously mobilized in the Austro-Hungarian Army.
On February 28, the Allied council decided to notify Hungary of the new demarcation line to which the Romanian Army would advance. This line coincided with the railways connecting the cities of Satu Mare, Oradea and Arad. However, the Romanian Army was not allowed to enter these cities. A demilitarized zone was to be created, stretching from there up to 5 km beyond the border marking the extent of the Romanian territorial requests on Hungary. The retreat of the Hungarian Army behind the westward border of the demilitarized zone was to begin on March 22, 1919.
The notification reached Hungary on March 19 through French Lieutenant-Colonel Fernand Vix. The Károlyi government resigned rather than accepting the notification, and on March 21 gave control to Béla Kun, who instituted a Communist regime in Hungary.
Within this period of time, only limited skirmishes took place between the Romanian and Hungarian troops, and on one occasion between Romanian and Ukrainian troops. Some Hungarian elements engaged in the harassment of the Romanian population outside the area controlled by the Romanian Army.[2][3]
Phase II: April 1919 – June 1919
After 21 March 1919, Romania faced two communist neighbors: Hungary and the Soviet Russia. The Romanian delegation at the Peace Conference in Paris requested that the Romanian Army be allowed to oust the Hungarian communists from power. Although well aware of the communist danger, the Allied council was marked by dissension between the US president Woodrow Wilson, the British prime minister David Lloyd George, and the French prime minister Georges Clemenceau about the guarantees required by France for its borders with Germany. In particular, the American delegation was convinced that French hardliners around Marshal Foch were trying to initiate a new conflict that would eventually lead to a new war, this time against Germany and the Soviet Union. Acting on these premises, the participants at the conference tried to defuse the situation in Hungary. Hence, the South African General Smuts was sent to Budapest on April 4 with a proposition for the Kun government to abide by the conditions previously presented to Károlyi. This action of the Allies also amounted to recognizing Communist Hungary. In exchange for fulfilling the conditions in the Vix Note, the Allied powers would lift the blockade of Hungary and adopt a benevolent attitude towards it in the question of the territories it had to yield to Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Kun however asked that the Romanian Army be ordered back to the line of the Mureş river, and the discussions stalled.
Meanwhile, Kun sought to gain time in order to be able to build up a military force able of waging war with Romania and Czechoslovakia. On the Romanian front, there were some 20,000 troops in the first line facing the Romanian Army. Kun managed to mobilize another 60,000 in the second line by the use of recruitment centers in Oradea, Gyula, Debrecen, and Szolnok, among others. This Hungarian Army was a mix of some elite units and officers from the former Austro-Hungarian Army, and poor-quality volunteers. They were equipped with some 137 cannons and 5 armored trains. Although a colorful mix, this army was held together by nationalist rather than communist ideals, and was therefore highly motivated. Kun hoped also that the Soviet Union would come to its help and attack Romania from the east.
Once the discussions with Kun stalled, the Romanian Army was ordered by the Romanian government to take action and force the Hungarian authorities to comply with the Allied council decision on February 28 concerning the new demarcation line.[4] The Romanian Army in Transylvania comprised 64 infantry battalions, 28 cavalry squadrons, 160 cannons, 32 howitzers, 1 armored train, 3 air squadrons, 2 pioneer battalions, organized into two groups: North and South. The overall command of the Romanian Army in Transylvania was entrusted to General George Mărdărescu, while General Moşoiu was appointed commander of the Northern Group. The Romanian battle plan was to strike with the more powerful Northern Group and take Carei and Oradea, thus separating the elite Szekely division from the rest of the Hungarian Army, made primarily of volunteers. Then the Group should proceed with the flanking of the Hungarian Army. At the same time, the Southern Group would advance only up to Radna and Beiuş, and then serve as pivot for the flanking maneuver of the Northern Group. The overall advance was to stop only at the Tisza river. The start of the offensive was planned for April 16.
The Hungarian attack
Aware of the Romanian preparations, the Hungarians fortified the mountain passes in their possession and launched a preemptive attack on the night between April 15 and 16. The attack was stopped with the help of the reserve formations and the Romanians defensive lines held. Between April 16 and 18, the Romanians started their own offensive, forcing the mountain passes after heavy fighting. On the front of the 2nd Vânători division, a battalion of Hungarian cadets offered heavy resistance, and was defeated by the Romanian 9th regiment only towards the evening of April 16. On April 18, the first phase of the Romanian offensive was over, and the Hungarian front was broken. Carei was taken by the Romanian troops on April 19, Oradea and Salonta on April 20. At this moment, the Romanian Army reached the line set by the Allies in the Vix Note. However, the Romanian High Command decided to go over this line and advance to the Tisza river, for military reasons: the Tisza makes a natural obstacle that is easy to defend, and at the same time the Hungarian Army was beaten but not destroyed. By doing so, the Romanians went against the wishes of the Allies.[5][6]
The fate of the Székely division
Making use of their cavalry, the Romanians hindered any attempts by the Hungarian Army to set a new defensive line between Nyíregyháza, Debrecen and Békéscsaba. At the same time on the front of the Northern Group, the best unit of the Hungarian Army, the Szekely division under the command of Colonel Kratochwil was retreating towards Nyíregyháza, being constantly harassed by the Romanian troops, mainly from the 2nd cavalry division. They tried to stop their retreat and fight around the city, but were dislodged by the Romanians, and Nyíregyháza was occupied on April 26. The Division tried to flee west over Tisza, but by this time the entire eastern bank of the river was controlled by the Romanians, the last Hungarian troops defending a bridgehead over the river being defeated on April 29 at Rakamaz. With their retreat route cut, the Székely division capitulated on April 29. [who fooled them that they were the best?]
The Romanian Army reaches the Tisza line
Debrecen was occupied by the Romanians on 23 April, and the Romanian Army started preparing for the assault on Békéscsaba. This began on 25 April and, on 26 April, the city fell after some heavy fighting. Most of the remains of the Hungarian Army converged towards Szolnok, where they tried to escape west over Tisza, establishing two concentric defense lines around Szolnok whose ends lay on the Tisza. Between 29 April and 1 May the Romanian Army managed to break through these lines, despite the reinforcements sent from the west bank of the Tisza. On the evening of 1 May 1919 the entire east bank of the Tisza was controlled by the Romanian Army.
On 2 May, the Kun government sued for peace. In the peace proposition sent through Lt. Col. Werth, Kun was ready to recognize all territorial demands of the Romanians and asked in exchange for a cessation of hostilities and no intervention in the internal Hungarian affairs. The Romanians offered only an armistice and this only under pressure from the Allied Supreme Command, as on 30 April the French foreign minister Pichon had summoned the Romanian representative at the Peace Conference, prime minister Brătianu, and asked him to stop the advance of the Romanian troops on the Tisza river and eventually retreat on the demarcation line imposed by the Allies. Brătianu promised that the Romanian troops would not cross the Tisza and would remain on the east bank of the river.
Gen. Moşoiu was named governor of the military district between the Romanian frontier and the Tisza river, being replaced at the command of the Norther Group by Gen. Mihăescu. At the same time, the Romanian 7th division was transported from the Hungarian front to the Russian front in Northern Moldavia.
The Hungarian attack on Czechoslovakia
Béla Kun tried to make use of the lull in fighting against the Romanians to improve his battered international position. He prepared an attack against Czechoslovak forces, which he deemed the weaker of its enemies, as he has just been defeated by the Romanians and believed that action against the Serbs was impossible due to the presence of allied French troops in Serbia. By attacking Czechoslovak troops, he tried to gain support from within Hungary, by making good on his promise to restore Hungary's borders. Kun also sought to establish a link to his Bolshevik allies in Russia. Internationally he argued that he acted on the belief that granting the territory where Hungarians were an ethnic majority to the newly-formed Czechoslovakia following World War I was unjust. To strengthen the army, Kun's regime recruited heavily from the male population between 19 and 25 years of age in the areas left under his control. Also many workers (mainly from the Budapest industrial area) joined the army. He also enlisted many former Austro-Hungarian officers, who joined the army out of patriotic rather than ideological reasons. For the offensive in Upper Hungary (today's Slovakia), the Hungarians concentrated two divisions, the 1st and the 5th, totaling 40 battalions with plenty of artillery.
On the 20 of May the Hungarians, under the lead of Colonel Aurél Stromfeld, attacked in force and routed the Czechoslovak troops in Miskolc. The Romanian Command tried to hold the link to the Czechoslovak Army and attacked the Hungarian flank with some troops from the 16th infantry division and the 2nd Vânători division. However, this action was to no avail and it could not stop the rout of the Czechoslovak Army. The Romanians retreated to their bridgehead at Tokaj and defended their position against Hungarian attacks between 25 and 30 May. The Hungarian attack against the Czechoslovak Army evolved well and consequently the Romanian troops in the North were in danger of being outflanked. On the 3 of June, the Romanians were thus forced to retreat from Tokaj on the east bank of Tisza, destroying all bridges over the river in the process and breaking any contact with the Hungarian troops. To deal with the danger of being outflanked and hinder the communication between the Hungarians and the Soviets, the Romanian troops along Tisza extended their defense line further North and linked with the troops of the Romanian 8th division, which since the 22 of May had advanced from Bukovina to meet them.
The success of their attack on newly forming Czechoslovak state allowed the Hungarian reds besides regaining Upper Hungary to also create a puppet Slovak Soviet Republic. At the end of the operations, the Hungarian Army had reached the old frontiers in the northeastern Carpathians. In the northwest, the campaign reoccupied important industrial regions around Miskolc, Salgótarján and Selmecbánya. They also started to plan to march against the Romanian Army in the east.
Involvement of Bolshevik Russia
On the 9 of April 1918 Bessarabia had united with Romania. The unification act that brought these old Romanian lands within the modern Romanian state was not recognized by the Bolshevik Russia and later was challenged by the Soviet Union as unlawful. Having to fight the Whites, the Poles, the Ukrainians and later an allied invasion in that region, the Red Army had no resources available to seriously threaten Romania at that time. The Russian hopes to use Otaman Grigoriev for an expedition against Romania shattered after much procrastination and later refusal of the rogue general. Furthermore, numerous peasant uprisings took place near Kiev.
Before the communist takeover in Hungary, the Bolsheviks used the Odessa Soviet Republic as a buffer state to invade Romania, which only turned into several sporadic attacks over the Dniester river in order to reclaim the territory of the former Bessarabia Governorate. A somewhat similar role was taken later by the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which covered roughly the territory of the present-day Transnistria. During that period of time the Romanian Army was being reorganized and such attacks were more or less successful. However, they were always met with force by the Romanian troops stationed in Bessarabia, which managed on all occasions to throw the Bolsheviks back over the Dniester (see Iona Yakir). After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk the Soviet forces were pushed out of neighboring Ukraine eastward and until late 1918 were nolonger a threat. [edit]
Military operations in Bessarabia in 1919
The most important attack took place at the end of January 1919, when the Bolsheviks pushing the Ukrainian Army towards Zbruch managed to take control of the Romanian city of Hotin. They held the city for a few days before being routed by the Romanian Army. After that, starting February 1919, enough Romanian troops were present in Bessarabia to thwart most attack attempts. The situation was further eased by the fact that the Bolsheviks lacked the resources to seriously threaten Bessarabia. At that moment they had to deal with the advancing Armed Forces of South Russia led by Anton Denikin. Furthermore, a French–Greek army of five divisions (three French and two Greek) under the command of the French general d'Anselme and with support from some Polish, Ukrainian and Russian volunteers, attacked near Odessa in western Crimea. All these events led to a calm-down of the situation in Bessarabia over most of the next two months.
In support of the allied attack, Romanian troops of the 39th regiment occupied Tiraspol on the 21 of March. Fighting at the same time in Transylvania, the Romanian Army could not provide more soldiers. In April, however, the army under general d'Anselme was defeated at Berzov by the Soviet 3rd Army and forced to retreat towards Odessa. With the change of government in France the allied forces were ordered to withdraw from Odessa later that month. Most of the Entente forces retreated by ship abandoning part of their heavy equipment. Some troops, together with their Russian and Ukrainian allies, retreated through southern Bessarabia. At the same time, the Romanian Army started fortifying its positions in Bessarabia in preparation of a possible Bolshevik large-scale attack.
On the 1st of May, the Russian Bolshevik foreign minister Georgy Chicherin issued an ultimatum to the Romanian government, asking it to evacuate Bessarabia and threatening with the use of force in case of non-compliance. At the same time more Bolshevik troops were concentrating along the Dniester. Anotonov-Ovsiyenko planned for a massive charge on May 10, 1919. By this they tried to ease the pressure against the Hungarian Bolsheviks, forcing the Romanian Army to prepare for an attack in the East. This is why the Romanians brought the 7th division as reinforcement from the Tisza front into Bessarabia.
After the ultimatum, the attacks on the Romanian troops in Bessarabia intensified, peaking on 27–28 May when a few hundreds of Bolshevik troops attacked Tighina. In preparation of this attack, they threw manifests out of a plane, inviting the allied troops to fraternize with them. However, only 60 French soldiers switched sides and supported the Russians crossing the Dniester. The Bolsheviks managed to enter Tighina, but were repulsed later that day by the Romanians with the help of some French troops in town.
To counter the Bolshevik threat, two more Romanian divisions were sent in the area: the 4th and the 5th infantry divisions. Furthermore, a territorial command was organized in southern Bessarabia, consisting mainly of the 15th infantry division. Starting end of June the situation calmed down in Bessarabia.
Phase III: July 1919 – August 1919
The Allied council was deeply displeased by the Romanian advancing to the Tisza without their approval. There were even voices blaming the Romanians for the troubles in Hungary and asking for an immediate retreat to the original demarcation line, concomitantly with a downsize of the Romanian Army. The Council tried also to persuade the Romanians to start talks with the Kun government. However, the Romanian government stood by its decision and argued that the Tisza line was the sole military meaningful demarcation line until the final border line between Romania and Hungary was established and internationally recognized.
The Council put pressure on Kun to stop its advances into Czechoslovakia under the threat of a coordinated attack of the French, Serb and Romanian troops from the South and the East respectively. They also promised a favorable attitude towards Soviet Hungary in the peace talks to follow and in delineating Hungary's new borders. On the 12th of June, these borders were brought to the attention of the governments of Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Hungary. Under these circumstances, Hungary signed an armistice with Czechoslovakia on the 23rd of June and by July 4, the Hungarian troops retreated 15 km south of the demarcation line. The Council demanded that the Romanians leave Tiszántúl and retreat also to their new borders, but the Romanians replied that they would comply only after the Hungarian Army would have demobilized. Upon hearing the Romanian demands from the Council representatives, Kun answered that from now on he would rely solely on the might of his army.
This new turn of events swung the Council against Kun and on the 11th of July it decided to start a coordinated attack of the Serb, French and Romanian troops against Soviet Hungary. The planning for this attack was entrusted to Marshal Foch. However, immediately after the Czechoslovak armistice, Hungary started to mobilize its army against the Romanians along Tisza and on the 17th of July the Hungarians were the first to strike.
The opposing forces
The Romanians were facing the Hungarians on a front of some 250 km, along the Tisza, from south of Szeged, where they were neighboring with French and Serb troops, up to north of Tokaj, where they were neighboring with Czechoslovak troops.
In comparison to April 1919, the Hungarian Army facing the Romanians now along the Tisza river had greatly improved. It was better organized and equipped, and it had a high morale as it fought for its motherland. The morale was further boosted by the successes against the Czechoslovak Army. The communists held control of the army command through their political commissaries, but they were supported by experienced professional officers. At division level and below mostly professional officers were in command. The Hungarians mustered 100 infantry battalions, with some 50 000 men, 10 cavalry squadrons with 1365 men, 69 artillery batteries of calibers ranging up to 305 mm, and nine armored trains. The troops were organized for attack into three groups, North, Central and South, with the Central group being the strongest. They planned to cross the Tisza with all three groups, and then advance towards Satu Mare, Oradea and Arad respectively, expecting to ignite a communist revolt in Romania, as well and counting on some form of support from the Soviet Russia, which they hoped would launch an all-out attack into Bessarabia, on Romania's eastern border.
The Romanian Army had some 92 battalions with some 48 000 men, 58 cavalry squadrons with 12 000 men, some 80 artillery batteries of calibers ranging up to 155 mm, two armored trains, as well as some support units. They were positioned along three lines. The first line included the 16th division in the north and the 18th division in the south. In the second line more powerful formations were located, the 2nd Vânători division in the North, concentrated in and around Nyíregyháza, and the 1st Vânători division in the south, concentrated in and around Békéscsaba. The third line included the most powerful Romanian formations and had to be used as maneuvering mass; it was composed of the 1st and 6th infantry divisions, 1st and 2nd cavalry divisions, as well as some support units. These troops took positions along the railway link stretching from Carei, through Oradea, up to north of Arad. The 20th and the 21st infantry divisions were tasked with maintaining the security and public order behind the third line. The first line was rather thin, as it was supposed to fight delay actions until the true intentions of the attacking Hungarians were to be revealed. After that, together with the troops in the second line they were to hold the attackers until the counterattack of the troops in the third line could commence. For such maneuvering actions, the Romanian command planned to make use of the railway links in their control and had prepared a sufficient number of trains. The Romanians were also highly motivated, fighting for their dream to unify (into a single country) all the lands inhabited by ethnic Romanians. This long yearned dream was now supported by Woodrow Wilson's principles of self-determination and nation state. Most soldiers were experienced World War I veterans.
The Hungarian attack
Between the 17th and the 20th of July, the Hungarians bombarded the Romanian positions and conducted reconnaissance operations. On the 20th of July, around 3:00 AM, after a violent bombardment, the Hungarian infantry of all three groups crossed the Tisza and attacked the Romanian positions.
Fighting on the flanks
In the North, on the 20th of July, the Hungarians took Rakamaz and some villages around it. Troops of the Romanian 16th division took back the villages but managed to retake Rakamaz only the next day, with the help of the 2nd Vânători division. However, the Hungarians renewed their efforts and, supported by their artillery, retook Rakamaz and two villages around it, but could not break out of the bridgehead. Therefore, they tried to outflank the Romanian positions and cross the Tisza further south at Tiszafüred with troops of the 80th international brigade but they were stopped there by troops of the Romanian 16th division. The Romanians brought also some troops of the 20th infantry division into combat and managed to clear the bridgehead at Tiszafüred on the 24th of July. Not being able to break out of Rakamaz, the Hungarians started fortifying their positions and redeployed some troops somewhere else. There was a lull in fighting in the north, as the Romanians followed suite. Only on the 26th of July do the Romanians attacked again and after some violent fighting that held until 10:00 PM, managed to clear the Hungarian bridgehead. After this, the Romanians were in complete control of the northern part of the Tisza's eastern bank.
In the south, the Hungarian 2nd division needed two days to take Szentes, which was being hold by the 89th and the 90th regiments of the Romanian 18th division. On the 21st and 22 July, Hódmezővásárhely changed hands several times between Hungarian troops and Romanian troops of the 90th infantry regiment supported by the 1st Vânători brigade. Then on the 23rd of July, the Romanians finally reoccupied Hódmezővásárhely, Szentes and Mindszent, thus throwing the Hungarians back over the Tisza and ending the fighting in this sector of the front. This allowed the Romanians to take the 1st Vânători brigade from the south front and use it in the center, where the Hungarian attack was progressing very well. [edit]
Fighting in the center
On the 20th of July, the Hungarians managed to establish a solid bridgehead on the east bank of the Tisza across Szolnok, despite the opposition of the Romanian 91st regiment of the 18th infantry division. The attackers brought the entire 6th and 7th divisions within the bridgehead and overwhelmed the troops in the first line of defense. The Hungarian 6th infantry division attacked to the east and took Törökszentmiklós, while the 7th division advanced towards Mezőtúr. At the same time, the 5th division was brought over the Tisza and attacked towards Túrkeve. On the 22nd of July, the Hungarians advanced towards Kunhegyes, after crossing the Tisza some 20 km north of Szolnok and defeating the Romanian 18th Vânători regiment. The Romanian troops of the 18th division were reinforced with formations from the second line, including some troops from the 1st cavalry division, and the entire 2nd Vânători brigade. On the 23rd of July, the Hungarians manage to take Túrkeve and Mezőtúr. On the night of the 23rd of July, the Hungarians controlled a 80 km-wide, 60 km-deep chunk of the right bank of the Tiza, opposite of Szolnok. Facing them to the east and to the south were the troops of the Romanian first and second line. To the north, a Romanian maneuver group was forming with troops from the third Romanian line, including the 1st infantry division of Gen. Obogeanu in the center, the 6th infantry division under Gen. Olteanu to the left and the 2nd cavalry division of Gen. Davidoglu to the right of the group, along Tisza.
The Romanian counterattack
The Romanian maneuver group attacked on the morning of the 24th of July. Elements of the 2nd cavalry division, supported by troops of the 18th infantry division took Kunhegyes. The Romanian 1st infantry division attacked the Hungarian 6th infantry division head-on and pushed them back, managing to take Fegyvernek. The Romanian 6th division was less successful, being counterattacked on the left flank by the Hungarian reserve formations. In total, on the 24th of July, the Romanians managed to push the Hungarians back some 20 km and retake the initiative. They reinforced the maneuver group with troops from the North, which became available when the fighting decreased in intensity there. These included the 2nd Vânători division and some cavalry units. The Romanian troops along the entire front received the order to attack the enemy the next day. On the 25th of July the fighting continued, being particularly violent on the front of the Romanian 1st infantry division, in and around Fegyvernek, where the Hungarians chose to counterattack. Towards the end of the day, the Romanians maneuver group started breaking through the Hungarian positions in the north. Also, Hungarian positions in the south were overrun. The Hungarians started a general retreat towards the Tisza bridge in front of Szolnok, which they blew up on the 26th of July in order to stop the Romanians from following them. On the evening of 26 July, the entire east bank of the Tisza was again under firm Romanian control.
The Romanians cross the Tisza
After repulsing the Hungarian attack, the Romanians started planning to cross the Tisza and deliver the final blow to Soviet Hungary, despite some opposition from the Allied council. They brought the 7th infantry division back from the Bessarabian front, where the Russians were holding still, and also the 2nd infantry division as well as some smaller infantry and artillery units. For crossing the Tisza the Romanian command prepared 119 battalions with some 84 000 troops, 99 artillery batteries with 392 guns and 60 cavalry squadrons with 12 000 men. The Hungarians made efficient use of their artillery, attacking the Romanian concentration areas. Between 27 and 29 July, the Romanians tested the strength of the Hungarian defense with small attacks. They finally decided to cross the Tisza in the vicinity of Fegyvernek, where the river makes a turn. On the night of 29th to 30 July, the Romanians crossed the Tisza. The main crossing at Fegyvernek was covered by decoy operations on other points of the front, where intense artillery duels took place. The Romanians managed to surprise the Hungarians at Fegyvernek who decided on the 31st of July to abandon the Tisza line and retreat towards Budapest.
The debacle of the Hungarian Army
After the bulk of the Romanian troops crossed the Tisza, they started advancing towards Budapest. The Romanian cavalry covered the flanks of the main body of troops and tried to discover the points of concentration of the Hungarian Army. At the same time, it severed the links between the different corps of the Hungarian Army. On the 1st of August, most fighting took place in the south, in and around Szolnok, the town having been severely affected by the fighting. At the end of the day, the Hungarians sent representatives to negotiate their surrender. In the center and in the north, the Hungarian troops were completely surrounded by the evening of the 3rd of August and the units start to surrender or to disintegrate. The 3rd of August saw the end of the Hungarian Red Army. [edit]
The Romanians occupy Budapest
The Romanians continued their push towards Budapest. The first Romanian units to enter Budapest on the evening of the 3rd of August were three squadrons of the 6th cavalry regiment of the 4th brigade, under the command of Gen. Rusescu. The 400 men with two artillery guns were the only forces to occupy the city until midday on the 4th of August, when the bulk of the Romanian forces entered Budapest and a parade took place through the center of the city in front of their commander, Gen. Moşoiu. The Romanian troops continued their advance until they stopped in Győr. [edit]
Casualties, prisoners and war booty
The third phase of the Hungarian–Romanian War saw the most intense fighting of the entire conflict. The Romanians lost 123 officers and 6 434 soldiers: 39 officers and 1 730 soldiers dead, 81 officers and 3 125 soldiers wounded and three officers and 1 579 soldiers missing. Until the 8th of August 1919, they captured 1 235 officers and 40 000 soldiers, seized 350 guns, including two with a caliber of 305 mm, 332 machine guns, 52 000 rifles and 87 airplanes. They also seized large quantities of ammunition, and means of transportation.
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Post by oszkarthehun on Sept 7, 2010 9:07:04 GMT -5
I had read the wiki article in full before you posted it but it does not negate what I have said. Which is that Hungarians of the time including soldiers were in a demoralised state of dissaray, the idiot Kun had been waging red terror campaigns with his Lenin Fiu thugs throughout Hungary. In addition, a group of 200 armed men—known as the Lenin Boys—formed a mobile detachment under the leadership of József Cserny. This detachment was deployed at various locations around the country where counter-revolutionary movements were suspected to operate. The Lenin Boys, as well as other similar groups and agitators killed and terrorised many people (eg. armed with hand grenades and using their rifles' butts they disbanded religious ceremonies)[4]. They executed victims without trial[5]. This caused a number of conflicts with the local population, some of which turned violent.After a failed anti-communist coup attempt on June 24, Kun organized a response in the form of the Red Terror via the secret police, revolutionary tribunals and semi-regular detachments like Tibor Szamuely's bodyguards, the Lenin Boys. The numbers of victims were estimated to range from 370 to about 600 persons executed[5]; most sources list 590 proven killings. It has been argued that the major limiting factor on this suppression were the former Social Democrats such as József Pogány, relative moderate supports of Kun.The situation of the Hungarian Communists began to deteriorate when, after a failed coup by the Social Democrats on 24 June, the new Communist government of Antal Dovcsák resorted to large-scale reprisals. Revolutionary tribunals ordered executions of people who were suspected of having been involved in the attempted coup. This became known as the "Red Terror", and greatly reduced domestic support for the government.[/b] The Hungarian Soviet found it increasingly difficult to fight Czechoslovakia and later Romania with the small volunteer force, and support for both the war and the Communist Party were waning at home, partly due to the most dedicated Communists having volunteered for combat.The Soviet government lasted for 133 days, falling on August 1, 1919. The Soviet Republic had been formed to resist the Vix Note, and created the Hungarian Red Army to do so. Given the disparity in power between Hungary and the Allies, Hungarian chances for victory were slim at best. To buy time, Kun tried to negotiate with the Allies, meeting the South African Prime Minister, General Jan Smuts at a summit in Budapest in April. Agreement proved impossible, and Hungary was soon at war later in April with the Kingdom of Romania and Czechoslovakia, both aided by France. The Hungarian Red Army achieved some success against the Czechoslovaks, taking much of Slovakia by June.
However, the Hungarians were repeatedly defeated by the Romanians. By the middle of July 1919, Kun decided to stake everything on an offensive against the Romanians. The Allied Commander in the Balkans, the French Marshal Louis Franchet d'Esperey wrote to Marshal Ferdinand Foch on July 21, 1919: "We are convinced that the Hungarian offensive will collapse of its own accord... When the Hungarian offensive is launched, we shall retreat to the line of demaracation, and launch the counteroffensive from that line. Two Romanian brigades will march from Romania to the front in the coming days, according to General Fertianu's promise. You, see, Marshal, we have nothing to fear from the Hungarian army. I can assure you that the Hungarian Soviets will last no more than two or three weeks. And should our offensive not bring the Kun regime down, its untenable internal situation surely will[6]. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B%C3%A9la_Kun
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Post by Catcher in the Rye on Sept 7, 2010 10:05:23 GMT -5
And what does that prove? The Romanians were attacked by the Hungarian army and defeated the Hungarians on their own without any help from the French who were in the south together with the Serbians and were not involved (I don't know how many French there were but I doubt they were in significant numbers).
That part is a lie, if you have read the description of the conflict, the French did nothing to help Romania (who didn't needed help in the first place) and more importantly they did nothing to help the Czechoslovakians who badly needed it. Even more, what Allies did was to help the Hungarians by not allowing any Romanian advance over the Tisa to finish the deal. That's why all the Romanian troops could do to help the Czechoslovakians was to make noise near the Tisa. That didn't troubled the Hungarians at all who realize they are free to do as they please. If you call that help from the Allies, you must be joking. So can you give any examples of the way the Allies were helping Romanians apart from trying to stop our advance?
In the end Allies did help the Czechoslovakians after they were defeated but that's all, the proper fightings were mano-a-mano.
Also:
In reality that French guy never moved his arse from his bed. He's saying that if the Hungarians will not behave, the Serbs, French, Czechoslovakians and Romanians will all do something like a counteroffensive?. The reality? The Serbs, French and Czechoslovakians never did a move.
You can try finding as many excuses as you like, the cause of the defeat were not the Allies (who in fact indirectly helped you), not the ratio of troops (which was roughly 1:1), not the equipment (for example the Hungarians had superior artillery while the Romanians had superior numbers in cavalry) and probably not the quality of troops. The military leadership was to blame otherwise why calling the Szekely division - elite and the best of the Hungarian army while all they did is surrender with no fight? You can't say there that the troops were "in a demoralised state of dissaray".
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wbb
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Post by wbb on Sept 8, 2010 2:01:35 GMT -5
bs, if it wasnt for ur little Entente allies support, and the support of France who had been supported by the Americans, Romania would never invade Hungary. Like Oskar said Hungarians were de-moralised, while Romanians were still in constant support of France and her allies. Your Latin friend did all they can to de-moralise Hungary and support Romania with everything so that Romania can easily bring Hungary into anarchy.
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Post by oszkarthehun on Sept 10, 2010 11:57:30 GMT -5
If you read through the article you posted it seems the Hungarians made a preemptive strike but the Romanians were already preparing for war and had already been bugging their Entente pals for permission for the Romanians to oust Hungarian authorities which sounds like they were asking for permission to attack.
Two new infantry divisions, the 16th and the 18th, were organized from Romanian soldiers previously mobilized in the Austro-Hungarian Army. On February 28, the Allied council decided to notify Hungary of the new demarcation line to which the Romanian Army would advance. The Romanian delegation at the Peace Conference in Paris requested that the Romanian Army be allowed to oust the Hungarian communists from power. Although well aware of the communist danger, the Allied council was marked by dissension between the US president Woodrow Wilson, the British prime minister David Lloyd George, and the French prime minister Georges Clemenceau about the guarantees required by France for its borders with Germany. In particular, the American delegation was convinced that French hardliners around Marshal Foch were trying to initiate a new conflict that would eventually lead to a new war, this time against Germany and the Soviet Union. Acting on these premises, the participants at the conference tried to defuse the situation in Hungary. [/b]
Aware of the Romanian preparations, the Hungarians fortified the mountain passes in their possession and launched a preemptive attack on the night between April 15th and 16th.
As is stated in your article Romanians already had battle plan to attack Hungarians on April 16th.
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Your article implies that comparatively many of the Hungarian troops were made up of volunteers. Also much of the Hungarian army that was put together to fight in Transylvania was just a very quickly put together unit, much of it through recruitment centres in various locations it was not except for the Szekely Unit a long standing army that had trained together for any length of time, it was mostly a ragtag army of recently volunteered recruits.
to quote your article ...
Kun managed to mobilize another 60,000 in the second line by the use of recruitment centers in Oradea, Gyula, Debrecen, and Szolnok, among others. This Hungarian Army was a mix of some elite units and officers from the former Austro-Hungarian Army, and poor-quality volunteers
The Romanian battle plan was to strike with the more powerful Northern Group and take Carei and Oradea, thus separating the elite Szekely division from the rest of the Hungarian Army, made primarily of volunteers. Then the Group should proceed with the flanking of the Hungarian Army. At the same time, the Southern Group would advance only up to Radna and Beiuº, and then serve as pivot for the flanking maneuver of the Northern Group. The overall advance was to stop only at the Tisza river. The start of the offensive was planned for April 16.
We see from the above paragraph that Romanians had already planned to attack Hungarians on April 16th.
Romanians were planning to attack Hungarian authorities in Transylvania and were pressing the Entente for excuses to invade Hungary. They obviously knew Hungary was in a weakened position with unstable Government a ragtag army not to mention they had the support of the Entetnte. The French officers comments illustrate that Hungary was in a state of internal decay and instability as he said the Soviet Republic was bound to implode with or without the Romanians defeating the Hungarians.
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wbb
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Post by wbb on Sept 11, 2010 5:08:19 GMT -5
Dont worry, Catcher of the Retards. It's seems to me that Romanians have trouble of pushing the so-called "asian" Hungarians out of Europe since Hungarians are strategically in Central Europe but Romanian inhabits further to the East along with the Black Sea. Maybe it Hungarians turn now, to pushed all the illiterate, racist Romanians to the middle of the Black Sea. So Romanians can set up their Romania in the middle of the Black Sea and the Capital of Romania will be the "Black Sea" in the Middle of the Black Sea. The same methods of how Palestinians want to push their Israeli Jews to the Medditeranean sea, except for the native Palestinian Jews, they can remain in Palestine.
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Post by Anittas on Sept 11, 2010 15:20:32 GMT -5
Go ahead. Push us.
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wbb
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Post by wbb on Sept 12, 2010 5:05:06 GMT -5
We will if u guys dont behave.
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Post by Catcher in the Rye on Sept 13, 2010 8:53:23 GMT -5
We see from the above paragraph that Romanians had already planned to attack Hungarians on April 16th. The only reason for Romanian troops to attack was to avoid a later war on two fronts. The Romanian plans were for a preventive strike. The Russian Soviets declared war on Romania in 1918 while Romania was still in war with the Central Powers and the Russians were supposed to be our allies. Even before that it was chaos, Russian division in Romania and at the Romanian borders killed their officers and started plundering and killing in the Romanian villages. Adding to that those troops left huge holes on the front. In 1919 it seemed like a large Russian invasion was to follow, so it was common sense to make plans to take out at least one of the enemies as soon as possible. After 21 March 1919, Romania faced two communist neighbors: Hungary and the Soviet Russia. The Romanian delegation at the Peace Conference in Paris requested that the Romanian Army be allowed to oust the Hungarian communists from power.
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Meanwhile, Kun sought to gain time in order to be able to build up a military force able of waging war with Romania and Czechoslovakia.BTW this discution is draging so for me it is over.
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Post by oszkarthehun on Sept 15, 2010 19:11:59 GMT -5
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That may be one motivation, but I dont think it was the only reason. Romania wanted to take its possesion and control and secure its hold over Transylvania but more than that it wanted territory in Hungary also. It wanted whatever it could get.
Secondly as pointed out in my previous post, the troops on both sides were not equal, as Hungarian troops consisted mostly of poorly trained volunteers that had hust been conscripted at the last minute.
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wbb
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Post by wbb on Sept 16, 2010 8:18:18 GMT -5
U know what i think Oszkar? I think the Hungarian armies were making a big mistakes using symestrical tactics, they should of use the asymestrical tactics, using more of guerilla-partisan warfare, the hit and run tactics. Because the Romanian armies were bigger in numbers, so therefore, guerilla could of work. In this way, Hungarians would have the chance to organise and increase their morality.
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